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The essay charts forty years of Zionist history to illuminate the 
' 
remarkable evolution of Israel's unified, apolitical army and Israel's 
"democratic civil-military tradition," forged in the fires of opposing 
military styles, ideological rivalry, competing underground forces, war 
and civil war. 
During the years 1907-1919, the Yishuv acquired two different 
military traditions, the Pioneer-Soldier tradition and the Professional 
tradition. 
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During 1920-1931, the presence of the British Mandatory 
power and rising Arab Nationalist violence produced a third military 
tradition the "Underground," first developed by the early Hagana, woven 
into the fabric of the Socialist-Zionism. During the period 1931-1936, 
the Hagana became a focal point in the political polarization of the 
Zionist movement, producing the Rightist underground, the IZL (the 
Irgun). By early 1937, the Right and the Left each possessed 
undergrounds separated by oceans of ideology. 
The Arab Revolt and the oscillating British policy in the years 
1936-39 militarized the rival Jewish undergrounds. By the summer of 
1939, violent, dramatic revolution in Palestine seemed imminent. United 
against British immigration policies yet divided in their strategies for 
the future of Jewish Pales tine, the IZL and the Hagana faced the choice 
of forming a united Jewish resistance or of engaging in a futile civil 
war. 
During 1939-1945, the Yishuv struggled to help defeat the Axis 
powers, defend the Yishuv, promote the immigration of Jewish refugees, 
and accommodate an oscillating British policy. From this collage 
emerged distinct underground military bodies of the far Right and of the 
far Left. The far Left spawned the development of the Palmach, which, 
despite competition between the far Left bloc and Ben Gurion ... s MAPAI, 
became the elite corps of the Hagana. From the militant Right, two 
schisms evolved, the LHI (the Stern Group) and the IZL under Menachem 
Begin-- each armed with differing ideology, tactics, and purpose, yet 
both dedicated to ending the British Mandate. In 1944, the growing 
strength of the IZL and LHI "revolt" conflicted with the Anglo-Zionist 
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diplomacy, precipitating a joint Hagana-British campaign, the "Season," 
against the "dissidents." In 1945, the Season ended in failure, as the 
official Yishuv waited for the unveiling of post-war British policy. 
During the post-war period, 1945-1946, Britain's anti-Zionist 
policy united a 11 the undergrounds in a "Jewish Resistance Movement." 
Despite internal tensions, the underground union endured for nine 
months. But the dramatic events of the summer of 1946 fractured that 
unity. During 1946-1947, the Hagana-Palmach and the IZL-LHI forces 
waged in de pendent and conf lie ting campaigns. But by 1948, e sea la ting 
Arab-Jewish violence drove the IZL and Hagana-Palmach together, in an 
uneasy alliance for the sake of "national" survival. 
From May 1948 through 1950, the new State of Israel struggled 
against the Arabs, as Ben Gurion struggled to dissolve the underground 
organizations. In the spring of 1948, Ben Gurion eliminated the 
confusion in the Hagana-Palmach command structure, placing himself in 
the role as political and military leader of Israel. In the summer, the 
LHI dissolved and the IZL was destroyed in a showdown with the IDF in 
the "Altalena Affair." Yet the IZL and LHI continued to fight in 
Jerusalem until the IDF forced their total disbandment in the late 
summer. Finally, Ben Gurion mustered the political clout to disband the 
Palmach. As the War of Independence ended, Ben Gurion gained a 
political mandate to shape the new Army. During 1949-1950, Ben Gurion 
engineered the IDF into a united and professional army, under the 
ultimate command of the civilian government. By 1950, the seeds of 
Israel's "democratic civil-military tradition" were implanted. 
The essay utilizes mostly secondary sources and memoirs, weaving 
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political and military history together into thorough account of the 
political unification of the Israeli Army. 
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PREFACE 
The essay involves over forty years of Zionist history, a complex 
history which has been examined, researched, discussed, and written 
about prolifically. To carve a meaningful and unique thesis from the 
wealth of historical material, this essay is imbued with several 
important limitations. The cutting edge of the thesis only grazes such 
significant topics as British-Zionist relations, Arab-Zionist relations, 
and Zionist-International politics without thorough examination. 
Complex and still highly controversial events-- such as the bombing of 
the King David Hotel, the attack on Deir Yassin, or the Altalena 
Affair-- are key events to the development of the thesis, but the essay 
rarely attempts to arrive at a decisive judgment regarding specific 
de tails. In the interest of simplicity, only the most essential 
military and political events are mentioned. The essay also relies on a 
very traditional historical approach by attributing the opinions, 
decisions, and actions of a group to their leaders. Within these 
parameters, with the help of these "limitations," the essay hopes to cut 
a useful historical channel to explore the political evolution of the 
Israeli Army. 
I wish to extend my thanks to the Portland State University 
History Department for its assistance and to the faculty for their 
excellence. I offer my specia 1 thanks to my advisor, Dr. Jo.n 
Mandaville. And I express my warmest and deepest appreciation to my 
family and to my wife, Elaine, for their support and love. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The preservation of the representative, civilian government's 
control over the military s true tu re is the corners tone of a democratic 
civil-military tradition, and a democratic civil-military tradition is 
one of the foundations for a stable, unified democracy. In Israel, this 
fundamental democratic civil-military tradition persists. Despite six 
major wars, despite an intense domestic security situation, despite the 
polarization of Israeli politics, despite the constant involvement of 
the Israeli population with the military, "the Israeli formula for 
civil-military relations remains intact." 
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Israel's democratic civil-military tradition is particularly 
significant in view of the fact that the Israeli Defense Force, or the 
IDF, plays such an enormous role in Israeli society. The IDF defends, 
educates, socializes, and unifies Israel. The IDF remains a symbol of 
pride for the vast majority of Israelis who, at some level, participate 
in the armed services. The IDF is a symbol of constancy, of solidarity, 
of unity. The IDF's role and image in Israeli society clearly 
contributes to the IDF's emergence as the one of the most powerful small 
armies in the world. The IDF's character is particularly unusual when 
compared to the armies of various other young nations which have emerged 
in the post-World War II period. As Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime 
Minister and chief architect of the IDF, noted: 
Israel is almost the only country in the region ••• of the 
Middle East and the wider region of Asia and North Africa where 
the army plays no role in politics. As we live in a democratic 
state, every Israeli soldier has the right to vote and the right 
to be a member of a political party and any other legal 
organization. But the army itself, as the defense force of the 
country, sees itself only as an executive instrument of the 
e lee ted re pre sen ta ti ves of the people, and they a lone can te 11 
the army what to do and what not to do. In this respect, it is, 
of course, the same as any old-established democratic country in 
the world, but this, 1zi-ke democracy, is quite an accomplishment 
for a young country. 
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The achievement of a unified army under the control of a 
representative government is remarkable given Israel's circumstances: 
the continuing threat of war and of terrorism, the constant social and 
economic crises, and the intensity of political and ideological 
conflicts. Given the immense popularity of Israeli generals and given 
that almost the entire society, filled with diverse and uncompromising 
viewpoints, participates in the army, Israel appears as fertile soil for 
military corruption, military bullying in the political arena, armed 
revolt or coup d'etats. Yet after over thirty-six years of statehood, 
the IDF has never truly crossed the line separating civil authority from 
military responsibility. The military has sometimes abused its power, 
but governmen ta 1 and judicial inquiries, and Israel's free press, have 
often castigated soldiers, commanders, generals, Chiefs of Staff, and 
Defense Ministers. The Israeli representative government, the Knesset 
and the Cabinet, re ta ins power and u 1 ti mate command over the army. In 
essence, Israel has successfully established a democratic civil-military 
tradition. 
The establishment of Israel's democratic civil-military tradition 
appears even more re-markable in the light of Zionist history. Israel's 
military tradition evolved, not in centuries but in forty years, within 
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a culture long dispossessed of a military heritage, forged in the fires 
of opposing military styles, ideological rivalry, competing underground 
forces, war and civil war. 
NOTES I 
1Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: 1967-1977 
(London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1969), Vol.II, p2. 
2Moshe Perlman, Ben Gurion Looks Back (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1965), p 151. 
CHAPTER II 
DEFENSE ORIGINS OF LEFT AND RIGHT 
Not since the Bar Kochbah revolt in 135-36 C.E. did there exist an 
independent Jewish army and the image of the Jew as a "Warrior." After 
the expulsion of the Jews from the Land of Israel, they endured 1800 
years in the Diaspora as, more of ten than not, an oppressed minority 
dispossessed of the right to own land and subjected to the passions of 
the ruling majority. Within this con text of the "Exile," the Jewish 
people developed a rich and varied cultural tradition, but no tradition 
of Jewish soldiership. For generations, lacking rights to own land and 
to be citizens, Jews found no role as a soldier with no land nor rights 
to defend. The soldier usually became the symbol of the oppressing 
majority and rarely a Jewish symbol. But the Zionist movement of the 
nine teen th century stressed the re turn of the Jewish people to the land, 
to ti 11 the land and to build upon the land. From the genesis of 
Zionism there existed the implicit no ti on that if Jews were to again 
possess land and autonomy, then they eventually would need to organize 
themselves as a community to defend their land and their rights. 
In Ottoman Palestine of the late nineteenth century few armed 
Jewish watchmen existed within the seat tering of the isolated rural 
settlements which, along with the small urban religious communities, 
composed the Jewish Yishuv (settlement). These settlers, particularly 
the independent farmers, showed little interest defying Ottoman 
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authority and establishing a cooperative, independent Jewish defense 
organization. These farmers usually hired Moroccan or Circassian guards 
to protect their property from robbers and brigands roaming the 
countryside. The roots of collective Jewish self-defense are found in 
the first decade of the twentieth century with the coming of the "Second 
Ali ya, It composed of Eastern European Jews infused with 
Socialist-Zionism. Many of these immigrants had participated in 
revolutionary activities in Russia and the majority were members of the 
Poale Zion Party (Workers of Zion) established in 1902. The Jews of the 
"Second Ali ya" established co llec ti ve settlements in the Gali lee and 
Judea based on the belief that the redemption of Jewish people required 
their return to physical labor and to the soil. These settlements 
concentrated on the task of developing the soil and their Socialist 
communities, and initially followed the example of the independent 
farmers by hiring Arab watchmen. Yet, their commitment to community 
self-sufficiency, to the "Land," and to creating a new "physical Jew" 
would eventually lend itself to the creation of organized Jewish 
1 
se if-defense. 
In September, 1907, ten men gathered in Jaffa, Yitzak Ben-Zvi, 
Israel Giladi, and Israel Shochat among them, to establish a society 
called "Bar Giora" dedicated to the concept of Jewish se if-defense and 
repudiating the practice of hiring non-Jewish defenders. Bar Giora 
began its defense work at Sejera, in the Galilee, while Shochat traveled 
to various settlements trying to convert them to the idea of Jewish 
self-defense; but th~ vast majority of the Yishuv remained cool to the 
idea of an illegal Jewish defense organization. In late 1908 the Young 
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Turk Revolution brought a loosening of Ottoman authority in Palestine 
which was preceded by widespread violence and crime. The Jewish village 
of Mescha dismissed its Moroccan guards and hired two members of Bar 
Giora whose effective defense work strengthened Bar Giora's reputation 
within the Yishuv. In 1909, Shochat and his comrades expanded the 
organization to include more settlements and renamed themselves 
"HaShomar" (the Watchman). 
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By 1910 most of the collective Jewish settlements in the lower 
Galilee were being protected by HaShomarim cells. By 1914 HaShomarim 
were hired to protect many collective communities in Samaria and in 
Judea, and they were even active on several major coastal, independently 
owned, plantations. At its peak, HaShomar was composed of about 200 
members and possessed about 100 men on call for active duty. Regardless 
of their acceptance of the mercenary-like method of being hired as 
watchman, HaShomar did so in order to spread their be lief in Jewish 
self-defense. They remained wedded to the ideals of Socialist-Zionism. 
They considered themselves the vanguard of the activist, 
nation-building, Left. They were a cohesive group dedicated to 
Socialism, Jewish Nationalism, and self-defense. Their headquarters at 
Sejera, in the Galilee, represented a model of Socialist and Jewish 
Nationalist achievement. Despite their growing numbers and reputation, 
HaShomar consciously remained a voluntary, nonprofessional security 
force in keeping with their philosophy that all Jewish farmers where 
capable of self-defense. Their appeal remained limited: HaShomar's union 
with Socialist ide~logy repelled independent farmers, middle-class 
urbanites, and the religious; and HaShomar's individualist, elitist, and 
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aggressive tone alienated orthodox Marxists and Pacifists, generating 
friction be tween them and many egalitarian communities. Furthermore, 
HaShomar remained illegal under Turkish law and no single event had 
occurred to inspire mass Jewish self-defense throughout the Yishuv. 
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When World War I broke out in the summer of 1914, many HaShomarim 
urged the Turkish government to form Jewish military uni ts in the 
interest of gaining post-war recognition for Zionism in Istanbul. At 
first, the Turkish government agreed to a proposal submitted by 
HaShomarim Ben-Zvi and David Ben Gurion, and began training about forty 
volunteers near Jerusalem; however, the Turks, wary of Jewish loyalties 
and connections, preceded to expel about 18,000 Palestinian Jews and 
arrest many of the HaShomarim. As the war progressed, Turkish policy 
hardened against the Yishuv. The Jewish community suffered terrible 
hardships and thousands died of starvation. After the Turks discovered 
in September, 1917, the espionage network known as "NILI," directed by 
the Aaronson family and Avshalom Feinberg, which informed on Turkish 
military activity in the region for British intelligence, only the 
imminence of the Allied invasion saved the en tire Yishuv from Turkish 
retaliation. Some HaShomarim survived brutal mistreatment in Turkish 
prisons for the duration of the war, but HaShomar only symbolically 
survived as an organization until it officially dissolved in May, 1919. 
Still, the former HaShomarim remained an influential political bloc in 
the 1920s which continued to advocated a militant, leftist program for 
the Yishuv. 
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Though HaShomar failed to become a mass Jewish 
self-defense force, it had provided an example of independent Jewish 
armed resistance, most significantly, amongst the rural collective 
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settlements. For the entire Yishuv, Bar Giora and HaShomar spawned a 
rich heroic legacy and cast a new image of the modern "Jewish warrior." 
World War I provided many young Zionists with military experience 
in the British Army and produced much of Zionism's future leadership. 
Jewish involvement with the British forces began with the approximately 
10,000 Palestinian Jews expelled by the Turks in March, 1915 who found 
asylum in Alexandria, Egypt. Two young Jews, Joseph Trumpe ldor, a 
Russian Army veteran, and Vladimir Jabotinsky, who came from Odessa, 
joined the refugees in Alexandria to advocate the immediate formation of 
a "Jewish Legion" to fight for the Allies against the Turks. Both 
Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky envisioned that Jewish participation in a 
British conquest of Palestine would obtain the support of the British 
Empire for the Zionist cause. By the end of 1915, after successfully 
overcoming stiff resistance from the British military authorities 
towards the founding of a Jewish Legion, Trumpeldor and Jabotinsky 
managed to achieve British consent for a transportation unit called the 
"Zion Mule Corps." A total of 650 Palestinian Jews volunteered for the 
Zion Mule Corps, including Ben Zvi and David Ben Gurion. Under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Patterson, the Zion Mule Corps 
served with distinction in the ill-fated British invasion of Gallipoli. 
Throughout 1915-1916, Jabotinsky and Chaim Weizmann, a prominent 
British scientist who was rapidly gaining stature as Zionism's foremost 
re pre sen ta ti ve in London, continued to push the British authorities to 
form a Jewish combat battalion to participate in the inevitable Allied 
offensive in Palestine. By the end of 1916, the remainder of the Zion 
Mule Corps gained the status of a "Jewish Legion," but was transferred 
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to the British Isles to guard the "home front," where it soon disbanded 
in early 1917, refusing to fight in the Irish Rebellion. Though 
Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor continued to press for a Jewish combat 
battalion, the British War Office remained suspicious and hostile to the 
idea of an Allied Jewish force involved in any way in the Palestine 
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campaign. 
Yet by mid-1917,Weizmann was gradually drawing support for Zionism 
and a Jewish Legion in London. In the Spring of 1917, the British War 
Office finally approved the formation of a Jewish regiment, the 38th 
Royal Fusiliers, recruited from the Jewish refugees in Alexandria, 
including 120 of the original Zion Mule Corps. In October the 38 th 
accompanied Allenby in the invasion of Palestine. During the struggle 
in Palestine, Weizmann achieved the culmination of his diplomatic 
efforts with British statesmen in London when the Balfour Declaration· 
was proclaimed on November 2, 1917, which promised British support for 
Zionism and which seemingly, justified Jewish military cooperation with 
Allenby's forces. By December Allenby's troops conquered most of 
Pales tine including Jerusalem, but the Turks still possessed the north 
and Allenby's offensive stalled. 
While the British prepared for the future northern offensive, 
Jabo tinsky concentrated on recruiting Jews from the Pales tine community 
which was still recovering from Turkish wartime occupation. By that 
summer, Jabotinsky and other Legionnaires managed to assemble over 1,000 
recruits from the Palestine community. From the Palestine recruits and 
from over 2,700 Jewish volunteers from England, Canada, and America, the 
39th and the 40th Battalions were also formed in the winter and spring 
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of 1918. In the spring, the Jewish battalions were assigned to guard the 
Jordan Valley and, in June, the 38th was transferred to Jerusalem. At 
this stage, Jewish troops amounted to more than 5,000 men or over 
one-sixth of Allenby's total force. 
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In response to the pleas of Patterson, the British War Office 
reluctantly permitted the Jewish battalions to participate in the 
northern offensive launched in the fall of 1918. As the battle drew to 
a close, Trumpeldor envisioned the Jewish Legion as an essential tool to 
develop the Yishuv, while Jabotinsky perceived of the Legion as the 
instrument for obtaining influence with the British Government. Yet, 
with Allen by' s vie torious offensive, Anglo-Jewish military cooperation 
had reached its zenith. Soon after the British signed the armistice with 
Turkey on October 31, British collaboration with the Jewish soldiers 
became a liability to British occupation policy. Despite the protests 
of Zionist leaders, the Jewish Legion underwent a process of swift 
demobilization, completed in the summer of 1919. Nevertheless, the 
Jewish Legion experience had given military to training thousands of 
young Zion is ts and instilled a British military men ta 1i ty in to many who 
emerged as the post-war leaders of the Yishuv. 
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By the end of World War I, two distinct military traditions were 
already cemented in to the foundations of the Yishuv: the HaShomar or 
"Pioneer" tradition residing primarily within many collective 
settlements and the Jewish Legion or "Professional" tradition inculcated 
into many who fought with the British Army. The HaShomar tradition 
merged together So~ialist-Zionism and Jewish self-defense, in the 
fashion of the G'dud HaAvodah (The Labor Legion), armed labor battalions 
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who extended Jewish settlement into hostile regions, which originated in 
1917 under the leadership and inspiration of Trumpeldor. The G' dud 
HaAvodah stressed the primacy of the "Pioneer-Soldier" in Zionism's 
"conquest of labor" and "conquest of the land." The Jewish Legion 
tradition, advocated by Ja bo tin sky, fostered the regard for 
non-political, professional soldiers dedicated solely to national 
self-defense. Jabotinsky advocated a Jewish Army recruited from the 
entire Yishuv population, to serve to make the Yishuv a valuable ally to 
the British and, ultimately, to guard a Jewish nation. Yet these 
mili tary-poli tica 1 outlooks remained dormant as British occupation of 
Palestine solidified, promising imperial authority and protection to the 
Yishuv. 
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Post-World War I Palestine witnessed the establishment of the 
British Mandate, the formation of the Yishuv's community government 
under the auspices of the Mandatory regime, and the intensification of 
Arab Nationalism. The Yishuv's representative bodies, the newly formed 
"Zionist Executive in Palestine" (later called the Jewish Agency) and 
the "Vaad Leumi" (Na tiona 1 Assembly), because of their proximity to the 
Mandatory government and because of the faith of leaders like Weizmann, 
believed in Britain's commitment to building a Jewish National Home and 
that British forces in Palestine would safeguard the Yishuv. The Arab 
riots of 1919-1921 shocked the Yishuv which had complacently depended 
upon the Mandatory Government's pro tee ti on. 
The Arab Nationalist wave of violence which began in the Galilee 
in late 1919 caught ~ewish northern settlements off guard. The 300-400 
Jewish Legonnaires who remained in the British Army were confined to 
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their barracks, while former Legionnaries who tried to organize an 
improvisa tiona 1 defense of the Yishuv were of ten arrested by British 
Mandatory Po 1 ice. In February of 1920, attacks of Arab guerrillas 
intensified in the Galilee. Northern settlements improvised independent 
and disorganized defenses. Among those killed in the attack on Tel Hai 
was Trumpeldor, regarded as the proto-type of the modern Jewish 
"Pioneer-Soldier." 
At the same time, since the British remained unwilling to 
forcefully suppress the violence and most of the Yishuv leadership 
remained uncertain of how to react within the con text of the Mandatory 
regime, Jabotinsky initiated the formation of former Legionnaries and 
other followers into the Yishuv's first "Hagana," or defense group. 
Jabotinsky's Hagana countered Arab violence in April by defending the 
Jewish side of Jerusalem. But when Jabotinsky's Hagana went on the 
offensive, storming the gates of Jerusalem's old city, they were stopped 
and arrested by the British authorities. 
For his leadership efforts in defending Jerusalem in the spring of 
1920, Jabontinsky's political followers consider him the "founder of the 
Hagana." Al though his defense group of the spring of 1920 was not the 
direct parent organization of what would later be called the "Hagana," 
it was the first showing of urban self-defense within the Yishuv. 
Jabotinsky's defense efforts did exemplify the need and the 
possibilities for Jewish self-defense in spite of the Mandatory presence 
and opposition; however, the urban middle-class, their livelihood 
seemingly entwined ~ith their Arab neighbors and with Mandatory 
authority, remained re luc tan t to engage in organizing illega 1 
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self-defense. Even after the bloody riots in Jaffa, in May of 1921, 
which claimed 47 Jewish lives and wounded 148 until the British Police 
finally suppressed the violence, the Jewish urban middle-class remained 
unconvinced by Jabotinsky's example and failed 
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underground defense group. 
to mobilize an 
Meanwhile, the mounting Jewish deaths and casualties in the 
countryside, where the Mandatory Police proved either unwilling or 
unable to offer adequate protection, forced the leaders of the Yishuv's 
rural collective settlements to react. In June 1920, the Achdut 
HaAvodah Party, composed mostly of constituents from the former Poeli 
Zion Party under the leadership of Ben-Gurion and re pre sen ting the 
majority of the rural collective settlements, established a Defense 
Committee which allocated funds for the procurement of arms and the 
training of officers. The Achdut HaAvodah committee, headed by Eliyahu 
Golomb and Dov Hoz, envisioned broad-based "Workers' Militias" organized 
at the local level, among the various collective settlements and labor 
unions, on a purely voluntary basis and lacking any centralized 
authority. The scheme appealed particularly to the collective rural 
settlements, isolated from the protection of the Mandatory police 
forces, because the scheme followed in the spirit of the HaShomar 
tradition, easily meshing with the structure of Socialist-Zionism. 
As the largest party within the "Histadrut," (the general 
federation of labor founded in 1920, composed of both socialist and 
non-socialist unions throughout the Yishuv), the Achdut HaAvodah Party 
eventually gained marginal financial support for their defense group 
from the Histadrut. At the same time, factions of G'dud HaAvodah and 
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ex-HaShomarim challenged the Defense Committee, attempting to establish 
a more militant defense organization and direct the Yishuv down a more 
Marxist-revolutionary path. But Ben Gurion, Golomb, and the moderates 
prevailed within the Histadrut. By June of 1921, the militant far Left 
accepted the authority of the Defense Committee, which became loosely 
tied to the Histadrut and, therefore, to a relatively broad political 
base. 
Despite a lack of sufficient funds and chronic arms procurement 
problems, the early Hagana began training officers, purchasing illegal 
weapons, and building secret armories by the end of 1920, under the 
command of Yi tzhak Sadeh and Golomb. But since Palestine remained 
relatively peaceful in the years 1922-1928, the early Hagana remained 
small and subordinate to the concern for agricultural development. The 
early Hagana remained localized, with no mobile units and with an 
entirely defensive military posture, dependent on the socialist 
settlements for funds, weapons caches, and manpower. From its 
inception, the Hagana was rooted in the rural collectives and in the 
Socialist-Zionist movement. lO 
Because of its association with the Achdut HaAvodah Party and the 
collective settlements, the early Hagana encountered opposition from 
different sources. Some smaller parties of the far Left opposed the 
early Hagana on pacifist principles or because some believed that Jewish 
militancy interfered with the goal of international proletariat 
solidarity. The religious parties felt uncomfortable with the entire 
notion of the Jewish militancy as a product of the "abhorrent" 
secular-Zionist cul tu re. But by far the strongest resistance to the 
16 
early Hagana came from the conservative urban middle-class and 
right-wing parties which feared the emergence of a "Red Militia" 
germinating in the rural socialist collectives. The violence of 
1919-1921 illuminated a profound gulf in self-defense attitudes within 
the Yishuv among political and regional lines. The opposition to a 
unified Jewish underground defense organization was symtoma tic of the 
deep divisions within the Yishuv and the Zionist movement over Zionism's 
political-social-economic goals. 
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Indeed by the 1920s, the polarity of the Zionist Movement, between 
the Right and the Left, began to emerge. The dichotomy became 
accentuated within the Yishuv by both the growth of the Labor Movement, 
pro-socialist in varying degrees, and the growth of a non-socialist 
middle-class. The "Third Aliya," 1919-1925, added thousands of Eastern 
European Jews, committed to Socialist-Zionism and agricultural labor, to 
the ranks of the Yishuv. This group, who regarded themselves as the 
elite cadre of Socialist-Zionism, had a tremendous impact on the 
development of institutions of the Zionist Left; in particular, the 
formation of HaKibbutz HaMeuchad (United Kibbutz Movement) which swiftly 
became the largest Socialist-Agricultural movement and the most 
enthusiastic advocate for vigilant self-defense units of the Hagana 
based in the collective settlements: a mili tary-poli tica 1 program 
descending directly from the HaShomar tradition. 
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The Third Aliya also contained thousands of mostly Polish Jews of 
middle-class backgrounds who settled in the three major cities: Haifa, 
Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. This urban middle-class organized 
non-socialist unions which joined the Histadrut, and formed centralist 
17 
or right-wing parties represented in the Vaad Leumi and in the WZO, the 
World Zionist Organization. The largest rightist party, the Revisionist 
Party, founded in 1925 by Jabotinsky, opposed the posture of the WZO 
towards the British Mandate and the influence of the socialist parties 
upon the character and des tiny of the Yishuv. Jabotinsky attacked the 
"Prac ti ca 1 Zionist" guide lines set by WZO President Weizmann, of the 
centralist General Zionist Party, for the gradual development of the 
Yishuv based on land purchases in Palestine from funds collected from 
the contributions of World Jewry, under the protection and authority of 
the Mandatory regime. Jabotinsky and the Revisionists advocated 
"Poli ti ca 1 Zionism," pressuring Britain politically to facilitate a 
massive Jewish immigration to Palestine and demanding full Anglo-Zionist 
partnership in establishing a Jewish state which would be politically 
and economically allied to the capitalistic West. The Revisionist 
platform called for Jewish hegemony over "greater Palestine" both sides 
of Jordan River (including Transjordan) enforced by a 
professional, national Jewish Army: a 
descending from the Jewish Legion tradition. 




The wave of Arab Na tiona list violence which stuck Pales tine in 
1929 again caught the Yishuv unprepared and overturned many of popular 
assumptions about defense. The British Mandatory forces, offguard, 
responded to the violence after most of the damage to lives and property 
had been done. London's political response attempted to appease Arab 
Nationalists, symbolized by the Passfield White Paper of 1930, which 
restricted Jewish immigration and land purchasing by the Zionist 
movement, apparently refuting the promises implicit in the Balfour 
18 
Dec la ration. Largely because of Weizmann ... s diplomacy, the Passfield 
White Paper was revoked, but the episode illustrated to the Yishuv at 
large that Great Britain possessed her own interests in Palestine apart 
from Zionist aspirations. The unmistakable shift of British policy 
triggered a growing awareness that, on critical matters of community 
survival, the Mandatory government couldnut be relied upon and that the 
Yishuv must become more self-reliant. 
The 1929 riots revealed the inadequacy of the Hagana as developed 
in the early 1920s. Without proper coordination of units, training, and 
arms, local Hagana units stationed at the rural settlements managed to 
repel most attacks in the countryside, but they could not prevent the 
slaughters in Hebron and Safad, nor the attacks on Jewish businesses in 
Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv. Both sides of the political spectrum voiced 
support for expanding the Yishuv's self-defense. 
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The Histadrut, which had assumed increasing responsibility for 
funding the Hagana, requested the Jewish Agency to form a Defense 
Committee composed of representatives from all political parties in 
proportion to their strength. In theory, the proposal ... s approval 
created a "Na tiona 1 Command," a Yishuv-wide, underground defense 
organization under the legally elected Yishuv government. In reality, 
the Hagana remained under the sponsorship of the Histadrut. Ben Gurion, 
then Secretary-General of the Histadrut, and Chaim Arlosoroff, head of 
the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, called for the 
enlargement of the Hagana in the settlements and in the cities. In 
1930, the Hagana solicited funds directly from the WZO Congress in 
Geneva. Despite the growing strength of the Left in Palestine, in the 
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Histadrut and in the Vaad Leumi, the power in the WZO in the early 1930s 
still rested with Weizmann and the centralist General Zionists. The 
General Zionists still believed in the ultimate protection of the 
British Mandate and stressed the financing of the Yishuv' s economic, 
demographic, and social development over defense spending. In addition, 
the General Zionists, supported by the right-wing parties, objected to 
giving the Socialists additional military power and a monopoly over the 
Yishuv' s defense. The Center and the Right successfully blocked the 
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proposal. 
The Hagana remained financially tied to the His tadru t which was 
increasingly dominated by the Socia list-Zionist Left. The failure of 
the Hagana to gain the financial backing of the WZO triggered an effort 
by former HaShomar militants to force the His tadru t to split from the 
WZO. Ben Gurion, Golomb, and other moderates defeated this proposition, 
but these tensions between the Left and the WZO at large damaged the 
Yishuv-wide appeal of the Hagana. The Hagana continued to suffer from a 
shortage of funds, from a difficulty recruiting new immigrants, and, 
with few exceptions, from problems with establishing units in urban 
areas. The Socialist collectives remained 
particularly the collective settlements of 
the Hagana's strongholds, 
Kibbutz HaMeuhad(United 
Kibbutz Movement), and the Hagana's "National" Headquaters consisted of 
one small office in Tel Aviv. While the Hagana did manage to recruit 
some non-Socialist, defense-minded, urbanites, they generally saw it as 
an auxiliary police force for those times when Mandatory protection 
failed; whereas the rural Socialists viewed the Hagana as the nucleus 
the Yishuv' s defense. The Hagana, by attempting to solicit defense 
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funds from the WZO and establishing a "National Command" under the 
Jewish Agency, had taken the first steps toward creating a unified 
defense force to protect the entire Yishuv; however, the Hagana, still 
linked to the collective settlements for manpower and to the Histadrut 
for funds, remained entrenched within the Socialist-Zionist Movement. 
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The Hagana's entrenchment in Socialist-Zionism caused a rupture of 
the organization in 1931. Ignited by a controversy in the Jerusalem 
branch of the Hagana between Socialists and non-Socialists over tactics 
in response to Arab rioting and a secret weapons cache of Hagana 
weapons and ammunition, the majority of the non-Socialists split from 
the Hagana and formed a separate defense organization called "Hagana 
B". The Hagana B unit in Jerusalem was soon joined by units in Safad, 
Haifa, and Tel Aviv, eventually amounting to some 2500 members. Under 
the leadership of Avraham Tehomi, Hagana B tried to maintain a 
non-political posture, in the Professional-Jewish Legion tradition, and 
avoid any alliance with a specific party or bloc. 
Yet, constantly threatened by the Hagana to return their weapons 
and to disband, and without a political platform, Hagana B remained an 
isolated, ill-equipped, and ineffectual force. Remaining po li ti ca lly 
neutral proved impossible. Desperate for funds, Tehomi contacted 
Jabotinsky in Europe to suggest a military organization backed by the 
Revisionist party, but Jabotinsky still envisioned a legal Jewish Army 
sponsored by the British and rejected the scheme. Tehomi failed to 
recruit many troops from the unaffiliated rural and urban middle-class, 
while groups of "Betar," the Revisionist youth movement, in Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem responded enthusiastically. Eventually, Tehomi signed a 
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recruitment and cooperative agreement with Betar cells. Since most of 
his troops were Genera 1 Zion is ts, Mizrachi (religious), and Be tarim or 
Revisionists, Tehomi could not prevent Hagana B's gradual drift to the 
Right. The formation of Hagana B, and its subsequent move towards the 
Right, further emphasized the Hagana 's iden tif ica ti on with the Left, 
weakened the Hagana's platform to serve as the sole "National" defense 
organization, and symbolized the growing polarization of the Socialists 
and non-Socialists in the Yishuv. 
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In the 1930s, the Socialist-Zionist movement continued growing in 
numbers and political influence. The world political climate favored 
the enthusiastic growth of Socialist movements. Both the Fourth Aliya 
(1925-1930) and the Fifth Aliya (1930-1938) brought thousands of 
Socia list-Zionists from Eastern Europe who boosted the strength of the 
agricultural collectives and Socialist labor unions in the developihg 
cities, so that the strength of Socialist-Zionism expanded beyond 
rural-urban lines. By the mid-1930s, the labor parties represented the 
largest bloc in both the WZO and the Vaad Leumi. In 19 3 3 , the Labor 
bloc accounted for 44% of the seats in the WZO. The appeal of the Labor 
Movement was broadened by the creation in 1930 of the MAPAI party, a 
result of the merger of the two largest Socialist parties in the Yishuv, 
Avdot HaAvodah and Hapoel HaTzair. In 1931 MAPAI captured 47% of the 
vote in the Vaad Leumi. Under the leadership of Ben Gurion and 
Arlosoroff, MAPAI became less oriented towards an orthodox Socialist 
ideology and more oriented towards Zionist-Nationalist concerns, 
summarized in Ben Gurion's motto," from a class to a nation." By 1941, 
MAPAI was composed of 20,000 members, 65% of whom came from rural 
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settlements and 35% from the cities. Ben Gurion viewed himself as a 
"synthetic" Zionist, who welded together a coordinated political and 
practical program. Ben Gurion led a broad coalition of 
Socialist-Nationalist-Zionists under the banner of MAPAI which dominated 
Yishuv politics for three decades, and which also dominated the 
leadership of the Hagana. 
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Paralleling the growth of the Labor Movement in the early 1930s, 
the Hagana managed to increase illegal arms purchases, placed local 
units under a regional command, formalized its officer training, and, 
perhaps most importantly, instated training in field-defense rather than 
static defense behind fixed positions. Mobile military tactics implied 
the Hagana .... s na tiona 1, rather than strictly loca 1, security concerns. 
Behind the competent leadership of men like Golomb and Yitshak Sadeh, 
the Hagana slowly overcame the problems of an underground defense 
organization, riding on the shoulders of the growing Socia list-Zionist 
movement. 
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The 1930s also witnessed the continued growth of the Revisionist 
Party both in Palestine and in the Diaspora. The Fifth Aliya brought 
middle and upper-class Polish and German Jews, allowed to escape Nazi 
oppression until 1938, who settled in urban centers of Palestine and 
boosted the ranks of right-wing parties. The Revisionist Party 
strengthened its roots with the development of Jabotinsky's Betar youth 
movement, which grew swiftly in the 1930s, numbering 78,000 members in 
twenty-six different countries by 1938. The movement emphasized 
military education and training, party discipline and uniforms, and mass 
gymnastics and processions, very much in the style of the great Fascist 
23 
move men ts sweeping the world. Yet Jabotinsky, Be tar, and the 
Revisionists were not Fascists, for they were democratic in ideology and 
in practice; but their emphasis on industrial and entrepreneurial 
development of of the Yishuv, on a "maximalist" vision for a Jewish 
State, and on the alliance of Jewish Palestine to "Western Capitalism" 
placed them at odds with Socialist-Zionism. 
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In the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine and in the WZO, mirroring the 
international political climate, fear and hostility fermented between 
Right and Left, between the Socialist-Zionist movement and the 
Revisionist movement. Socialist-Zionists considered the Revisionists to 
be "Fascists," and the Revisionists considered the Socia list-Zionists 
"Bolsheviks." In June of 1933, Arlosoroff's murder intensified the 
hatred between the Left and the Right. Although the three Revisionists 
accused of the crime, Avraham .S tavsky, Zvi Rosenblatt, and Abba Ahimer, 
were tried and a.cqui tted by a Mandatory court, the Leftist press and 
leadership vehemently condemned Jabotinsky, Be tar, and the 
Revisionists. The suspicion and hatred ran so deeply following the 
Ar losoroff murder that the Labor parties ostracised the Revision is ts 
from the 1933 WZO Congress. Immigration certificates, distributed by 
the Jewish Agency, were refused to Betarim. Refusing to recognize the 
WZO's authority, Revisionists applied directly to the British officials 
for certificates. The WZO countered with economic sanctions against the 
Revisionists while Jabotinsky ordered his followers to boycott WZO funds 
and institutions. Labor disputes between Socialist and non-Socialist 
unions intensified. Betar and Socialist youths fought in the streets. 
Yet in the constant, and c rue ia 1, propaganda war, with both Right and 
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Left vying for the Yishuv's support, the Left controlled the more 
established media apparatus: printing presses, newspapers, and radio 
stations. The Jewish Agency possessed official status granted by the 
British and the backing of Zionism's international fund raising 
apparatus, the "Jewish National Fund" and the "National Fund." The 
Zionist "establishment" in Palestine successfully forced Jabotinsky into 
the role of an outsider. 
21 "The unrelenting socia 1 and economic 
hostility between the two groups was never to be dissipated, not even in 
the most cri tica 1 moments of na tiona 1 survi va 1." 
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During 1934-1935, there were attempts at reconciliation between 
the Revisionists and Labor. In 1934, Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion met in 
London to discuss a conciliatory agreement between the Revisionists and 
the Labor Movement. They reached an agreement based on an 
understanding that all parties must refrain from warfare, slander, 
libel, and insult, and confine themselves to ideological discussion; a 
compromise between the Histadrut and the newly founded "National Workers 
Federation," the Revisionist's trade and labor union,· concerning labor 
disputes, strikes, and arbi tra ti on; and the suspension of the two year 
boycott on the funding for the Revisionist Party and immigration 
certificates for Revisionists-Be ta rim. The agreement was ratified by 
the Revisionists. But Yi tzhak Ta benkin, leader of Kibbutz HaMeuchad 
which was rapidly gaining influence within the Histadrut, had formed a 
coalition with the left-wing parties, HaShomar HaTzair and Left Poele 
Zion; this far Left bloc was disenchanted with the compromises of Ben 
Gurion and MAPAI, which they saw as a betrayal of the 
Socialist-Pioneering tradition. Tabenkin's far Left coalition forced 
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the Histadrut to reject the Ben Gurion-Jabotinsky agreement in 1935. 
The rift between Right and Left could not easily be bridged. 23 
The Ar losoroff murder and the ensuing propaganda battle, coup led 
with the rise of anti-Semitic Fascism in Europe, diminished the 
popularity for the Right within the Yishuv. In the 1934 elections of 
delegates to the WZO Congress, the Revision is ts received only 11% of the 
vote compared to 49% for the Labor parties. Unwilling to defer to the 
power of Socialist-Zionism in the WZO, as some non-Socialist parties did 
in the interest of unity, Jabotinsky organized a separate institutional 
structure to present a constant political-ideological challenge to the 
"establishment" of the WZO. After a referendum held by the Revisionist 
Party in 1935, the majority followed Jabotinsky to form the New Zionist 
Organization, or NZO, while a small minority, represented by the United 
Zionist-Revisionist Party remained in the WZO. The NZO, organized along 
the same democratic lines as the WZO, eventually represented a world 
constituency of over 713,000 members, even larger than the WZO with 
635,000 members, though most of the NZO's support resided in the 
Diaspora. 
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Jabo tinsky achieved complete emancipation from the 
discipline of the WZO, the Jewish Agency, the Vaad Leumi, and the 
Histadrut. Conciliation had failed and the political gulf between the 
Left and the Right widened. 
Disenchanted with Weizmann's "minimalistic" approach to the 
Yishuv' s development, convinced that the British must be pressured to 
establish a Jewish State, and prophetically sensing the need to save 
European Jewry from growing anti-Semitism, Jabotinsky and the NZO 
adopted a platform calling for immediate mass Jewish immigration to 
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Palestine and the development of a military organization capable of 
achieving those ends by force. The activist Right found the seed for 
such an organization in the Hagana B. 
By the mid-1930s, Hagana B, renamed "Irgun Z'vai Leumi,"(National 
Military Organization) or IZL, was dominated by Revisionists and 
Beta rim. Jabotinsky suggested to the IZL leadership that the 
organization be brought under party discipline and profit from the NZO's 
backing of funds and manpower. Hagana B under Tehomi had not decisively 
broken with the Hagana's policies and had been careful to exclude 
pro-Jabotinsky Revisionists from positions of command. In 1935, Tehomi 
attempted to rejoin the Hagana. The organizations remained reunited for 
three weeks until a incident involving the stoning of a Betar parade 
triggered the nullification of the agreement. By the spring of 1937, 
Tehomi became convinced of the need for Hagana unity in critical times. 
A power-struggle ensued between a Tehomi led faction and a more militant 
faction committed to Ja bo tin sky. Tehomi tried to merge the en tire 
organization with the Hagana,but the militant Betarim and Revisionists 
had become the majority of the corps. The result was a split in April 
between Tehomi's faction of 500-1000 men who returned to the Hagana fold 
in July of 1937 and the remaining 1500-2000 men who composed the 
pro-Jabotinsky IZL led by young militants such as Avraham Stem and 
David Raziel. IZL became the military organization of the militant Right 
which possessed a program and a strategy independent and distinct from 
the Yishuv "establishment" and the Hagana. 
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During the years 1907-1919, the Yishuv acquired two fundamentally 
different military traditions, the Pioneer-Soldier tradition and the 
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Professional tradition. During 1920-1931, these two traditions remained 
subordinate to the presence of the Mandatory power. Rising Arab 
Nationalist violence threatened the Yishuv and produced a third military 
tradition, the "Underground," first developed by the early Hagana. The 
small, early Hagana became woven into the fabric of the 
Socialist-Zionism. Hence, during the period 1931-1936, the political 
orientation of the Jewish underground became a focal point in the 
political-ideological polarization of the Zionist movement. By early 
1937, the Right and the Left each possessed underground armies separated 
by oceans of ideology and loyalties. 
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CHAPTER III 
GROWING MILITARIZATION OF THE UNDERGROUNDS: 1936-1939 
The Arab Nationalist violence which erupted in 1936-1939 radically 
altered the policies of the British Mandatory authorities, the attitude 
of the Yishuv to the Mandate, and the posture of the Jewish underground 
military organizations, the Hagana and the IZL. The Mandatory Police 
Forces were again caught offgua rd and found that they were unable to 
restore order without the aid of the Yishuv. In London, there was a 
growing consensus that some new formula for Palestine must be introduced 
to preserve wider British interests in the Middle East. Within the 
Yishuv, the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 served as a catalyst to convince 
the majority of the Jewish population that a permanent self-defense 
organization was fundamen ta 1 to the Yishuv-s survival. 
As deaths and casualties mounted in early 1936, the Mandatory 
regime decided that they must ally themse 1 ves with the Yishuv, 
particularly in the countryside, in order to inexpensively and 
efficiently maintain law and order. The centralists like Weizmann and 
moderate leftists like Ben Gurion had, since the Balfour Declaration of 
1917, considered the British as the legitimate partners of the Zionist 
Movement; therefore, they eagerly adopted the proposal for joint 
Anglo-Jewish defense efforts. In addition, the Jewish Agency already 
possessed the basis for a legal defense force: the underground Hagana. 1 
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In July, 1936, the Mandatory government constructed a "Supernumary 
Police Force," or SPF, composed of approximately 22,000 Jews, who mostly 
were, or were in the process of becoming, associated with the Hagana. 
The SPF represented the "legal Hagana;" not the Jewish Army Jabotinsky 
had advocated for guarding Palestine's frontiers, but legal defense 
uni ts to pro tee t indi vidua 1 settlements and communities. Al though the 
British provided only 8,000 rifles and minimal training, thousands of 
young men of the Yishuv received military training, light weapons, and 
experience from their participation in the SPF. The legal SPF provided 
an opportune cover for the continued development of the Hagana. The 
British military generally understood that Anglo-Zionist mi 1i tary 
cooperation allowed the Yishuv to further its own self-defense 
capacities, but the Mandatory needed an ally, so from 1936-1938 the 
British accepted the Hagana's "quasi-legal" status. 
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During the rioting of 1936, even the SPF often proved insufficient 
to protect Jewish communities. The officia 1 Jewish leadership, 
including Weizmann, recognized that the Hagana needed to expand its 
operations independently, beyond the joint Anglo-Jewish forces. In 1936 
the WZO agreed to allocate sufficient funds for the Hagana to purchase 
weapons, to hire permanent salaried officers, and to train corps for a 
permanent "National" Hagana. By 1938, the "Kofer Hayishur" (Community 
Fund) of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi contributed directly to 
the Hagana. 
Backed politically and financially, the Hagana Command organized 
the expanded Hagana office in the Histadrut building in Tel Aviv. The 
Hagana leadership evolved in to an army's General Sta ff: recruiting from 
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kibbutzim, private settlements, and cities; training officers and 
reserves; improving communications and publishing military 1i tera ture; 
opera ting clandestine arms and supply purchases; ins ti tu ting a small 
armament industry and an intelligence system; and independently raising 
funds in Palestine and abroad. Golomb and Ben Gurion drafted the 
Hagana's constitution which stated that the Hagana was " a general 
Yishuv confederation which in all of its activities stands above class 
and party and is only responsible to the higher national authorities." 
Although the Hagana remained fused to Socialist-Zionism and dominated by 
the leadership of MAPAI and Ben Gurion, the Hagana was founded in the 
name of "national defense." Infused with the support of the WZO and the 
British, the Hagana began to assume the proportions of an inclusive, 
Yishuv-wide defense force. 
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Under the Hagana's "quasi-legal" status, the British accepted, and 
even encouraged, the Hagana's initiative in combating Arab guerrillas in 
the countryside from 1936 to 1938. In the summer of 1936, Yitshak Sadeh 
formed "Nodadot" (patrols) to track guerrillas back' to their bases. 
Sadeh advised his troops, "don't wait for the Arab marauder. Don't wait 
to defend the kibbutz. Go after him, move on to the offensive." 4 In 
the autumn of 1937, the British approved the formation of mobile units 
which received more extensive training and weaponry. The Hagana command 
authorized Sadeh to form mobile units called "FOSH" (Field Companies) 
recruited from the ranks of the "Jewish Settlement Police," the rural 
branches of the SPF. Following in the "Pioneer-Soldier" tradition of 
HaShomar and G'dud HaAvodah, Sadeh's more militant stance attracted 
militant young men and women from the rural collective settlements, 
33 
predominately from the Socialist Kibbutzim and Moshavim (less structured 
collective settlements) of HaKibbutz HaMeuchad. Aided by a large influx 
of youth to kibbutzim and Moshavim in the late 1930s, Sadeh galvanized 
the settlements into a defense network. Under Sadeh, using such tactics 
as erecting overnight "Fortress and Tower" settlements, the Kibbutz and 
Moshav you th became the "vanguard" of the Hagana ... s "offensive" defense. 
From this corps of young, militant Socialist-Zionists, under the 
guidance of Sadeh, emerged the elite, "crack- troops," of the Hagana. 
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By 1938, London decided that the Arab Revolt must be suppressed 
more forcefully and more speedily. The British sent Cap ta in Char le s 
Orde Wingate to organize a commando unit to launch offensive strikes 
against Arab guerrillas in Palestine and the surrounding region. 
Drawing from Sadeh's FOSH troops and British Troops, Wingate mobilized an 
Anglo-Jewish commando team known as "Special Night Squads," or SNS. 
Between May and September of 1938, Wingate and the SNS led raids into 
Syria and Lebanon, pacified the Galilee, and, most importantly for the 
British, secured the Iraq-Haifa oil pipeline. As violence ebbed in 
1939, the British dissolved the FOSH units and the SNS, and withdrew 
Wingate because his adamant pro-Zionist sympathies contradicted those of 
his military superiors and a fluid British foreign policy. Yet the 
tactics and personality of Wingate left an indelible impression on young 
Jewish commanders like Yigael Allon and Moshe Dayan. 6 
The offensive tactics employed by FOSH and SNS under Sadeh and 
Wingate effectively helped suppress the Arab Revolt, yet these tactics 
represented a departure from previous Hagana policy and complicated the 
position of the Jewish Agency. In 1936, the Jewish Agency and the 
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Hagana adopted the official position of "Havlaga," or restraint, towards 
the Arab riots and attacks. The policy of Havlaga posited that Hagana 
troops would return fire and hold their defensive positions, but that 
Hagana units would refrain from initiating "counterterror." The Hagana 
command's policy of Havlaga forbade " the murder of women, children, the 
passerby and innocent Arabs." 
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Havlaga found its roots in the 
"Practical" Zionist orientation of Ben Gurion, Golomb, and the Hagana 
Leadership. Settlement, Aliya, and socio-political development were the 
cornerstones of Zionism. Defense was a reality in Zionism's survival 
but it represented a secondary front. Golomb noted that Zionism should 
"not be accomplished by force alone." Nationhood required an 
"independent Jewish force" for reasons of "political necessity" and for 
reasons of national psychology and culture, "to turn the oppressed Jew 
of the Diaspora into an independent Hebrew in his land," 
8 
yet Jewish 
historical and European revolutionary experience exemplified the dangers 
of abusive military power. The protagonists of Havlaga wished to steer 
Zionism and the Hagana off that pa th. As Ben Gurion saw the period of 
1936-1939: 
This was a period when ••• any objective historian would say 
that the Hagana stood the supreme test. Not only did it 
preserve our position in the country, but it enabled us to 
strengthen it and to extend our settlement and development. Its 
watchwords were restraint in the face of Arab terror and 
expansion of our cons true ti ve ac ti vi ties as the best answer to 
Arabs' attempts to stunt our development. Restraint did not 
mean passivity. Its call was to fight terrorist gangs and never 
to kill an innocent Arab ••• I was most firm ~n turning my face 
resolutely against indiscriminate violence. 
Guided by Havlaga, the Hagana adopted the slogan of "Tobar 
HaNeshek," or "Purity of Arms," which emphasized the poli ti ca 1 
capabilities of a limited defense posture. Weizmann and Ben Gurion 
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viewed Havlaga as "morally attractive and politically useful" in making 
a positive impression on British and world public opinion for Zionism. 
Havlaga was based on the belief that the Arab masses did not support the 
revolt, so massive retaliation by the forces of the Yishuv would prove 
counter-productive. The proponents of Havlaga feared that offensive 
tac tics by the Hagana against Arab guerrillas would provide a pre text 
for the Mandatory regime to close off lega 1 Jewish immigration at a 
critical time of rising anti-Semitism in Europe. Ben Gurion and 
Weizmann believed that the futility of the Arab Revolt and Havlaga 
worked to the advantage of the Yishuv by solidifying the partnership of 
Zionism and the British. Because of the British partnership, from 
1936-1938, the Hagana had been developing into a formidable national 
military force. Ben Gurion and Weizmann stressed that Havlaga 
indirectly benefited the general development of the Yishuv's independent 
strength by cementing an Anglo-Zionist alliance. 
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While Havlaga appeared to offer Zionism a strong poli tica 1 and 
moral foundation in the international political arena; the difficulties 
of adhering to Havlaga under the cruel realities and constant pressures 
of warfare generated in tense controversy within the Hagana Command and 
the Jewish Agency. The growing concern for military-security realities 
over poll tical expediency was symbolized by the appointment in July of 
1938 of Yohanan Rattner as Chief of the "National Command." Rattner was 
a military man, not a politician, by training and temperament, and less 
concerned with ideology than with security. The more militant leaders 
of the Hagana, such as Sadeh, pointed to the highly effective, offensive 
tactics of FOSH and SNS which by the late 1930s had corroded the meaning 
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of Havlaga. Still, Ben Gurion, as leader of the MAPAI, exercised the 
strongest influence within the Labor Movement, the Jewish Agency, and, 
ultimately, the Hagana. The proponents of a more militant Hagana policy 
remained under the political discipline of the Jewish Agency and the 
Vaad Leumi. Though its meaning was eroded by the actions of FOSH and 
the SNS, the Jewish Agency retained Havlaga as the official Yishuv 
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policy during the violence of 1936-1939. 
Jabotinsky, the NZO, and the IZL, having broken from the Zionist 
"establishment," launched an independent program in response to the Arab 
Revolt. By the mid-1930s, Jabotinsky feared that unless steps were 
taken to create an immediate refuge in Pales tine, European Jewry would 
be overrun by Hitler and the Nazis. Jabotinsky's platform called for the 
"liquidation of the Diaspora" by resettling eight to eighteen million 
Jews in "greater Palestine." He called for a Mandatory regime dedicated 
to fulfilling the Balfour Declaration by facilitating massive Jewish 
inunigration and national development in Palestine. He called on the 
Yishuv and World Jewry to unite under this national banner and exert 
maximum pressure upon the British government. Jabotinsky stated in 1936 
that the Jewish people were "confronted with the dilemma either to fight 
with the British military forces or be content with the role of cowards 
and to suffer the consequences • " 12 Jabotinsky molded the Betar Youth 
around the concept of "Maavak," or conflict politics which stressed the 
danger of Jewish restraint, which would lead to British and 
international indifference when European Jewry became threatened with 
des true ti on. Yet, as a politician, Jabotinsky stressed the 
organizational, political, and diplomatic front in conjunction with 
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military power in the fight for a Jewish state. 
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In the late 1930's, Jabotinsky initiated a massive NZO fund 
raising and publicity campaign to gather support for the Revisionist 
platform in the United States and Europe. The Betar movement in Europe 
expanded, trying to mobilize the Jewish communities to make A liya en 
mass by offering educational and paramilitary training. Revisionist and 
Be tar offices coordinated the mobilization effort with the IZL. The IZL 
in Pales tine received military aid from Revisionist ac ti vi ties abroad. 
Both Betar and IZL were well organized amongst the middle-class in 
Poland. The rightist Polish government, which encouraged Ali ya in the 
interest of ridding Poland of Jews and anti-Semitism, gave arms and 
training to IZL recruits, including Jewish university students like 
Menachem Begin. Revisionist offices in Europe concentrated on 
coordinating illegal immigration with IZL in Pales tine. The 
Revisionists operated illegal immigration, coined "Aliya Bet," which 
brought 15,000-20,000 immigrants into Palestine during 1936-1939. In 
May of 1939, the British Intelligence Service, the CiD, reported that 
the Revisionists were sponsoring illegal immigration on a larger scale 
than any other Jewish group. 
Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Party leaders appealed to the WZO 
and the Jewish Agency for funding to aid the illegal immigration 
operations, but those requests were denied. Ben Gurion and the official 
Zionist leadership opposed the Revis ion is t' s illegal immigration 
activities, fearing that the Mandatory government would be induced to 
cut off legal immigration. But Jabotinsky's primary concern was the 
fate of the Jewish millions in Europe. Jabotinsky and his followers 
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cried out to European Jewry to emigrate to Pales tine before disaster 
struck, while the Zionist "establishment" clung to the twin polices of 
"gradualism" and Havlaga. 14 Revisionist Samuel Katz wrote that, 
''looking back, the Agency's persistence in this suicidal policy seems 
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fantastic. 
Under Jabotinsky"'s banner gathered militant young Jews, hostile 
towards the anti- Semitic climate of the World, disaffected with the 
official Zionist movement, and devoted to a revision in Zionist 
leadership, tac tics, and program. IZL militants viewed the weight 
Weizmann and the Jewish "establishment" gave to Anglo-Zionist relations 
as treasonous in the circumstances of the late 1930s. The leadership of 
the IZL took Jabotinsky"'s militancy and fervor, but saw no optimism in 
the intransigent Mandatory government. They saw only an apathetic Yishuv 
dominated by the Socialist-Zionist elites' policy of Havlaga, while Arab 
Nationalist guerrillas raged around them. Men like Raziel and Stern, 
who had not participated in Betar, were more infused with militant 
revolution than the ideology of Revisionism. After the outbreak of Arab 
violence in 1936, Tehomi, along with Jabotinsky, opposed counterterror, 
but the younger commanders favored severe reprisals by the IZL. Freed 
of Tehomi"'s influence and believing that the official Yishuv and the 
Hagana were being irresponsible not to forcefully retaliate in kind to 
Arab violence, the IZL prepared unilaterally for an anti-Arab battle. 
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By August of 1937, Jabotinsky also appreciated that Havlaga was 
too narrow a policy to adequately defend the Yishuv, for it gave the 
attacker the strategic advantage. Jabotinsky gave his approval for the 
IZL to launch an "active defense" of the Yishuv. After gaining the 
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consent of Jabotinsky to wage a wider struggle, the IZL proceeded to 
combat Arab terror with counterterror. IZL definitively abandoned 
Havlaga by launching retaliatory strikes against the Arab community. 
One attack in the Arab Market in Jerusalem, under the command of Moshe 
Rosenberg, in November killed 10 Arabs. The British responded to IZL 
terrorism by arresting those they managed to catch, while IZL forcefully 
resisted arrest. The British caught and tried IZL terror is ts as 
criminals while IZL saw themselves as "freedom fighters" engaged in a 
war of "Na tiona 1 Libera ti on." Shlomo Ben Joseph, a young IZL member, was 
apprehended by British police for attempting to blow up an Arab bus. 
During Ben Joseph's trial in the spring of 1938, the IZL intensified 
assaults on the Arab community. In order to make a political 
demonstration to Arab leaders and the Yishuv of Britain's impartial 
opposition to terrorism, Ben Joseph was sentenced to death. But Beh 
Joseph's hanging on June 29, 1938 galvanized support for the IZL within 
the Yishuv and gave the IZL its first martyr. After Ben Joseph's 
execution, David Raziel assumed command of IZL and· intensified its 
terrorist activities. In the summer of 1938, IZL bombings in Arab 
sections of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa killed a total of 75 Arabs. 
IZL terror had become part of Palestine's landscape. 
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IZL's terror tactics bothered Jabotinsky deeply. Originally, 
Jabotinsky opposed terrorism on political grounds, for he hoped that the 
British government could be coerced into establishing a legal Jewish 
Army. More importantly, Jabotinsky morally abhorred the idea of Jewish 
terrorism. At the outbreak of the 1936 riots, Jabotinsky wrote to IZL 
commanders, stating that "the Jews, in the midst of attack, do not loose 
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their senses, but are able to restrain themselves." O'n another occasion, 
Jabotinsky wrote to IZL command, asking, " where is the heroism in 
shooting an Arab peasant in the back when he comes on his donkey 
bringing vegetables to Tel Aviv? And what public advantage is gained by 
such an act?" 18 Jabotinsky proudly backed the illegal immigration 
efforts of the IZL but felt grave moral doubts about reprisals. He 
asked IZL command, " how can your Irgun people throw bombs in Arab 
quarters at random, indiscriminately killing women and children? You 
must at least warn the Arabs in time to evacuate the sections where you 
are going to retaliate?" In principle, Jabotinsky abhorred the tactics 
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of terror. 
For the young IZL militants, Jabotinsky remained their chief 
ideologue and wielded great influence upon them. IZL' s early 
commanders, such as Rosenberg and Raziel, required Jabotinsky's personal 
approval. Yet Jabotinsky possessed no distinct position in IZL's 
structure. Since 1924, Jabotinsky spent most of his time working in 
Europe, so he was geographically removed from IZL decisions. Because he 
headed the legal international NZO and the Revisionist World Union, 
Jabotinisky purposefully removed himself from IZL ac ti vi ties. 
Ultimately, Jabotinsky was in a poor position to decide on tactical 
issues regarding Havlaga vs. coun terterror. And as the world situation 
deteriorated and British policy appeared increasingly hostile to 
Zionism, Jabotinsky began to advocate that forceful, revolutionary 
pressure had to be ins ti tu ted by the Yishuv to create a safe Jewish 
harbor for the threatened millions of European Jewry. Jabotinsky 
opposed Tehomi's attempted merger with the Hagana in the spring of 1937, 
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in part, in anticipation of armed confrontation with the British. Yet 
Jabotinsky was increasingly isolated from militancy. Jabotinsky""s 
attitude and the Revisionist Party's relationship with IZL evolved into 
a state of complex ambivalence. 
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A struggle evolved between the political forces of the Right, 
Jabotinsky, Betar, the Revisionist Party, and the NMO on the one hand, 
and the militant forces of the Right, the IZL and the militant Betarim 
on the other. Some militant Betarim in Europe, like the young Begin, 
disputed Jabotinsky""s less-than-militant stance towards IZL reprisals 
and advocated for tougher diplomacy with the Mandatory government. But 
within Betar, Jabotinsky""s seniority and representative authority 
prevailed. Betar""s Political Committee in Palestine attempted to govern 
IZL, but the political strength lay with the IZL General Staff. During 
1937-1938, intense friction sux:faced between Betar and IZL. Tension 
also developed between the IZL and the Revisionist organizations over 
the responsibility for illegal immigration. But the locus of the 
dispute was the issue of the authority of Jabotinsky and the Revisionist 
Party on matters of IZL military operations. 
Jabotinsky viewed IZL within a political-diploma tic scheme and 
that military efforts must be coordinated with political believed 
efforts. IZL militants like Stern rejected diplomacy completely. 
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In February of 1939, in Paris, Jabotinsky met with Stern, Raziel, and 
other IZL commanders to formulate a tenable political-military agreement 
and end the internal strife. In the agreement that was reached, 
Jabotinsky gained recognition as IZL""s commander-in-chief while IZL 
gained the highest rung in the Betar power structure in Palestine. Yet 
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the differences regarding their perceptions of the situation in 
Palestine remained. Jabotinsky retained the official authority but he 
also remained thousands of miles away from daily conflicts in 
Palestine. 
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The tac tics of the IZL re presented the greatest threat to the 
authority of the officia 1 Yishuv bodies: the Vaad Leumi, the Jewish 
Agency, and the Hagana. The IZL undermined the Hagana's position as the 
sole representative of the Yishuv's military force in the eyes of the 
Jewish community, of the Arabs, of the British, and of the World. In 
July of 1936, Ben Gurion and Golomb stressed that the IZL must accepted 
the authority of the Jewish Agency and the policy of Havlaga or the 
result would be "civil war." Golomb issued this warning in conferences 
with Revisionist leaders Arieh Altman and Jabotinsky. 
23 
Jabotinsky 
responded that he was " not competent to give orders in such matters. 1124 
·Indeed , the political lines of communication between the Jewish 
Agency and the IZL remained confused. And there existed little common 
ground for negotiation. 
The members of IZL believed in the morality of their cause and 
that the majority of the Yishuv silently supported their tactics, that 
''Irgun reprisals were generally approved by the man in the street." 
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IZL fighters could not fathom how the Jewish Agency could fail to 
retaliate for the murder of Jewish civilians while the British disarmed, 
arrested, imprisoned, and even executed Jews trying to "defend" the 
Yishuv. And, with all of the Jewish Agency's resources, especially the 
the support of the in terna tiona 1 Jewish establishment, the Revisionists 




Conversely, the official Yishuv leadership viewed the IZL as 
dangerous, immoral fanatics, undermining years of careful diplomacy. 
When the IZL killed a Jew dressed as an Arab in Haifa in the summer of 
1937, the Hagana arrested the assailant. In turn, the IZL kidnapped a 
Hagana member and held him as ransom for their comrade, but Ben Gurion 
refused to compromise. Furthermore, the IZL, desperately low on funds 
and believing their cause to be crucial to the Yishuv's survival, 
attempted several bank robberies at Jewish Workers' Banks. Tensions 
between the Jewish Agency and IZL reached a point where civil war seemed 
. i 27 1mm nen t. 
Al though the IZL was numerically smaller than the Hagana, in 1939 
possessing about 2000 active fighters compared with the Hagana's over 
20,000 members, the IZL was more centrally controlled and cohesive. In 
addition, the IZL attracted the more activist elements from the Yishuv 
than did most of the widely dispersed, locally sponsored, Hagana units--
with the exception of the FOSH and SNS troops. Yet the Hagana enjoyed 
the critical advantage of the political and the financial backing of the 
official Jewish institutions. Both the Hagana and IZL competed for the 
financial support of World Jewry and the backing of Zionist you th 
movements, the reservoirs of manpower, within the Yishuv. 28 This 
fierce competition polarized the two military forces even further, 
fermenting old animosities and distrust. 
Aside from the deeply rooted political hatred that Ben Gurion and 
most leftist leaders felt towards the Right, IZL's tactics distanced it 
from the tac tics of the Hagana. As Hagana commanders perceived the 
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situation, the Hagana was fighting the Arab guerrillas in the 
countryside and establishing Jewish settlements, and the IZL troops were 
simply not with them. Ben Gurion asked, "how could bomb throwing in an 
Arab quarter of Jaffa be compared to the heroism of the defense of 
Tirath Zvi ( in the Bet She'en Valley) or the Hagana battles at Hanita 
(northern Galilee) or the exploits of. •• Wingate' s Special Night Squads, 
chasing Arab bands to their bases and engaging them there?" 
29 
Tac tics 
and the location of their military activities compounded the differences 
be tween the IZL and the Hagana. In essence, the Hagana and the IZL, as 
products of competing ideologies, were competing for domination of the 
Yishuv's security structure. True military unity could not exist 
without true political tolerance. 
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In the autumn of 1938 a temporary accord was worked out be tween 
IZL and the Jewish Agency through the mediation of Israel Rokhach, a 
United Revisionist (represented in Vaad Leumi) and Mayor of Tel Aviv. 
In exchange for cooperating with the Hagana, the IZL would receive some 
Hagana funds and facilities. IZL would retain autonomous status but any 
reprisals would require the consent of a joint committee. Jabotinsky 
and Ben Gurion met in London to solidify the alliance. Jabotinsky 
agreed to the accord, but Ben Gurion, doubtful of the influence of the 
Revisionist party upon the IZL, did not believe that the IZL would 
comply to Havlaga and he suddenly rejected the proposa 1 for 
reconciliation. Jabotinsky continued to call for a round table 
conference be tween the NZO and the WZO leadership. Yet Ben Gurion 
believed that " the only condition on which the IZL can be brought in to 
our ranks is for it to willingly accept the political discipline of the 
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Likewise, the IZL militants like Stern and Razie 1 feared that 
cooperation with the Hagana would erode their effectiveness and end 
their historic mission. As IZL member Yitshak Ben Ami recalled, " we 
did not believe that the Hagana could be freed from a defensive 
mentality nor from socialist control and turned into an effective 
military." 32 They perceived the Hagana as a Socialist dominated 
"state-within-a state," a military clique serving the interests of the 
"establishment" elites. Arbitration could not easily mend the wounds 
separating the two underground military forces within the Yishuv, 
fostered by over a decade of political hatred. 
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The IZL and the Jewish Agency were not completely alienated from 
each other in their struggles during the 1936-1939 violence. The entire 
Y-ishuv was united under a common cloak of violence: by 1938, 292 Jews 
had been killed and 649 wounded by Arab attacks. Everyone suffered 
during the 1936-1939 conflict regardless of their poli tica 1 
affiliation. The Jewish Agency did exert its influence in the cases of 
young IZL fighters like Ben Joseph to persuade the Mandatory authorities 
to forego capital punishment. According to Ben Gurion, the Jewish Agency 
"did everything in our power to avert the death sentence," and he viewed 
Ben Joseph's hanging as Britian's "first evil act." 34 Though Ben 
Gurion and his followers detested IZL and its methods, the restless, 
more militant elements within the Hagana felt sympathetic. Though the 
Jewish Agency spoke out publicly against the IZL's illegal immigration 
and denied requests by the Revisionist Party for funds to aid illegal 
immigration operations, the Hagana accepted 'de facto' the arrival of 
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Jewish refugees to Pales tine regardless of who sponsored the 
transportation. With the situation in Europe deteriorating, the Hagana 
also began to sponsor its own clandestine immigration services. In 
1938, the Hagana founded the "Mosad,"(the Establishment) which brought 
in 5,000-10,000 illegal refugees during 1938-1939. Both the IZL and the 
Hagana were dedicated to saving and safeguarding Jewish lives. Yet it 
was the shifting British policy in Palestine which ultimately brought 
the opposing parties of the Yishuv closer together. 
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To secure their wider interests in the Middle East, the British 
searched for a diplomatic approach for a more stable formula for 
Palestine. In 1937 the Royal Peel Commission proposed a partition of 
Palestine which would create a Jewish portion, composed roughly of the 
northwestern quarter of the country, and an Arab portion, composed of 
the remaining three-quarters, excluding Jerusalem which would remain 
under British jurisdiction. The Arab leadership flatly rejected the 
plan. Within the Zionist movement, Weizmann and his followers welcomed 
the proposal as a promising first step after years of diplomacy. Ben 
Gurion cautiously favored Partition but the issue threatened to split 
the MAPAI party. In particular, Kibbutz HaMeuchad and other rural 
Socialist-Zionists opposed any boundaries to potential Jewish settlement 
in Pales tine. Jabotinsky and his followers rejected the plan as it 
diametrically opposed the Revis ion is t program for a "greater Pales tine" 
under absolute Jewish sovereignty. They feared that if the Jewish 
Agency accepted Partition, then the IZL would be forced to confront the 
Jewish Agency and the Hagana. The Pee 1 Partition Plan emerged as an 
issue which might split the Yishuv in two. 
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The Peel Partition issue never materialized. As the power of Arab 
Nationalism increased in the Middle East and as the possibility of war 
with Germany or Russia appeared on the near horizon, London became more 
concerned with securing her imperial interests in the region. By 1939 
Partition plan was revoked. In its place, the British instituted the 
"White Paper" of May 17, 1939, in order to placate the Arab world. The 
White Paper limited Jewish land purchases in Palestine and, most 
significantly, as the situation for European Jewry darkened, it limited 
Jewish immigration to a mere 1500 per year. At roughly the same time, 
the Arab Revolt in Palestine was finally put down in the spring of 1939 
and the Mandatory government's limited cooperation with the Hagana ended 
completely. The Mandatory police began disarming, arresting and 
imprisoning Hagana troops. The drama tic shift in British policy forced 
the Hagana further underground and forced the Jewish Agency 
re-evaluate their program of two decades of Anglo-Zionist partnership. 
to 
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Weizmann and the moderates urged res train t, believing that the 
British policy could be reshaped in time. Militant elements in the 
Hagana fe 1 t time was running out and placed in tense pressure upon Ben 
Gurion to retaliate against the British. Characteristically, Ben Gurion 
advocated a middle course. Like Weizmann, he considered Britain a "bad 
partner" and not an enemy of the Jewish people. Unlike Weizmann, Ben 
Gurion fe 1 t that Britain must be convinced of the immorality of the 
White Paper and their. inability to enforce it. Ben Gurion convinced the 
Jewish Agency to attack the White Paper via mass demonstrations and an 
increase in illegal .immigration. 
The question of how the official Yishuv should react to the White 
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Paper triggered a power struggle for the control over the Hagana. 
Within the Vaad Leumi, socialist and non-socialist parties struggled for 
control. Ben Gurion tried to bypass the National Command and place the 
Hagana under the direct control of the Jewish Agency Executive with 
himself at the helm, but his attempt was blocked by the non-socialist 
parties. In March of 1939, a compromise was reached to reorganize the 
General Staff under the command of an apolitical figure, Yacov Dori. 
Though the National Command remained intact, Ben Gurion and the Jewish 
Agency gained direct control over Hagana intelligence and weapons 
procurement. Ben Gurion failed to seize direct control of Hagana forces 
yet he stood at the fulcrum of all policy decisions. 
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Still, the Yishuv remained divided on how to react to the White 
Paper. The leftist HaShomar HaTzair movement favored a general strike 
and civil disobedience. Militant elements within the Left favored 
cooperation with IZL, a united resistance against the Mandatory regime. 
Yet the crux of the debate was whether the White Paper policy and the 
desperation of European Jewry warranted severing Anglo.-Bri tish relations 
and concentrating the Hagana power on forcibly obtaining an independent 
Jewish nation. Militants in the Hagana pressured Ben Gurion and Golomb 
to unleash the Hagana upon the Mandatory regime. Ben Gurion did not 
dismiss the possibility of someday waging a national "War of 
Liberation," for after the issuance of the Pee 1 Partition Plan he had 
ordered the Hagana command to draw up plans for such a contingency. But 
he deemed that the Yishuv was far too weak to succeed in combating the 
British forces and that the Anglo-Zionist partnership was not yet 
defunct. As Ben Gurion commented in late May of 1939, "I do not propose 
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the slogan of a Jewish state ••• at this moment ••• my ultimate objective is 
not the establishment of a state in only part of the country." Ben 
Gurion wanted to fight the White Paper but not the Mandatory government 
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Ben Gurion""s formula of illegal immigration coupled with mass 
demonstrations prevailed as the officia 1 policy adopted by the Jewish 
Agency. After the issuance of the White Paper, Jewish Agency sponsored 
and Hagana directed illegal immigration efforts increased significantly, 
but the British blockade made illegal inunigration difficult, costly, and 
politically risky. The Histadrut sponsored demonstrations and strikes 
against the White Paper, but the vast majority of the Yishuv did not 
participate. Meanwhile, the situation of European Jewry became 
increasingly cri tica 1 and the White Paper policy remained firmly in 
place. 
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Just as the IZL believed that force was the proper response to 
Arab attacks on the Yishuv, they viewed the British White Paper policy 
as a direct threat to the survival of the Yishuv""s lifeline of 
immigration. They believed that only an impressive demons tra ti on of 
Jewish military power would des troy British enforcement of the White 
Paper. The IZL was prepared to "spare no sacrifice to frustrate and 
defeat" the White Paper. 
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By the spring of 1939, Jabotinsky gave 
the IZL commanders permission to wage armed resistance against the 
Mandatory regime as long as the White Paper remained in effect. The IZL 
began to at tack both the Arab community and the Mandatory regime. On 
February 27, the IZL bombed British administrative buildings in Tel 
Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa. On May 17, IZL blew up the Pales tine 
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Broadcasting station. On May 23, IZL killed its first British 
policeman. IZL blew up an Arab movie theater in Jerusalem on May 29, 
Palestine's main post office on June 12, and the Jerusalem radio station 
on July 30. Bombs were placed in telephone booths and in public 
buildings. Railroads were sabotaged. Shootings occurred in Arab 
neighborhoods. In August, six British policemen were killed in Haifa. 
IZL anti-British violence escalated in the urban communities of Haifa, 
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Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. 
Simultaneously, under the direction of Eri Jabotinsky 
(Jabotinsky's son), IZL illegal immigation efforts also accelerated 
despite a chronic shortage of funds and the obstacles erected by the 
British navy and the CID. According to Jabotinsky and the IZL 
leadership, Havlaga was bankrupt and time had run out for gentlemanly 
diplomacy with the British government. ·By the summer of 1939, 
Jabotinsky Revisionists and the IZL had clearly established their policy 
towards the Yishuv's twin problem of defense against the Arabs and 
resistance to the White Paper: total armed struggle. 
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Although the Yishuv remained intensely divided over the twin 
problem of defense against the Arabs and of resistance to the 
Mandatory's White Paper policy, most of the Yishuv rejected the IZL as a 
small, dangerous group which harmed the Zionist cause by "marring the 
record of Pales tine Jewry." 43 This outlook was fostered by the 
continued propaganda efforts of the Jewish Agency and the 
"establishment" press renouncing the IZL tactics. In June and July, the 
Jewish Agency published pamphlets condemning terrorism: 
Thou sha 11 not kill is a commandment out of the roots of an 
ancient people ••• we shall not build ••• our national future by 
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imitating the wars t of the gentiles • • • let us stop this evil at 
its beginning. Isolate it. Let the Yishuv unite to defend the 
national homeland from
4
Ehe terrorists from within as from the 
enemies from without. 
Despite their mutual rejection of the White Paper and simultaneous 
efforts with illegal immigration, the tactics and political orientation 
of the Hagana and the IZL in their struggle against the Mandatory policy 
remained profoundly at odds. 
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By the summer of 1939, within the Yishuv, the White Paper had 
weakened the position of Weizmann and those who still clung fervently to 
their faith in the "Anglo-Zionist bond," and strengthened the support 
for the Jabotinsky's program and the IZL's tactics. The Hagana morale 
suffered from some defections over to the IZL. Militant members 
clamored for anti-British action in the fashion of the IZL. In June, in 
response from pressure from these militants and in anticipation of 
possible armed struggle with the Mandatory forces, Ben Gurion authorized 
the formation of "Special Squads" from the ranks of the disbanded FOSH 
and SNS uni ts. The Specia 1 Squads were under the direct authority of 
Ben Gurion and the Jewish Agency, and commanded by a committee composed 
of Rattner, Hoz, Sadeh, and Israeli Galili. The Special Squads acted as 
an anti-Arab terrorist unit and a secret police to punish informers, and 
they planned and trained for an anti-British campaign. In August, the 
Specia 1 Squads set severa 1 CID cars aflame, blew a hole in the 
Iraqi-Haifa oil pipeline, and sank a British immigration patrol boat, 
the "Sinbad II." Still, these actions were rather "experimental" in 
character and not orchestrated as an outright rebellion against the 
Mandatory regime. The Specia 1 Squads did draw up plans to assassinate 
key British officials and attack key government buildings, but Ben 
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Gurion stalled more assaults upon the British regime. Pressured to 
res train by Weizmann, believing that Anglo-Zionist relations were not 
beyond repair, and judging the Hagana to be unprepared to challenge the 
Mandatory forces, Ben Gurion reserved the possibility for a Hagana 
campaign against the Mandatory regime while he continued to concentrate 
the Hagana's activities on illegal immigration. 
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While the Jewish Agency and the Hagana continued to a void any 
direct armed clashes with the Mandatory forces, the IZL commanders and 
Jabotinsky became increasingly convinced that the British would never 
establish a Jewish commonwealth unless the Yishuv revolted openly 
against the Mandatory regime. But the IZL campaign of violence fared 
badly. Constantly in need of weapons and ammunition, the IZL aborted 
many planned missions. Key IZL members were being apprehended by the 
British Police, including Raziel and Yacov Merridor who were arrested in 
March, and Stern who was arrested in May. The IZL campaign in the 
spring and summer of 1939 was too fragmentary and had no discernible 
effect on the Mandatory regime. In the English press, ·even ts in Europe 
submerged the reports of anti-British violence in Palestine. The IZL in 
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Palestine could not lead a revolt for national liberation alone. 
With the IZL resistance movement within the Yishuv disintegrating, 
with the official Yishuv leadership still unprepared to resort to armed 
resistance, with European Jewry in the deepest peril, with the White 
Paper firmly imbeded in Mandatory policy, and with the diplomatic 
channels exhausted, Jabotinsky decided that the time had come for swift, 
bold action. In late August, he and the IZL High Command formulated 
plans for massive armed revolt to overthrow the Mandatory regime in 
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April of 1940. The Polish Army had committed 20, 000 rifles, machine 
guns, and grenades and the IZL possessed 5,000 rifles in warehouses in 
Warsaw. Approximately 30-40,000 European Betarim trained in preparation 
for the spring invasion. Jabotinsky and IZL Command estimated about 
5000 would manage to evade the British coastal defenses and join the 
2000 IZL troops in Palestine. Jabotinsky himself would land in 
Palestine to lead the coup d' etat and proclaim a provisional government 
in Jerusalem. Only Stern objected to the plan, which was approved by 
the IZL command. Jabotinsky and the IZL leadership believed this plan 
would prove to be the definitive battle for a Jewish Nation. 
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Jabotinsky's scheme was based on the presumption that once a true 
"War of Liberation" had begun, the Hagana and the majority of the Yishuv 
would join in the battle. This presumption was extremely optimistic 
after a decade of political-ideological rivalry between the 
pro-Jabotinsky Right and the officia 1 Yishuv institutions dominated by 
the Left. Moreover, Ben Gurion, the Jewish Agency, and the Hagana were 
preparing for the possibility of forcibly pressuring the British to 
revoke the White Paper, but not to lead the Yishuv into a full-scale 
battle to overthrow the Mandatory regime. Jabotinsky's presumption 
posited that Jewish Nationalism would supersede a generation of 
political differences. 
The 1930s had produced two independent Jewish underground 
organizations, backed by competing political-economic-social ideologies; 
the Arab Revolt and the oscillating British policy in the years 1936-39 
had militarized bo tJ:t sides dramatically. By the end of the summer of 
1939, violent, dramatic revolution in Palestine seemed imminent. United 
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in their opposition to the White Paper, parallel in their illegal 
immigration efforts, yet divided in their strategies for the future of 
Jewish Pales tine, the IZL and the Hagana seemed to pressed to the 
brink-- of forming a united Jewish national resistance or of engaging in 
a futile civil war. 
NOTES III 
1 Luttwark and Horowitz, p. 14. 
2 Rothenburg, p. 25; and Yehµ.da Bauer, From Diplomacy to 
Resistance (Philadelphia: Jewish Publishing Society, 1970), p. 11 •. 
3 Perlmutter, p. 29 & p. 32; and Bauer, p. 15. 
4 Perlmutter, p. 32. 
5 Rothenburg, p. 26; and Perlmutter, p. 15 & p. 32; and Luttwark 
and Horowitz, pp. 12-13. 
6 Rothenburg, p. 26; and Perlmutter, p. 33; and Luttwark and 
Horowitz, p. 13. 
7 Bauer, p. 15. 
8 Perlmutter, p. 30; and Rothenburg, p. 25. 
9 Perlman, p. 76. 
10 
Luttwark and Horowitz, p. 12; and Perlmutter, p. 24; and 
Rothenburg, p. 25. 
11 Luttwark and Horowitz, p. 14. 
12 Schechtman, p. 446. 
13 Perlmutter, p. 25; and Schechtman, p. 446. 
14 Yi tsaq Ben Ami, Years of Wrath; Days of Glory (New York: 
Robert Speller & Sons, 1982), p. 160 & p. 232; and Schechtman, p. 423 & 
p. 16; and Sacher, p. 187; and Bauer, p. 61; and Katz, p. 43; and 
Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 
1979), p. 41. 
15 
Katz, p. 24. 
16 Perlmutter, p. 26; and Laqueur, p. 374; and Katz, pp. 10-12. 
17 Rothenburg, p. 26; and Perlmutter, p. 27; and Bethell, p. 44; 
and Perlman, p. 79. 
18 Schechtman, p. 453. 
19 Schechtman, p. 453; and Laqueur, p. 375. 
20 Schechtman, pp. 447-451. 
21 Schechtman, p. 416 & pp. 454-457; and Haber, pp. 50-51 & pp. 
90-91. 
22 Schechtman, pp. 458-459; and Perlmutter, p. 27; and J. Bowyer 
Bell, Terror Out of Zion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p~ 
44. 
23 Schechtman, p. 459. 
24 Schechtman, p. 451. 
25 Katz, p. 24. 
26 Ben Ami, p. 211. 
27 Laqueur, p. 374; and Bell, p. 43. 
28 Bauer, p. 49; and Perlmutter Vol. II, p. 12; and Luttwark and 
Horowitz, p. 18. 
29 Perlman, p. 78. 
30 Perlmutter Vol. II, p. 12. 
31 
Michael Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion-The Armed Prophet (Englewood 
Cliffs: Arthur Barker Limited, 1967), p. 68. 
32 Ben Ami, p. 110. 
33 Perlmutter, p. 30 & p. 27; and Bauer, p. 15. 
34 Perlman, pp. 79-80. 
35 
Katz, pp. 42-43; and Ben Ami, p. 160; and Rothenberg, p. 26; 
56 
and Be 11 , p • 48. 
36 Perlmutter, p. 33. 
37 
Bauer, p. 53; and Perlmutter Vol. II, p. 12. 
38 Horowitz and Lissak, p. 50; and Bauer, p. 36. 
39 Bauer, p. 61; and Horowitz and Lissak, p. 182; and Bar Zohar, 
pp. 50-53 & p. 68; and Rothenburg, p. 27. 
40 
Bethell, p. 68. 
41 Bell, p. 48; and Sacher, p. 223; and Bethell, p. 41 & p. 156. 
42 B A . en mi, p. 159. 
43 Be the 11, p. 42. 
44 B A . en mi, p. 232. 
45 Perlmutter, p. 20. 
46 Bauer, pp. 47-48 & pp. 57-61; and Bethell, p. 73. 
47 Bauer, p. 15 & p. 67. 
57 
48 Bell, p. 28; and Ben Ami, p. 233; and Schechtman, p. 482 & p. 41. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE YISHUV AT WAR: 1939-1945 
On September 1, 1939, three notable events occurred. Firstly, the 
British shot and killed three Jews in a foiled illegal immigration 
operation, which potentially could have further enraged the Yishuv and 
moved the Jewish Agency closer to launching severe assaults on the 
Mandatory regime. Secondly, the Mandatory Police raided the IZL's 
headquarters and arrested most of the IZL commanders, which potentially 
could have upset Jabotinsky's coup d'etat scheme. Finally, Hitler's 
invasion of Poland ignited World War II, overturning the entire existing 
status quo of Anglo-Zionist relations, of internal Yishuv relations, and 
of the Yishuv's underground armies. 
On September 3, World Jewry, the WZO, and the Jewish Agency voiced 
their total support for the Allied war effort. Brita in may have been a 
"bad partner" in Palestine but it was still the strongest democracy in 
the eastern hemisphere combating the Nazis, the most cruel enemy of the 
Jewish people. The majority of the Yishuv suspended their an ti-British 
animosities fermented by the institution of the White Paper. In 
September, 1939, the Yishuv demonstrated overwhelming support. for the 
British war effort when over 120,000 men and women of the Yishuv 
registered for the Allied draft. By late 1939, the Jewish Agency began 
carrying out a Yishuv-wide enlistment campaign. The Yishuv and the 
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British seemed united in the war against the Axis. 
1 
As in World War I, Weizmann viewed massive Jewish enlistment and 
the Yishuv's full cooperation with the British war effort as an 
opportunity to cement the Anglo-Zionist bond and gain post-war 
reciprocation from London. Weizmann was convinced that Britain would 
repay the Yishuv' s moderation and Jewish cooperation in wartime with a 
new par ti ti on proposal favoring the Yishuv after the war. As in World 
War I, Weizmann called on World Jewry to enthusiastically enlist and, in 
December, 1939, he requested the British to establish an official 
"Jewish Army" composed of 10 ,000 troops, 4 ,000 from the Yishuv, to 
participate with the Allies in the fight against the Axis in the Middle 
East. But the British government remained wary of post-war obligations 
and conscious of the greater strategic importance of Anglo-Arab 
relations, and they continuously postponed es tablisJlmen t of Jewish 
battalions for most of the war. United in their war against Hitler but 
divided in their interests in Pales tine, Anglo-Zionist relations 
2 
remained tense and ambivalent throughout the World War II. 
Despite the almost total support voiced by the Yishuv for the 
British war effort, the issue of "enlistment" triggered an intense 
debate within the Vaad Leumi, the Jewish Agency, and the His tadru t over 
the Yishuv' s priori ties in wartime. Golomb and other military men 
worried that enthusiastic enlistment in the British army could leave the 
Yishuv defenseless. The loudest voices in opposition to massive Yishuv 
enlistment came from a coalition of groups from the far Left, 
particularly the various constituents of the Socialist Kibbutz Movement. 
This far Left coalition argued against sending large numbers of the 
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Yishuv' s manpower to fight in the European theater. Their leading 
spokesman, Tabenkin, rejected the premise of Ben Gurion and Weizmann 
that massive Yishuv enlistment would secure Zionism's post-war position 
with the British: 
If we reach a point where we have no value here without the 
English, then, even in the eyes of the English, we shall have no 
value ••• the political and factual center for us is· the 
independent Hagana. That must serve as our springboard ••• our 
independent 
3
army is more important that any under British 
authority. 
Tabenkin and the far Left coalition felt that Ben Gurion and Weizmann 
were compromising the safety of the Yishuv. In place of unlimited 
enlistment, the far Left proposed the creation of independent Jewish 
uni ts to cooperate with the British in defending the Yishuv and the 
country. After the defense of the land and the Yishuv would be 
guaranteed, the far Left would consider sending certain auxiliary units 
to nearby countries. Although the left-wing coalition did not agree on 
where "defending Palestine" extended, they united in their concern for 
the defense of the settlements by preventing a massive exodus of Yishuv 
4 
manpower. 
The more moderate, Left-of-Center, Socialists characteristically 
favored a compromise of enlistment and activism. Ben Gurion's slogan 
for the war effort carried a duel message that, "we should help the 
British in their war as if there were no White Paper, and we should 
fight the White Paper as if there were no war." Despite the fact that 
the British continued to stop Jewish immigration at such a tragic hour 
and in public voiced a decide 1 y pro-Arab stance, Ben Gurion and Moshe 
Share tt, a MAPAin:i:k and Head of the Jewish Agency's Political 
Department, advocated that cooperation with Britain's war effort 
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potentially offered the Yishuv political advantages and provided an 
opportunity for thousands of the Yishuv's manpower to gain formal 
military experience in the professional British Army. Yet 
simultaneously they believed the Yishuv must resist the White Paper 
policy in a way that would not endanger the British war effort. The 
Jewish Agency and the His tadru t should sponsor mass demonstrations 
against the White Paper and the Hagana should continue its illegal 
immigration efforts. 
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This dispute be tween Ben Gurion-- and the moderate Left-- and 
Tabenkin-- and the far Left-- over military priorities was an extension 
of general differences with regard to Zionist policy and orientation. 
During the 1930's, the far Left, Kibbutz HaMeuhad in particular, had 
gained great influence within the Vaad Leumi, the Histadrut, and the 
Hagana as a bloc within the dominant MAPAI party. But in the 1940's, as 
the White Paper and war in Europe closed off the stream of young 
Socialists and as Socialism lost some of its in terna tiona 1 luster after 
the Soviet-Nazi Pact, the power of the far Left began declining. The 
Kibbutz HaMeuchad faction in MAPAI (sometimes referred to as MAPAI B), 
together with the "HaShomar HaTzair"(The Young Watchman) movement 
affiliated with Kibbutz HaArtzi, formed a more orthodox Marxist 
coalition that objected to Ben Gurion's gradual shift to the moderate 
center. The far Left opposed Ben Gurion's emphasis on "National" over 
"Class" concerns as a be traya 1 of Socialist-Pioneering tradition and 
international Socialism. The growing power of Ben Gurion and the 
moderate, left-of-center majority in MAPAI, generated intense friction 
over the economic-political-ideological priorities for the Yishuv. 
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These disputes during 1939-1941 managed to further diminish the strength 
6 
of the Hagana. 
During the years 1939-41, the Hagana reached its lowest ebb. 
Although the Hagana still possessed on paper some 12,000-27,000 
competent troops, the numbers depended upon who was counted. About 5000 
Hagana troops were classified as "HISH" (Field Soldiers) composed of the 
best-trained, ex-FOSH and ex-SNS troops; over 20,000 men and women were 
described as "HIM" (Reserve Soldiers); and several thousand were counted 
as "GADNA" (Youth Battalions) members. Many of the most fit and best 
trained troops were among the first to enlist with the British forces 
abroad. 
Despite an inadequately small professiona 1 staff, organizational 
improvements were accomplished. Jacob Reizer, who took over the 
National Command in November, 1939, and Yacov Dori, of the General 
Staff, proceeded to reorganize the Hagana ... s budget and to improve the 
Hagana's structure by dividing the command into eight separate 
districts. Later, the Hagana High Command integrated the districts in 
three major regions: the north, the south, and the central. Despite the 
objection of both the right-wing urban parties and the left-wing rural 
parties to the loss of localized control, Reizer's and Dori's changes 
were implemented. The Hagana's internal structure had been improved and 
the command made more centralized. 7 
During 1940, Ben Gurion again tried in vain to wrestle direct 
control of the National Command in to the hands of the Jewish Agency. 
Ben Gurion's maneuvers precipitated numerous struggles between left-wing 
and right-wing parties for greater influence in the National Command. 
63 
The disputes temporarily came to rest in May, 1941, when a new National 
Command was formed under the neutral leadership of Moshe Sneh, balanced 
with four non-Socialists and four Socialist re pre sen ta ti ves. Golomb 
remained Commander of the Hagana and Yacov Dori became Chief of the 
General Staff. On May 15, 1941, the Hagana's National Command published 
a statement of Hagana principles stating that, "the Hagana is subject to 
the authority of the World Zionist Organization, together with the 
people of Israel in Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) • It stands under 
their jurisdiction and responds to their command." 
8 The statement 
went on to outline the chain of command, the ranking system, and the 
Hagana's character as the sole, unified, and representative military 
force of the Yishuv. But both the far Right and the far Left remained 
disgruntled. Tehomi lead a walk-out of the "Middle-Class Unionist" 
party who boycotted the ~ational Command for two months and threatened 
to form their own defense committee. Yet all these internal political 
battles remained subordinate to a hard reality that, because of the 
Yishuv's enlistment in the Allied war effort, the .Hagana, without 
sufficient manpower, remained a skeleton of an army. 
9 
The independent strength of the Hagana was further undermined by 
British wartime policy. With Britain locked in a battle for national 
survival and increasingly concerned with securing Arab alliances, the 
Mandan tory regime swiftly cracked-down on "the presence of secret arms 
and underground military organizations among the Jews" and demanded the 
immediate disarmament of the en tire Yishuv. JSP troops, the "legal" 
Hagana, were disarmed and arrested throughout Palestine. On October 5, 
1939, the Mandatory Police Force raided the training base for the 
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Hagana's Special Squads and arrested forty-three officers, including 
Moshe Carmel and Dayan, sentencing them for long terms in Acre Prison. 
This hard blow forced the Hagana further underground and contributed to 
the disbandment of the Special Squads in December. In January, the 
Mandatory forces uncovered two important arms caches in northern 
settlements. Weapons became very scarce and Hagana commanders at the 
highest levels refused to give up their arms. Throughout the war, the 
Mandatory forces disarmed, arrested, and imprisoned members of the 
Hagana depending on the "ebb and flow" of the war effort. 
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In spite of shortages in manpower, weapons, and funds, the Hagana 
continued trying to bring in more i l lega 1 immigrants fleeing from the 
advancing Nazi armies. And the British Navy continued to accost the 
vessels and sent thousands of the refugees to detention camps in 
Mauritius. On November 24, 1940, the Hagana tried to blow a leak in the 
"USS Patria 11 in order to force the disembarkation of the 1400 Jewish 
refugees; accidentally, the explosion caused the unseaworthy vessel to 
sink, killing 240 Jews. With the Hagana's part in the· tragedy unknown 
to the public, anti-British hostility boiled within the Yishuv. By the 
summer of 1940, the Mandatory government was accusing the Jewish Agency 
of not cooperating in the fight against Hitler, while the Jewish Agency 
and the Hagana became more defiant of British authority. The working 
relationship of the Jewish Agency and the Mandatory government 
deteriorated to an explosively low level. Only the knowledge 
11 greater common enemy, the Nazis, kept the peace. 
of a 
With the fall of France in June, 1940, the British stood alone 
against the Axis powers. In search of allies, Churchill, Clement 
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Attlee, and other British cabinet members voiced their support for a 
Jewish division. And Nazi occupation of Europe cut off the flow of 
immigrants to Palestine. The hostilities between the Jewish Agency and 
the British over the enforcement of the White Paper receded under the 
weight of the common fear that the Axis might win the war. By the end 
of 1941, almost ll, 000 recruits had been drawn from the Yishuv. The 
Jewish Agency adopted a policy of unlimited enlistment. During the 
extent of the war, approximately 27,000-30,000 Jews of the Yishuv served 
in the Allied forces. These recruits gained technical and practical 
military training in Allied armies, inculcating a "Professional" 
military style into thousands of young Jewish warriors. 
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Jews of the Yishuv served with uncommon bravery in commando and 
espionage operations in Europe, the Balkans, and in the Middle East. 
The Britain's "Special Operations Executive," or SOE, trained thousands 
of Jews from the Yishuv whose native languages were German, Italian, or 
Arabic as agents to infiltrate enemy lines, providing valuable espionage 
training for the Hagana. The SOE people re leased Hagana troops from 
British prisons, and the Hagana repaid the SOE with. daring intelligence 
work in Europe and the Middle East. The Hagana managed secretly to 
rotate different people through the training to expand the numbers 
receiving weapons and experience. The British authorities understood 
that the Hagana was developing its own resources but the desperate war 
situation overran those considerations. Likewise, Jewish soldiers, the 
Yishuv, and the Jewish Agency over looked Anglo-Zionist tensions, and 
concentrated on winning the World War. 
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Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Party also viewed Hitler and the 
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Nazi Empire as the primary threat to the Jewish people. On September 5, 
1939, Jabotinsky, like Weizmann, proclaimed his and the NZO's full 
support for the Allied war effort. Jabotinsky pleaded with the British 
government to accept Jewish Palestine as a loyal base for British 
wartime operations and lobbied for the establishment of an Allied Jewish 
division. He vowed to use his influence within the American Jewish 
community to urge the United States to enter the war in exchange for 
allowing Jewish refugees to freely enter Pales tine. He urged World 
Jewry to enlist, believing that the fate the European Jewry's millions 
depended on a swift Allied victory. The World War seemed to be bringing 
Jabotinsky and the militant Right back within the Yishuv's political 
mainstream. 
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Jabotinsky instructed IZL command to suspend the revolt against 
the Mandatory regime for the duration of the war. Yet various opinions 
circulated within the Revisionist Party, Betar, and the IZL command. 
Some followed the position of Jabotinsky and enlisted immediately. 
Most, including Raziel, felt opposed to enlistment until Britain created 
the distinct "Jewish Army" advocated by Weizmann and Jabotinsky. And 
some, lead by Stern, who had long resisted the outside authority of 
Jabo tin sky and his "old fashioned Zionism," 
15 
rejected cooperation 
with the British entirely until a political settlement was reached in 
Palestine. Stern pledged to continue the anti-British struggle. 
Raziel, who accepted Jabotinsky's ultimate authority and wished to 
maintain the IZL's political link with the Revisionist Party, ordered 
the IZL to refrain from attacking the British for the duration of the 
war. Although Raziel possessed the strongest posture within the IZL, 
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the decision was not accepted unanimously. Aggravated by clashes of 
personality and ambition, Stern and Raziel engaged in a bitter dispute. 
Jabotinsky attempted to heal the differences between Raziel and Stern; 
however, he eventually granted Raziel his full support and ordered Stern 
16 
to obey. 
While the issue of enlistment and cessation of anti-British 
attacks remained unresolved within IZL, it proceeded to carry out 
operations. In Palestine, the IZL continued their attacks on the Arab 
communities and the British continued to arrest them. On November 7, 
1939, the British arrested 38 IZL and Betar members, including Stern. 
Desperately low on funds with their European offices shut down, IZL 
exhorted money from the Yishuv's middle-class and unsuccessfully 
attempted to rob several banks, which spread further hostility for the 
IZL within the Yishuv. In retaliation, the Hagana gave intelligence 
reports on the IZL to the British CID. By late 1939, with the Mantadory 
forces cracking-down on Jewish undergrounds, with the I?:L rife with 
internal dispute, with growing sentiment against the lZL tactics, and 
with many IZL fighters enlisted in the British Army, Razie l ordered a 
truce with Britain in exchange for the release of IZL prisoners, 
including Stern. By 1940, the IZL became relatively quiescent in 
Pales tine. 
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In Europe, the IZL continued its illegal immigration efforts, 
including the daring rescue of refugees on the Danube. Meanwhile, the 
Jewish Agency persisted in officially discrediting Revisionist sponsored 
immigration and refused to issue precious immigration certificates to 
IZL operatives. Significantly, even in the Jewish Ghetto uprisings in 
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Eastern Europe, such as the famous Warsaw Ghetto uprising, when Jewish 
resistance groups in the early 1940's fought the onslaught of Nazi 
Armies for months, the Revisionist-Be tar and the Socia list fighters 
refused to fight in unity. Likewise, the war failed to unite the IZL 
and the Hagana in their parallel efforts to rescue Jewish refugees from 
extinction in Europe. Even in moments of na tiona 1 genocide, the venom 
of political hatred remained potent. 
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As the ranks of the European Revisionist Party, Betar, and IZL 
disappeared under the cloak of Nazi power, the IZL had become a restless 
military organization without political moorings and without clear 
tactical objectives. By the summer of 1940, the vacuum in IZL 
precipitated another feud between Raziel and Stern. In June, 1940, a 
frustrated Raziel attempted to resign and enlist in the British Army, 
but Ja bo tin sky re instated him. Yet Jabotinsky failed to close. the 
S tern-Razie 1 rift. Most of Stern's followers objected to the IZL's 
subjugation to the poli tica 1 bonds of Jabotinsky and the NZO as a 
detriment to the IZL's function as an independent, "National Liberation" 
army. Stern saw the Raziel faction as stagnant, while he and his 
followers were "flexible, innovative, and restless." 19 In July, Stern 
and a small group of followers began searching for a new poli tica 1 
orientation and a new mi li tan t purpose. When Jabo tin sky suddenly died 
on August 3, reconciliation efforts between Raziel and Stern collapsed. 
By the end of the summer of 1940, the break between the Raziel faction 
and the Stern faction became permanent. 
20 
With the Revisionist Party and the Betar movement disintegrating 
almost into extinction, and with the IZL's resistance against the 
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Mandatory regime in intermission, Raziel decided to enlist in the fight 
against Hitler and many of the IZL troops followed his example. By 
November, Raziel suspended all IZL operations. In December, Altman, of 
the Revisionist Party and Bert Katznelson, of MAPAI, negotiated and 
signed a draft treaty of reproachment be tween the Revisionist Party and 
the His tadru t. The third section of the treaty referred to unifying the 
security organizations, the Hagana and the IZL. Yet the wounds of the 
Arlosoroff killing, the economic differences, and general fear and 
mistrust prevented reconciliation. MAPAI rejected the treaty. A chance 
to end the schism within the unifying context of the war was lost. 
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Meanwhile, Raziel and his IZL comrades prepared to lead an attack 
against the Rashid Ali government in Iraq for the British Army. The 
ambitious scheme involved exploding oil refiners, gathering 
intelligence, and kidnapping the Mufti. On May 13, 1941, Raziel was 
killed and the operation aborted, ending IZL-British cooperation. After 
Raziel's death, first Aryeh Possak, then Merridor assumed command of the 
dilapidated IZL. The IZL intelligence Chief, Israe 1 Pritzker, 
established close connections with the CID to combat "Communism" in 
Palestine and to spy on Stern and his followers, thereby, widening the 
chasm between the remnants of the IZL and the Sternists; but, aside from 
Pritzker's work, all IZL military operations halted. In August, the 
Revisionist Party and the Jewish Agency reached an agreement on 
enlistment. Though the agreement was not officially ratified until 
1944, most of the remaining IZL members enlisted in the British forces. 
Pennyless, without charismatic leadership, and lacking a critical mass 
of members, the IZL had informally dissolved. 
22 
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While the IZL decayed, the Sternist faction found new roots. In 
September, 1940, Stern founded a new national liberation movement 
called, " Lohami Herut Yisrael," (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), 
or LHI. During 1940-1943, LHI represented 100-300 mostly young, Eastern 
European Jews who were students of Russian revolutionary history, of 
personal terror, and of political assassination as an effective, 
justifiable means to wage a national revolution. Stern also attracted a 
few Polish Betar members, such as Israel Sheib and Natan Yellin-Mor, and 
some extremely militant Palestinian-born Jewish youth who had no 
previous contact with the Revisionist movement. Stern moved LHI far 
from the ideology of Jabotinsky Revisionism by proclaiming a war, not 
just on the Mandatory regime or the White Paper, but on Great Brita in, 
on all of Britain's allies, and on European imperialistic oppression of 
all Middle Eastern peoples. LHI lived "in a pre~l939 world," not only 
viewing the Arabs as rivals, but also as potential anti-imperialistic 
allies. 23LHI believed that the British imperialistic yoke represented 
h d Z
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t e greatest anger to ionism. 
The LHI never acknowledged the Allied cause against Hitler. In 
fact, Stern sent LHI' s Naf ta 1i Lubincz ik in late 1940 to contact the 
Axis powers to gain an anti-British ally. In early 1941, Lubinczik did 
make contact with a German consul in Beirut, but Pritzker and IZL 
intelligence uncovered the scheme and informed the CID, who foiled LHI's 
maneuver. In January, 1942, the British arrested LHI's Freedman 
Yellin-Mor in Syria, on his way to make contact with the Axis powers in 
the Balkans. Stern and LHI believed in a total war on Britain, beyond 
any other ethical or political considerations. Though LHI represented a 
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small, poorly organized, ill-equipped anarchist group active only in 
Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv, LHI terror tied down British soldiers 
who could have been fighting in the North African desert. 
25 
LHI radio and LHI posters proclaimed a direct war of terror on 
British personnel in Palestine. Though LHI was small and politically 
isolated, its operations of arms theft, extortion, robberies, bombings, 
and gunbattles poisoned the entire country. In September, 1940, LHI 
robbed a Anglo-Zionist Bank in Tel Aviv. In December, they blew up the 
Immigration Office in Haifa. 
while trying to rob a bank. 
In January, 1941, the LHI shot two Jews 
In December, 1941, LHI bombs killed two 
British policemen and seriously wounded two others. In January, an LHI 
bomb meant for a British Intelligence officer killed two Jewish 
policemen. LHI engendered an especially bitter hatred amongst the 
Mandatory Administration and police forces. 
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The Jewish Agency sponsored newspapers loudly condemned LHI 
terr or and called upon the Yishuv to "put a stop to such unprecedented 
crimes." 27 Weizmann called upon 
"tragic, futile, un-Jewish resort 
the Yishuv to 
to terrorism." 
repudiate LHI' s 
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Because LHI 
ignored the war effort and because of their tac tics, the vast majority 
of the Yishuv despised the LHI. Tip-offs by Jewish citizens accounted 
for many of the British arrests or shootings of LHI terrorists. The 
British placed a price on Stern's head and displayed his photo in the 
press and on posters. And both Hagana and IZL intelligence handed over 
information regarding LHI to the British CID. By 1942, the British 
security had become more effective in countering LHI assaults. In 
January, 1942, the Mandatory police shot four, reportedly unarmed, LHI 
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members in Tel Aviv. In February, 1942, Mandadory police shot and 
killed Stern. 
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The questionable shootings in January and Stern's controversial 
"murder" aroused some sympathy for the LHI and built a image of Stern as 
a "martyred freedom-fighter." The Jewish Agency used its political 
influence to help reprieve several LHI members from the death sentence. 
After Stern's death, his deputy, Yacov Zelnik, assumed command and 
plotted assassinations and kidnappings of British high officials. Yet 
by the summer of 1942, most of the LHI fighters were apprehended and 
imprisoned, and Zelnik finally surrendered to the police. With the help 
of both Hagana and IZL intelligence, the British police and the Yishuv's 
community rejection kept LHI's terrorist activities at bay and the 
organization remained quiescent for almost the next two years. The 
LHI's flurry.of violence and call to oust Britain was lost in the horror 
of the Nazi triumphs. 
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During 1941, the situation for the Allied armies became 
desperate. With the fall of Ethiopia and the Balkans ·to the Axis, with 
the Germans pressing in on Greece and Turkey, with the political swings 
towards the Fascist-Right in Egypt, with the rise of Rashid Ali in Iraq, 
with the Vichy-French in power in Syria and Lebanon, and with Rommel 
moving eastward in North Africa, Palestine suddenly became a cornerstone 
of desperate Allied hopes. 
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The voices of the Yishuv, particularly from the far Left and the 
kibbutz movements, which had worried that massive enlistment would leave 
Palestine defenseless, became shriller. As the young kibbutznik Yigael 
Allon saw the crisis, " a force protecting the Jewish community is 
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necessary" while "the Jewish community's best men are fighting in a 
variety of fronts far from home and protection of the Yishuv may not be 
forthcoming ••• " 32 Tabenkin and other left-wing leaders distrusted the 
British commitment to safeguard Palestine and the Yishuv. The left-wing 
parties viewed the Yishuv as the last hope of the Jewish people and felt 
that the rural settlements and kibbutzim must assume full responsibility 
to assemble a Hagana corps to protect the Yishuv and the physical 
foundations of the Zionist cause. Even HaShomar HaTzair, which 
traditionally had opposed extensive militarization efforts, cried out 
for mobilization to protect the settlements. Although HaShomar HaTzair 
envisioned a force integrated within the British framework and Kibbutz 
HaMeuchad wanted a separate command, the far Left united in advocating 
the basic notion of a permanent, independent Jewish force in the 
Yishuv. 
Yet right-wing parties protested that the Yishuv's primary 
responsibility required total financial support and enlistment in the 
Allied war effort. And Ben Gurion argued that the Hagana was already 
burdened with illegal immigrations in the face of British opposition and 
that funds and existing manpower must be directed in that direction. 
The debate persisted as the war situation grew more and more grim. 
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In early spring of 1941, Rommel launched his first offensive in 
North Africa, and the British, hard pressed for experienced military 
manpower, released Hagana, and even IZL, prisoners. The British made an 
tacit agreement with the Hagana to allow them to assemble a specia 1 
commando force. In May, 1941, the Hagana National Command appointed a 
special committee to create an independent force to cooperate with the 
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British in defending the Yishuv and the region against the oncoming Axis 
forces. The committee named the corps the "Palmach," or "Strike 
Company," and fielded many commanders from men who had participated with 
Sadeh and Wingate in the FOSH and SNS units. Golomb and Sneh convinced 
the committee to choose Sadeh, as the most logical choice and the best 
qualified commander, to organize the Palmach into a permanent, 
independent, professional, and elite Hagana corps. 
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As with FOSH and the SNS, Sadeh recruited from cities, you th 
movements, private settlements, and, mostly, from the kibbutzim. Many 
of his troops and almost all of his officers came from the ranks of the 
young leftist kibbutzniks who had declined to enlist with the British. 
During the summer of 1941, despite a severe shortage of manpower, 
weapons and funds, the early Palmach developed into a small commando 
force of 400-500 troops. In May, the Palmach corps carried out commando 
raids and intelligence gathering for the British in Syria and raided oil 
refineries along the Lebanese coast. In June, the Palmach participated 
as scouts and guides in the Allied invasion of Syria and Lebanon. The 
early Palmach evolved into an excellent small commando force, yet it 
failed to address the Yishuv's self-defense needs. 
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In the spring of 1942, the alarming Axis victories in North Africa 
ignited a heated debate within the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency over 
the contingencies if Rommel's armies should reach Palestine. The 
arguments were extensions of earlier discussions on the Yishuv's wartime 
priori ties. Many re pre sen ta tives, from a variety of parties, argued 
that the Yishuv and Palestine would be crushed by the Axis armies and 
that plans for withdrawal should be explored. Most parties favored 
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increased general enlistment coupled with the demand for an immediate 
Jewish di vision in the British Army as the most prac ti ca 1 response. 
Distrusting the British commitment to defend Palestine, the far Left 
advocated an uncompromising defense of settlements and the immediate 
mobilization of an independent army. They declared that ultimately only 
an independent Jewish force "could serve as the nucleus for a fight to 
the end by the Jewish community in Ere tz Israe 1." 
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Al though the 
debate remained unresolved, Rommel's second offensive in the early 
summer of 1942 and the 
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British government's response in Pales tine 
altered the context. 
Initially, the British command had rejected joint defense plans, 
concerned that the Hagana and Jewish Agency would gain a position as 
"claimant for services rendered." 
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Yet the impending invasion of 
Rommel's forces encouraged an instant British alliance with the Yishuv. 
The British army sponsored joint training of Palmach and British troops 
at Kibbutz Mishmar HaEmek. While many Pa lmach troops had opposed 
cooperation and reconciliation with the British as long as the White 
Paper remained in place, they eagerly accepted the arms and training 
provided by the British. The British-Palmach force trained in 
conjunction with the "Carmel Plan." Developed by Sadeh and Rattner, the 
Carmel plan envisioned a last stand by the Yishuv against the Nazis by 
fighting a guerrilla war in Palestine's northern hills. The imminent 
danger, the British financial support, and the recruitment efforts of 
the far Left, triggered a substantial enlistment in the Palmach. 
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Kibbutz HaMeuchad's efforts to attract Jewish youth to the kibbutz 
movement and to leftist politics went hand in hand with the mobilization 
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of the Palmach. In November, 1941, Palmach was composed of about 460 
troops, of whom about 100 came from kibbutzim of the far Left. By April 
1942, the Pa lmach amounted to 842 members, of whom over 600 were from 
the kibbutzim of the far Left, 350 from HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 200 from 
Kibbutz HaArtzi, and 70 from Hever HaKvutzot (another kibbutz 
movement). By the late summer of 1942, the Palmach numbered over 1,300 
troops and 65% came from twenty-eight communities of the far Left's 
Kibbutzim, especially from the settlements of Kibbutz HaMeuchad. From 
its inception, the Palmach's leadership and character was linked to the 
left-wing of Socialist-Zionism. The far Left viewed the Palmach as its 
prodigy, as a symbol of courageous national self-defense in the face of 
the Nazi invasion. 
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The invasion never came and the "Carmel Plan" was never tested. 
With the British victory at El Alamein in November, 1942, the tide of 
the North African war shifted and British-Palmach cooperation abruptly 
ended. The British Mandatory forces began confiscating arms and 
arresting Hagana commanders. The Palmach training at Mishmar HaEmek 
ended and the Palmach resumed its status as a "subversive organization." 
The British implemented arms searches on the kibbutzim, arrested Palmach 
commanders, and held politically motivated trials over arms issue to 
prove to the Arabs that British "impartial'' justice had returned to 
Pales tine. The sudden shift in Mandatory policy forced the .Pa lmach 
underground and inspired a growing militancy in the officia 1 Zionist 
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organi.za ti.ons. 
During 1942, the first detailed reports on the Holocaust reached 
the leaders of World Zionism, inspiring a sense of urgency to create a 
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Jewish refuge. In the summer of 1942, the famous Biltmore conference of 
the WZO adopted a more clearly defined "Nationalist" program which 
specified a "Jewish State" as the post-war goals of World Zionism. The 
Biltmore program represented a defeat for the "gradualist" constituents 
of Weizmann and a victory for Ben Gurion and the more "activist" 
elements in the Jewish Agency. In November, following the Biltmore 
resolution, defining independent "Statehood" as post-war goal of Yishuv, 
the Hagana High Command began laying the basis for cons true ting a 
"National Army," while the official Yishuv leadership began debating a 
comprehensive defense policy. 
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The crux of these debates was again the military and financia 1 
priori ties of the Yishuv in wartime. The issue of the Pa lmach, which 
suffered severe budgetary problems during 1941-42, surf aced 
immediately. Without British funding for the Palmach, -the burden would 
be shouldered by the Yishuv. Right-wing parties, especially the 
"Middle-Class Unionists," ( who had been boycotting the Hagana ... s 
National Command at the time of the Palmach's inception) vehemently 
opposed sponsorship of the Palmach; non-Socialist parties emphasized 
that enlistment in the Allied armies and financial aid to the Allied war 
effort were the imperative national duty. Left-wing parties continued 
to assert the necessity of maintaining a permanent Jewish defense force 
and pointed to the achievements of the Pa lmach. The far left also 
voiced concern for preparing for the possibility of fighting the British 
after the war. According to Tabenkin, the leftist bloc "viewed the 
Palmach as the nucleus of a concentrated Jewish power which was 
destined to decide the fate of Zionism at the the end of the war." 
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Ben Gurion emphasized that the Hagana and related funds should be 
directed towards illegal immigration especially in anticipation of the 
refugees after the war. Ben Gurion and Golomb still believed enlistment 
and the eventual formation of Jewish battalions should be the present 
objectives. Yet the crucial factor with regard to the Palmach appeared 
to be money, which was very, very scarce. 
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With so much voiced opposition in the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish 
Agency, and without British financial assistance, the Pa lmach"" s 
continued existence seemed doubtful until Kibbutz HaMeuchad offered an 
origina 1 proposa 1. Conceived of by Israel Livartosky and Sadeh, and 
advocated by Israel Galili and Tabenkin, the Palmach troops would be 
totally supported, housed, fed, and equipped by some of the communities 
of Kibbutz HaMeuchad in exchange for two weeks per month of labor for 
the kibbutzim. For Kibbutz HaMeuchad, the solution would solve the 
shortage of manpower on kibbutzim caused by enlistment and fulfill their 
demands for more vigilant self-defense, developing a 
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"Pioneer-Soldiers" as envisioned by Trumpeldor. 
corps of the 
The ·right-wing parties objected to the large budget for such a 
sma 11 army and feared the formation of a "Red Army," or a "Cossak 
Elite." Indeed, Ben Gurion and other critics from MAPAI also feared that 
the Palmach would evolve into the private army of the radical Left. The 
debate over the Palmach""s future again related to the broader disputes 
raging within the Socialist-Zionist movement and within the MAPAI 
party. But the novelty of the scheme, the growing anti-Zionist behavior 
of the British, and the fact that the scheme solved the financial issue, 
convinced many MAPAiniks to support the plan. Ultimately, a c·ompromise 
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formula was reached, sending 40% of kibbutzim youth to Palmach, 30% to 
the JSP-Hagana, and 30% to British Army. Though the debate over the 
Yishuv's preferences for its underground military continued, the Palmach 
endured the internal strife to become wedded to the kibbutzim of the far 
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Left. 
During 1943, the Palmach struggled through a difficult period of 
transition with the new labor-military structure. A group of Palmach 
men led by Natan Peled declared their opposition to the Palmach's 
marriage with the leftist kibbutzim and stressed the importance of 
maintaining an army's independent, apolitical posture. Some 100-150 men 
dropped out of the Pa lmach' s ranks due to the Pa lmach' s sectarian 
character. Recruiting became difficult with manpower scarce and the 
Palmach's numbers dipped to almost 1000. 
Yet, slowly, the Palmach's prestigious reputation as a fighting 
corps earned it the backing of other elements in the Yishuv's Left, 
specifically from Kibbutz HaArtzi, the second largest kibbutz movement 
in Palestine. The HaShomar HaTzair and its "Hakshora" youth movement, 
which had an enormous following in pre-World War II Europe, were based 
on non-militaristic and anti-elitist values, emphasizing Socialism, 
Pioneering, and Nationalism; but the disaster in Europe combined with 
continued Arab and British opposition to Zionism made their origina 1 
idealism appear obsolete and empty. In search of a new platform, 
HaShomar HaTzair began making overtures to HaKibbutz HaMeuchad regarding 
cooperation in the Palmach during 1943. 
The two kibbutz movements inched their way toward an 
accommodation. They debated the Palmach's structure and character, 
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enlistment, and role of officers, and their problems with recruitment. 
Tabenkin and HaKibbutz HaMeuchad argued for a fixed number of fighting 
elite, for professional soldiers with a totally independent command. 
HaShomar HaTzair's position outlined a two year service followed by 
reserve duty to create a mass militia of superior troops with a large 
body of junior officers who would also serve in the Hagana, and serve as 
the officers in a future Jewish Army. In the end, considerations of 
"National" loyalty to the Hagana's National Command tabled the HaKibbutz 
HaMeuchad proposal and bolstered the HaShomar HaTzair formula. By 1944, 
HaShomar HaTzair and Pa lmach signed a formal recruitment agreement 
aiding the Pa lmach with its manpower shortage and giving Hakshora a 
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national purpose. 
Under the sponsorship of the kibbutzim and leftist youth 
move men ts, the Palmach expanded and developed during the years 
1943-1945. By the end of 1944, the Palmach contained over 1500 troops; 
by the summer of 1945, boosted by the Hakshara youths, the Palmach 
numbered 1900, with subs tan tia 1 uni ts in such urban communities as 
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Peta Tiq'vah. Although officially under the 
Hagana National Command, the Palmach established an independent command 
s true tu re organized in to four regiona 1 bat ta lions: the Gali lee, the 
Jezreel Valley, the Judean Hills, and the Negev. And with the minimal 
resources available , the Palmach began training small naval, air, and 
reconnaissance units near Tel Aviv. Most significantly, the Palmach 
emerged as an elite underground force, a strategic reserve of expert 
commando troops for. special tasks, with a unique military character. Lj.() 
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The Palmach's distinctiveness originated from t.h3 character of its 
troops. Most of the officers, with exceptions like Sadeh, were young. 
Yigal Allon assumed command of the Palmach in May, 1945, at age 28. In 
addition, one-fifth of the recruits were young women. The Palmach 
became a "youth movement in arms." As a "fighting kibbutz," the 
Palmach's spartan life attracted sons and daughters of leftist elites of 
Kibbutzim and Moshavim. As Galili expressed it, "the Palmach was in the 
kibbutz of the settlement movement" and the young "Sabras"(native-born 
Israelis) who participated "were the followers of the doctrines of 
pioneer Zionism--simple, monolithic, and strong." 
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With an unusually 
high percentage of officers, 60%, the Palmach mirrored the egalitarian 
solidarity of the kibbutz by fostering a combination of "freedom and 
discipline, laxity and responsibility" in the relations between 
commanders and troops. By 1945, over 90% of all the Palmach's senior 
officers and over 40% of its rank-and-file were members of Kibbutz 
HaMeuchad. Kibbutzniks of the far Left re presented the origina 1 and 
principle fabric of the Palmach. 
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The Palmach's special character was fostered, not only by the 
background of the recruits, butalsoby the nature of their training. 
Poli tica 1 training and military training were combined. Out of 493 
training hours required of Palmach officers, 120 hours were devoted to 
political-ideological indoctrination. The Palmach's training stressed 
individual initiative, leadership, discipline, and "cadre-building." All 
the youthful, idealistic, egalitarian, and vigorous qualities of kibbutz 
life, coupled with.militant Socialism, were infused into the corps of 
the Palmach, into young kibbutznik-fighters like Allon, Dayan, Yitshak 
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Rabin, and Chaim Bar-Lev. The Palmach developed an elitist 'esprit de 
corps' as the vanguard of the "Pioneering-Nation Building" Left, as the 
direct descendent of the "Pioneer-Soldier" tradition. 
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Ben Gurion and the other critics of the Palmach correctly 
anticipated that the Palmach would emerged as a proud symbol and the 
military arm of the far Left. But the Palmach also became the first 
elite and professiona 1 corps of the underground Hagana. Likewise, in 
early 1944, the far Left affiliates of MAPAI formally split to create 
the independent parties of "HaTunua La'Ahdut HaAvoda" (The Movement for 
the Unification of Labor), under the leadership of Tabenkin, and the 
smaller "Left Poeli Zion." Yet, they remained within the political 
circumference of the official Yishuv. The Pa lmach became the 
"crack-troops" of the Hagana, produ<;ed much of the Hagana 's leadership, 
and remained loyal to the Hagana's National Command. Despite the 
dominance of the far Left over the Palmach staff, which caused suspicion 
among moderates in the MAP AI, the Pa lmach was widely recognized as a 
disciplined body and obedient to the Yishuv government. The far Left 
"battled" Ben Gurion and his MAPAI bloc only in the His tadru t, the Vaad 
Leumi, and Jewish Agency. 
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During 1943, as the underground Hagana grew in strength, 
spearheaded by the evolution of the Palmach, Anglo-Zionist Relations 
worsened. Since the tide of the World War had turned in their favor, 
the British lost interest in Jewish enlistment and requests for a Jewish 
battalion. Mapping out Britain's post-war strategic-diploma tic 
interests in the reg~on, the British Foreign Office feared the potential 
for a Jewish revolt. On January 9, the British seized a Palmach truck, 
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arrested two Palmach men, and confiscated the truck's 10,000 bullets. 
On March 6, the Palmach raided a British armory and recovered the 
confiscated ammunitions "with interest." In early 1943, a Jewish 
infantry battalion in Palestine was sent abroad, contrary to the 
assurances given by the British at the end of 1940. On April 29, the 
British police searched the Jewish Agency office in Tel Aviv, striking a 
another blow to Anglo-Jewish relations. In protest, the Jewish Agency 
temporarily closed its enlistment offices. On March 29, the British 
government offered a post-war reconstruction plan based on the 
continuation of the White Paper, generating angry public demonstrations 
from the Yishuv and stern formal protests from Zionist leaders. During 
the summer of 1943, the public trial of two Hagana men, Eliyahu Reichlin 
and Eliyahu Leusrkin, indicted for stealing arms and ammunition, was 
made into an international condemnation of the Jewish Agency. In July, 
the British arrested Weizmann's bodyguard for possessing a handful of 
ammunition. In the Fall, the British began massive arms searches in the 
kibbutzim. On November 16, a kibbutznik was killed during an arms 
search at Ramat HaKovesh, in the north. The British actions stimulated 
mass anti-British sentiment within an already embittered and traumatized 
Y. h 53 is uv. 
While the British strictly policed the Yishuv and closed the gates 
of Pales tine to Jewish refugees, the Yishuv received ever increasing 
news regarding the true extent of the Holocaust. The en tire Yishuv was 
embittered by the vivid memories of most of the wartime illegal 
immigration operations that ended in disaster, like the fate of the "USS 
S truma." Forbidden to enter Pales tine in December, 1941, the S truma 
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harbored in Turkey until the ship was banished to the Black Sea, where 
the archaic vessal sank and all its 769 passengers perished in February, 
1942. Then in April, 1943, at the Allied Bermuda conference, the 
British government reiterated that Palestine could not be considered a 
place of refuge for the remnants of European Jewry following the war. 
The "civilized" world seemed indifferent to the immense sufferings of 
the Jewish people, infecting the entire Yishuv with despair and interest 
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The Hagana did organize some successful ventures, such as the 
"Underground Railroad," built of bribes, connections, and daring, which 
rescued 4,000 Iraqi and Persian Jews. Information also circulated about 
the valiant fighting of Jewish resistance groups in the doomed Jewish 
ghettos of Europe. Yet most intelligence reports echoed with messages 
of thousands, possibly even millions, of Jews being slaughtered in 
Europe. In desperation, during 1943-1944, Golomb recruited 250 Hagana 
and Palrnach volunteers and composed a bold plan to parachute commandos 
behind German lines, into ghettos, and lead an orchestrated resistance 
movement. Thirty- two Hagana and Pa lrnach troops did parachute in to the 
Balkans, including the young poet Hanna Szenech, but the Nazis caught 
and executed many of the commandos, and crushed the staged revolts. In 
early 1944, despite the pleas of Yishuv leaders, the British command 
cancelled the parachute scheme. Similarly, despite the pleas of Jewish 
leaders in London and Washington, the Allied air forces, engaged in day 
and night bombings over Germany, rejected proposals to bomb 
concentration camps. In the eyes of the Yishuv, even the Allies, 




In the winter of 1944-1945, the Yishuv's official bodies debated 
the post-war response to Britain. The General Zionists, moderate 
MAPAiniks, and even HaShomar HaTzair, argued that the situation had not 
yet arrived at a state of emergency and the Yishuv should not resort to 
anti-British violence. HaShomar HaTzair opposed using force to resist 
arms searches, stressing that the situation had not yet reached a state 
of "maximal emergency;" but the majority of the left-wing argued for 
more forceful reaction. 56 More militant right-wing parties, 
MAPAiniks like Golomb, and the Kibbutz HaMeuchad faction prophesied that 
conflict with the Mandatory was inescapable. As Golomb put it, "we 
shall be forced to fight a zealot's war and the war will be the 
foundation over which the political roof can be laid." 
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Weizmann argued for moderation and res train t in . spite of the 
tragic climate of the moment, for the Yishuv to wait until the war ended 
before making any fateful decisions. But even Ben Gurion and moderate 
MAPAiniks felt that Weizmann acted too compromisingly towards the 
British. In November, Ben Gurion temporarily resigned from the 
Chairmanship of the Jewish Agency to protest British policy and the 
obsolesence of the conciliatory posture of Weizmann. Al though the 
official Yishuv leadership failed to reach a definite plan and 
timetable, the consensus favored restraint until the culmination of the 
war, the continuation of illegal immigration, and a "wait and see" 
attitude towards Anglo-Zionist relations. Depending upon post-war 
British policy in Palestine, the possibility that the Hagana might 




With the Allies gaining the offensive against the Nazis, with the 
German forces beaten out of North Africa, and with the safety of 
Pales tine assured, war drums, long subdued by the danger of an Axis 
victory, sounded in the "unofficial" quarters of the Yishuv. As the 
British continued to enforce the White Paper, to turn away escaping 
refugees, while the news about the Ghetto resistance and nightmarish 
facts about the reality of Hitler's "Final Solution" surfaced, the 
uneasy truce be tween the mi 1 i tan t Yi s hu v and the British began to 
unravel. The tragic prophecies of Jabotinsky had come true and the 
militant, revolutionary program of the far Right gained credence and 
. . 59 increasing support. 
By 1943, however, enlistment and inactivity had eroded the ranks 
of the IZL. In the autumn of 1943, Merridor tried to organize a united 
resistance movement from the remnants of the IZL and LHI, and from the 
restless elements in the Hagana. But LHI had no faith in cooperation 
with the Hagana and LHI-IZL relations remained tense •. IZL intelligence 
had been informing on LHI during 1941-1942 and the old scares of the 
Raziel-Stern conflict lingered. On September 3, 1943, the LHI killed 
Israel Pritzkier, the skillful IZL intelligence officer. As LHI's 
Yellin-Mor recalled, "after our split with the IZL, hard feelings grew 
up ••• and hard feelings between comrades-in -arms can be worse than 
be tween enemies • " 
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LHI refrained from joining but some restless Hagana men responded 
affirmatively. Binyamin Eliau and Yosef Idelberg of the Hagana in Haifa 
and even some Palmach fighters in the Jerusalem company, including Sadeh 
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and Shimon Avidan, showed interest in establishing a joint political 
body dedicated to ending British rule and to forming a Jewish national 
army. Merridor and Lankin of the IZL, and Colonel Aharon of the Hagana 
formed a triumvirate council which founded an underground body called, 
"Am Loham" (Fighting Nation). Am Lo ham formulated plans for 
assassinating and kidnapping British high officials, but the unity 
failed to last very long. In December, Hagana Intelligence uncovered Am 
Lo ham's existence. Fearing the IZL initiated merger would adversely 
effect the Hagana, the Hagana High Command ordered its men to withdraw 
inunediately. A few Hagana men defected to the IZL but most complied 
with the order. Am Loham fell apart. The revolt against the Mandate 
would not be "united. " 
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In December, 1943, the ranks of IZL swelled from a small influx of 
Polish Betarim and from the Jewish soltjiers arriving in General 
Wardys laws Ander' s "Free Polish Army" which had swept through Russia, 
Persia, and in to the Middle East. Many of these men had been hardened 
by brutal imprisonment under Stalin. They were also· gripped by the 
knowledge that their families were dying in Hitler's ovens, and 
convinced that the Allies refused to do enough to save them. Of the 
4000 Polish Jews in Ander's corps, some 1000 elected to stay in 
Palestine, including Menachem Begin. 
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After some difficulty, Begin, a well-known former Betar leader, 
obtained his release from Ander's regiment. LHI's Sheib tried to 
recruit Begin to assume command of LHI with the hope that Begin could 
reunite LHI and IZL. But as a disciple of Jabotinsky, Begin envisioned 
constructing a professional, underground resistance and he disapproved 
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of the persona 1-terror tac tics of the LHI. After the collapse of Am 
Loham, Merridor relinquished command and Begin was appointed Supreme 
Commander of the IZL. 
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Begin started to reorganize and to rejuvenate the IZL. He named 
Merridor as his deputy with orders to build a general staff, recalled 
enlisted IZL soldiers from Allied armies abroad, and successfully 
recruited from the Yishuv"" s middle-class and Sephardic communities. 
Indeed, the Yishuv's slowly _growing oriental urban community, which 
lacked a Socialist tradition, provided Begin with 25%-35% of his 
recruits. By early 1944, the IZL possessed approximately 1000-1500 
fighters and emerged as a small, yet superbly organized, resistance 
movement. Equally essential, Begin reinstated formal fund raising in 
Palestine and abroad, and he developed the infrastructure of a 
political-underground movement to replace the shattered support of the 
NZO. 
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Revisionist leaders like Altman envisioned the IZL as a military 
arm merely to threaten the Mandatory government into ·negotiation, but 
Begin fe 1 t the time for negotiations had past. He broke the remaining 
links which the IZL kept with the vestiges of the Revisionist Party, 
which was limping back towards the Yishuv""s political center. Like 
Jabotinsky, Begin stressed "maximal pressure for maximal demands." Begin 
believed that, the Jewish people must fight to make themselves a free 
nation living in a land of their own. Begin proclaimed, "a Jewish State 
is now necessary to save us. Our people are living on a volcano." The 
IZL"" s logo, an arm clenching a rifle superimposed over a map of "greater 
Israel" with a slogan reading, "Rak Kak," or "Only thus," advertised 
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their maximal goals via the most militant means. Another IZL slogan, 
"in Blood and fire Judah fell, in blood and fire Judah shall rise 
again,"(which paradoxically was also the symbol of the original 
HaShomar) stressed the national trial of life or death that lay ahead 
for the Jewish people. 
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Begin viewed the "poli tica 1 factor" as the key ingredient. Though 
Begin reserved the power of ultimate choice over IZL's targets, he 
granted full tactical command to the IZL general staff and concentrated 
on IZL's political aims. Although he maintained contact with LHI and 
respect for their cause, he opposed the LHI's personal-terror tactics as 
counter-productive, stressing that, "if you kill an individual, there 
will be another individual." 
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Begin, like Jabotinsky before him, 
stressed that terror must be orchestrated with political timing, that 
tar~ets must be chosen with politics in mind. Begin understood that the 
IZL's military punch must be combined with a vigorous propaganda 
campaign of posters, newspapers, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts. 
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Begin recognized that, for the IZL successfully to gather support for a 
war against the Mandatory forces, IZL initially needed tacit approval 
from the Yishuv, to seize "the proper balance of official condenma tion 
and public toleration." 
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By 1944, convinced that the Allies could not lose the war, that 
diplomacy with the Mandatory regime would prove useless without a Jewish 
show of force, and that the Jewish Agency behaved apa the tica lly and 
debated esoterically in the face of the desperate situation, Begin and 
IZL prepared to act. On February 1, 1944, Begin "declared war" on the 
British Mandatory regime. With the war against the Nazis still in 
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progress, Begin stipulated that British military targets were not to be 
attacked. And to stress the distinction between the IZL and LHI, Begin 
emphasized that IZL terror was "never against individuals" but a "War of 
Liberation" against the institutions, administration, and police forces 
of the Mandatory regime. IZL posters denounced the British: 
There. is no longer an armistice be tween Jewish you th and the 
British administration in the Land of Israe 1, which . hands our 
brothers over to Hitler ••• Four years have passed since the war 
began and a 11 the hopes in your hearts have evaporated ••• the 
British regime has sea led its shamefu 1 be tray al of the Jewish 
people ••• there no longer is an armistice between the Jewish 
people and the Bri5~sh administration ••• our people are at war 
with this regime. 
In most cases, the IZL command warned British personne 1 before 
their attacks, yet casualties were unavoidable. In February, IZL 
launched a wave of anti-British attacks, blowing up the Tax and 
Immigration offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. In late February, 
they blew up CID stations in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. In March, IZL 
blew up the Mandatory Police Headquarters in Tel Aviv and CID 
headquarters in Haifa. In May, they seized a government radio station 
in Ramele. In July, IZL gutted the Land Registry Office in Jerusalem, 
killing two Arab constables. In August, IZL raided three CID barracks 
and stole their weapons. In September, the IZL attacked four British 
police stations, killing four Arab policemen and seizing large 
quantities of weapons and ammunition. On September 27, the IZL sounded 
a Shofar (a ceremonial ram's horn) on Mount Zion in Jerusalem, an act 
outlawed since the riots of 1928. Two days later, the IZl attacked a 
Mandatory stronghold at Tegart Fortress in Haifa. From February to 




Meanwhile, LHI emerged from hibernation. After Stern's death, 
Zelnik's surrender, and the purging of another leader named Giladi, a 
triumvirate of Yellin-Mor, Sheib, and Yi tzak Shamir assumed leadership 
of the LHI. With Yellin-Mor in prison, Shamir reorganized the group, 
set up various branches, laid down rules, established a propaganda 
department, and enlisted a permanent strike force. After twenty-three 
LHI people escaped through a tunne 1 at the La trun prison in November, 
1943, including Yellin-Mor, the LHI regrouped. New members were added 
from the trickle of Polish refugees and from Ander's corps. By 1944, 
LHI numbered some 300-400 fighters, including six women. When the IZL 
revolt started in February, 1944, the LHI unilaterally joined in the 
fight against the Mandatory and began terrorizing British personne 1. 
According to Yellin-Mor, "the Irgun were only attacking buildings. 
And we were laughing at them ••• the British would simply reconstruct the 
buildings with our money. We thought it more effective to aim at the 
lives of the British." 
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The LHI terrorized British personne 1 with guns and booby-trapped 
mines. In February, the LHI killed two British policemen. They also 
blew up a car in attempting to assassinate a British official which 
killed two policemen and a Jewish bystander. And they engaged in 
numerous gunbattles with the police, and attempted to bomb Mandantory 
vehicles. In March, they shot three policemen in Tel Aviv. In August, 
they made several attempts to kidnap and assassinate Sir Harold 
MacMichael, the British High Commissioner. In September, they shot the 
highly effective, British agent Tom Wilkin. The LHI spread fear and 
hatred amongst the Mandatory authorities and throughout most of the 
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Yishuv. 72 
Ostracized by the Jewish community and hunted by the police, the 
disorganized LHI lived the nomadic life of fugitives. Unlike the IZL, 
the LHI possessed no secret armories, always carried personal weapons, 
and resisted arrest. As Yellin-Mor explained: 
Our slogan was 'kill or be killed, but don't be arrested .... 
Prison could have destroyed our movement. Conditions in the 
detention camps were not bad and many people were broken. They 
became neutral. And I admit that in 1944, most Jews were quite 
satisfied with British rule ••• if you had taken a vote, perhaps 
80-90% would have given you a good opinion of the British. But 
that is not the point they were the alien power and we had to 
fight the.;13 to gain our freedom, whether they were liberal or 
inhuman. 
During the spring and summer of 1944, Begin's and the IZL 
command's attempts to merge LHI with the IZL ended in frustration. 
Begin urged Shamir to abandon LHI's personal terror tactics which caused 
British reprisals and arms searches that hurt the IZL and, therefore, 
their mu tua 1 war on the Manda tory. Though there still existed hard 
feelings between the IZL and LHI members over Jabotinsky's doctrines, 
essentially, their aims ran parallel since the IZL had' declared war on 
the British. By the end of the summer, Yellin-Mor agreed to cooperation 
but not a complete merger. By October, they established a tacit working 
agreement that specified the LHI would relinquish the policy of carrying 
personal weapons, a tactic which had led to numerous and useless clashes 
with Mandatory police, and would coordinate their strikes with the IZL. 
From February to October, 1944, Jewish terror against the Mandatory 
regime was coordinated and frequent. 
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Yet while the LHI and IZL made war on the British, Anglo-Jewish 
Agency relations suddenly improved. In the spring of 1944, Churchill 
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finally ordered the formation of a "Jewish Army Group" attached to the 
British Eighth Army and mobilized from Jewish recruits already enlisted 
in British forces. By that summer, a Jewish Brigade finally emerged, 
consisting of 3,500 troops and 350 officers. Some of the Yishuv' s 
leadership received the establishment of the Jewish Brigade with mixed 
feelings, as "too little too late," or as a deception to remove more 
Jewish soldiers from Palestine; but most perceived of it as a thaw in 
Anglo-Zionist affairs. Ben Gurion and Sharett felt the Jewish division 
offered addi tiona 1 military experience to thousands of Jews from the 
Yishuv and Weizmann promoted it as a major diplomatic achievement. At 
this same time, the British government intimated that a new partition 
plan for Pales tine, more generous to the Yishuv than the Peel Plan of 
1937, was being considered in London and in Washington. Anglo-Zionist 
relations appeared to be warming. It appeared that the cooperation, the 
moderation, and the patience exhibited by the Yishuv would indeed be 
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rewarded after the war. 
Yet the terrorism of the two "dissident" organizations provided a 
constant thorn in the side of Weizmann's "British reciprocation" 
formula. By 1944, despite the protests of the far Left bloc, the Jewish 
Agency and the WZO were gradually incorporating the remnants of the 
Revisionist Party into Zionism's "official" political sphere. When the 
IZL first declared war on the Mandatory regime in February, Ben Gurion 
and most of the Jewish Agency fe 1 t that the Revision is ts had betrayed 
the agreements imp lie it in the Bi 1 tmore program. Most of the 
non-Socialist and Socialist parties supported the Biltmore platform and 
agreed to wait for the unveiling of British post-war policy, with the 
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notable exception of HaShomar HaTzair (which sought independent 
agreement with the Arabs subsequent to any plans for statehood). Ben 
Gurion sent Dov Joseph of the Jewish Agency to confer with Revisionist 
Leaders. Joseph quickly discovered that the Revisionist Party, greatly 
diminished in stature by the war, held no influence with the IZL. 
Within the WZO, some wished to negotiate with the "Committee for a 
Jewish Army," an IZL sponsored group in America, led by Pierre Van 
Paissen; but Ben Gurion argued persuasively that, since the IZL excluded 
themselves from the WZO, then they could not expect recognition. Ben 
Gurion became increasingly convinced that the LHI and, especially, the 
IZL represented a serious challenge to the Jewish Agency's authority and 
an extreme threat to the Zionist cause as military-political machines 
outside the compromising influence of the Yishuv's official political 
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arena. 
As the British police force became ever more exasperated and 
alarmed by rising Jewish terrorism, the Mandatory adminis tra ti on began 
applying immense pressure on the Jewish community to help curb the 
violence. The British threatened to make severe reprisals against the 
en tire Yishuv if the Jewish Agency failed to combat Jewish terrorism. 
Most right-wing, religious, and leftist parties in the Vaad Leumi 
opposed cooperating with the British po lice as long as the White Paper 
still remained in effect. Both moderate General Zionists like Weizmann 
and moderate MAPAiniks like Ben Gurion and Share tt argued persuasively 
that the dissidents' defiance of the Yishuv "establishment" jeopardized 
potentially fruitful, and delicate, Anglo-Zionist negotiations. Nearly 




On April 2, 1944, the Jewish Agency published its official policy 
on the dissident organizations which called for voluntary efforts to 
stop the terror, the extortion, and the propaganda of the IZL and LHI by 
isolating the groups' members within the Yishuv. Ben Gurion supported 
the media blitz against the dissidents but warned that· the Hagana might 
resort to stronger measures, that "if there is no alternative, we shall 
face force with force. It will be a tragedy but a smaller tragedy than 
the danger inherent in a small group gaining control over the entire 
Jewish community." 
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The Jewish Agency hoped community isolation and vigilant efforts 
by the Mandatory police might quickly exhaust the IZL and the LHI. In 
April, two LHI members were arrested for killing a British policeman 
after a tip-off from the Hagana intelligence. Because of an IZL 
informant, the British arrested fifty IZL men, including Arieh Ben 
Eliezer of the High Command. In conjunction with police action, the 
official Jewish press vigorously condemned the IZL and LHI as "criminal 
Luna tics ••• deeply despised by every member of the Jewish community." 79 
The Jewish Agency issued public statements, declaring that the 
"deadly hand which directed these operations is unwittingly or 
maliciously helping the enemies of the Jewish people." 
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After LHI 
and IZL attacks in March, the Jewish Agency declared a day of protest 
and fas ting. The Jewish Agency hoped that an energetic media campaign, 
voluntary community isolation, and the muscle of the Mandantory would 
manage to suffocate the dissident organizations. 
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After the April resolution, the Hagana protected the Yishuv from 
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extortion and the WZO establishment disrupted IZL fund raising in the 
United States. But the Jewish Agency's "anti-dissident" strategy failed 
to dis lodge the IZL' s support in Pales tine. 
muffled the Jewish Agency's media machine. 
IZL counter-propaganda 
And British police 
operations played into the hands of the IZL-LHI's strategy by harassing 
much of Jewish population. Likewise, British corporal punishment only 
generated sympathy from the Jewish community. Most importantly, the 
British CID found the Jewish communal reluctance to inform on fellow 
Jews an impenetrable barrier and Mandatory police failed to arrest the 
ring-leaders of the LHI and IZL. The dissident organizations were badly 
hurt by arrests, shootings, imprisonment, and deportation of their 
members, but not bled to death. 
While the British government began making overtures regarding the 
establishment of a Jewish state, they sternly warned the Jewish Agency 
that Jewish terrorism must first be eliminated. The pa ths of the 
British Government and of the Jewish Agency seemed to run more and more 
parallel, and Ben Gurion, Weizmann, and Moshe Sharret became more and 
more determined not to let the LHI and the IZL obstruct their course. 
With the anti-dissident campaign as outlined in April failing, Ben 
Gurion reluctantly agreed to attempt reaching a negotiated accord with 
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the IZL and the LHI. 
From August to late October, 1944, Ben Gurion sent Sneh, who knew 
Begin in Poland, and Golomb to persuade the dissidents to comply to the 
authority of the Jewish Agency. Golomb met severa 1 times with LHI' s 
Yellin-Mor but to no avail. Golomb argued that LHI terror violated 
communal discipline, undermined the international status of the Jewish 
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Agency, and jeopardized the political negotiations with Britain. But 
LHI was so deeply underground, so isolated, and so out of touch with 
diplomacy, that Golomb's arguments proved fruitless. 
Yellin-Mor countered that LHI's tactics exaggerated the strength 
of the underground and placed the Palestine problem in the international 
spotlight. He refused to accept that diplomacy could change Mandatory 
policy. He told Golomb that sooner or later the Hagana "would have to 
start fighting the British too, otherwise the Jewish Agency would lose 
control over the people here," so even if the Hagana "was only 
considering the possibility of one day having to fight the British, he 
ought to come to terms with the IZL and us." 83 Golomb and Yellin-Mor 
found little common ground for discussion. 
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The more protracted conferences with Begin, Eliahu Lankin, and the 
the IZL command were also marked by different basic assumptions. Sneh 
and Golomb noted that the IZL terror tactics would upset the Jewish 
Agency's. delicate negotiations with Britain regarding a partition plan. 
Sneh stressed that Begin was out-of-touch with Anglo-Zionist diplomacy. 
IZL's terror tactics, Sneh argued, were inappropriate to international 
situation, hurting the war effort, and giving Britain an excuse to 
suppress a Jewish state. Golomb noted that British searches for IZL 
terrorists had uncovered Hagana workshops and arms caches, which 
weakened the Yishuv's overall defenses. Golomb and Sneh noted that the 
Jewish Agency re presented the legitimate spokesman for the Yishuv' s 
majority, " the elected leadership of the entire Jewish community," 
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and that the IZL defied that authority. Most emphatically, Golomb 
stressed that the IZL did not represent the Yishuv, yet they had taken 
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it upon themse 1 ves to act as rep re sen ta ti ves. The Hagana was the 
Yishuv's official underground army, yet the IZL performed military 
operations unilaterally. 
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Begin insisted that the IZL would continue to fight the Mandatory 
regime. He believed that the IZL's demonstration of Jewish power and 
determination gave dignity to the Zionist cause, presented a positive 
image of Jews, pressured the British regime, raised international 
awareness of the Palestine problem. Begin and the IZL staff decried the 
British as "Nazis" for their war guilt, confirmed in July by Foreign 
Minister Anthony Eden's refusa 1 to bomb the Hungarian railway lines to 
the concentration camps. Britain deserved the punishment it received. 
Begin believed the British would never voluntarily leave Palestine and 
that the Jewish Agency was being baited into apathy. 
As for a· partition plan, there existed "no good partition 
agreement," Begin remarked, " the homeland is a unity and cannot be cut 
up." 
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As for the Jewish Agency's rightful authority, "we cannot 
accept that you have a monopoly in the political field," Begin said,"for 
we also have political objectives, and they are no less legitimate than 
yours." 88 On several occasions, Begin reiterated that the IZL was 
prepared "to view Ben Gurion as the leader of the community ••• as the man 
who must manage the political and military war ••• but on one condition--
that he should begin the war on the foreign ruler." 
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By the end of 
October, Golomb and Sneh were firmly convinced that Begin could not be 
persauded to call off the IZL revolt. At their last meeting on October 
31, Golomb warned Begin that if he did not comply to the Jewish Agency's 
authority, the Hagana would take steps to "finish" the IZL. 90 
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By mid-October the partition plans for Palestine rapidly gained 
momentum in London and Washington. Both Churchill and Roosevelt voiced 
their support for creating a Jewish state. Churchill and other 
traditionally pro-Zionist British statesmen intimated to Weizmann that 
they personally favored the creation of an independent Jewish state. 
But part of the price was the erradica tion of Jewish terrorism. The 
British demanded that the Jewish Agency respond in one of two ways: the 
Hagana intelligence must gather and submit a list of names for British 
security to investigate; or the Hagana must act independently to crush 
the dissident organizations. Providing a list risked the chance that 
the IZL intelligence might also submit a list of names regarding the 
Hagana and Palmach; and a Yishuv-wide British police operation might 
generate more anti-British hostility and might uncover strongholds, arms 
caches, and vital information of the Hagana. Independent Hagana action 
risked igniting a civil war. If the Hagana took forceful action against 
fellow Jews, it would violate the image it had established with such 
policies as To'har HaNeshek and Havlaga. Such action would constitute a 
"corrupt use of weapons" and break sacred ethnic boundaries. 
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During late October and early November, the Jewish Agency debated 
whether the Hagana should take anti-dissident action. The far Left, 
particularly Ahdut HaAvodah and Left Poeli Zion, opposed cooperation 
with the British and emphasized that the Palmach would refuse to take 
part in anti-dissident action. Rabbi Yehuda Fishman of Mizrachi, and 
Yitshak Gruenbaum, Pertez Bernstein, and Yitzhak Schmorak of the General 
Zionists, spoke out against a war between "brothers" and cooperating 
with the British while the White Paper policy remained fixed. Fishman 
100 
noted that " as long as the White Paper exists, those who execute it are 
our enemies " 92 ' that without the White Paper there would not be 
Jewish terrorism. Gruenbaum and Fishman supported an intense propaganda 
campaign and submitted that the British should be informed that the 
Jewish Agency would not aid the Mandatory in an anti-terrorist campaign 
unless the White Paper was repealed. 
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As the negotiations with Begin and Yellin-Mor failed to deliver 
results and as the British government and Weizmann pressured the Jewish 
Agency to act, Ben Gurion, Sharett, Golomb, and even Sneh strongly 
advocated forceful action by the Hagana and cooperation with the British 
police forces. Sharett proclaimed that, "civil war would be worth while 
if it could save our future and salvage our chances, which are clearly 
discernable on the po li tica 1 horizon ••• by cooperating with the 
authorities we prove to them and to the who le world that we oppose 
terrorism ••• " 94 Golomb stressed that, "if the Yishuv did not want to 
commit political suicide, it had to wake up to the fact that something 
was creating a stink right under its nose." 
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Golomb argued that if 
anti-dissident measures were not taken, then the British government 
might draw the conclusion that " we have no yet earned the the right to 
independence and that it cannot rely on us in this particular corner of 
the Middle East." 96 Sneh advocated for the Hagana's full cooperation 
"with the authorities and with the po lice." 
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The Jewish Agency 
Executive could not reach a consensus, so the matter went before the 
Vaad Leumi. 
While the Ytshuv' s re pre sen ta ti ves debated the issue of 
anti-dissident action, Ben Gurion and Golomb prepared militarily for 
101 
that scenario. On October 18, Golomb returned from London to announce a 
new campaign would begin to end Jewish terrorism: 
The dissident organizations are causing untold damage to 
Zionist diplomacy. Thus it is no longer possible simply to 
condemn terrorism. lnforma tion and education will no longer do 
the job, neither will the articles written in the daily press. 
If there is no alterna~~ve, we will have to fight these crazy 
and damaging actions. 
On October 20, Golomb ordered Avidan and Allon to assemble and train 170 
"politically reliable" men for anti-dissident action. The Hagana 
command accepted Galili's demand that Pa lmach involvement in 
anti-dissident action would be voluntary. Most of the anti-dissident 
squad consisted of left-wing kibbutzniks of the Palmach and Hagana who 
adamantly opposed Revisionism and suspected the political intentions of 
the IZL. Meanwhile, Hagana intelligence continued to gather information 
on the dissidents as they had since April, the IZL and LHI leaders were 
repeatedly warned of the consequences of non-compliance, and the 
official Yishuv leadership continued to discuss anti-dissidents 
methods. 
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The leading advocate for swift Hagana action against the LHI and 
the IZL was Ben Gurion, who feared the growing military-political 
strength of the dissident movements. The opponents of Ben Gurion' s 
"anti-Fascist crusade" believed that Ben Gurion was only trying to 
strengthen the position of himself and MAPA! in the Yishuv. Gurion 
understood the inherent political danger if the Hagana took military 
action to suppress the dissidents, for as he remarked in 1941: 
Perhaps some times die ta tors hip is necessary, especially during 
a big historical crisis. But there is always a danger in it 
because it is in the nature of die ta tors hip that it loves to 
perpetuate itse1fo
0
even when it turns into a destructive and 
harmful force. 
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But Ben Gurion believed that, not only his own power and authority was 
at stake, but that the dissidents' growing strength threatened the 
entire Zionist enterprise. The dissidents' "revolt" could not succeed in 
driving the British regime out of Palestine, Ben Gurion argued, but the 
LHI and IZL violence offered the British an excuse for harsh 
countermeasures against the Yishuv, turned the world's attention away 
from the plight of European Jewry, upset the Partition scheme by 
arousing the Arabs, and, most importantly, represented a direct threat 
to the Jewish Agency's authority. 
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After a heated debate with many dissenting voices, the Vaad Leumi 
voted to take unilateral action against the terrorists without involving 
the British. Although the Jewish Agency publicly protested the 
Mandatory government's deportation of 251 detainees to Eritrea on 
October 25, objecting to removal of any Jew from Palestine, they were 
deeply absorbed in their anti-dissident plans. By October 25, the Inner 
Zionist Counci 1 confirmed that drastic measures were indeed required. 
On October 26, the Jewish Agency press announced a "unanimous decision" 
that "the Yishuv and all its powers will do their best to stop terror," 
though it made no mention of the methods to be used. 
The political risks involved caused the Jewish Agency to remain 
ambivalent and indecisive. An all-out effort was rejected in favor of a 
more limited operation involving surveillance, disrupting IZL 
operations, and in some cases arrests. The operation was designed to 
break the internal security, the financial structure, and the morale of 
the dissident organizations. The Pales tine Post dee la red that, "the 
authorities may rest assured that the Yishuv as a whole has its own 
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accounts to settle with the terror is ts 11 and would help the Mandatory 
11eradica te a dangerous cancer. 11 lOZ 
Meanwhile, IZL's revolt continued, a IZL-LHI merger gradually 
solidified, and LHI continued to pursue its independent operations. 
Lord Moyne, British Colonial Secretary, was widely regarded within the 
Yishuv as a war criminal and an anti-Semite. Rumors circulated of his 
alleged insensitivity to the plight of Jews perishing in the Europe. He 
was associated with the Struma tragedy and with Britain dropping the 
Joe 1 Brand Plan of exchanging thousands of Allied trucks with Germany 
for the lives of thousands of Jewish children. The hostility that the 
IZL and the LHI held for British officials like Moyne was well known. 
Moyne symbolized British power in Middle East, and LHI had already tried 
to kidnap him. As Yellin-Mor explained, 11 we weren't in a position to 
kill Churchill in London, so the logical second best was .to hit Lord 
M • c • 11 103 oyne 1n ai.ro. 
On November 6, LHI's Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Tsouri 
assassinated Lord Moyne and his driver in Cairo. The. news of Mayne's 
killing shook the Middle East and Great Brita in. Begin and the IZL 
commanders, furious that the LHI opera ti on was taken without prior 
knowledge, broke off IZL relations with LHI. In London, Moyne's 
as sass ina tion appalled the British government. As a close personal 
friend of Moyne, Churchill felt agrieved and angry. On November 17, 
Churchill solemnly addressed the House of Commons: 
If our dreams for Zionism should be dissolved in the smoke of 
the revolvers of assassins and if our efforts for its future 
should provoke a new wave of banditry worthy of the Nazi 
Germans, many persons like myself will have to reconsider the 
positio't
04
that we have maintained so firmly for such a long 
time. 
104 
British Zion is ts like Churchill and Lord Gort threatened Weizmann that 
if the Jewish Agency failed to demonstrate its utter refutation of 
anti-British terror, the partition resolution· would be withdrawn and 
Zionist dreams of independent statehood would be buried. Deeply shocked 
by Moyne's killing and alarmed by the British reaction, Weizmann 
instructed the Yishuv to eradicate terrorism and warned, " that I shall 
not be able to continue with my political work if terrorism is not 
suppressed ••• it must be to prove to Mr. Churchill that we earn what is 
• II 105 given to us. 
When the Jewish Agency Executive met on November 18-19, LHI's act 
had provided a pre text for the Jewish Agency to take stiff er measures 
against Jewish terrorism. In the Jewish Agency Executive, only Fishman 
still objected to any Hagana action against the LHI and the IZL, while 
Gruenbaum and Sharmok objected to cooperating with the Mandatory 
forces. Ben Gurion and the majority prevailed. In public speeches on 
November 20, 1944, Ben Gurion and Moshe Share tt declared war on the 
dissident movements and announced a four-point program for the Yishuv 
citizenry: dismiss from workplaces and schools all terrorist or those 
who aid terrorists; refuse shelter or protection to terrorists; resist 
threats or extortion by the terrorist organizations; and "to render all 
necessary assistance" to the Hagana and the Mandatory police in stamping 
out terrorism. Share tt proclaimed that, "terrorism in Pales tine is 
calculated to wreck the chances of our political struggle and destroy 
our internal peace ••• our very existence here is at stake." 
106 
On 
November 21, at a Histadrut convention, Ben Gurion declared: 
All the long tradition of Jewish mercy must be forgotten, if 
we are to have mercy in the future ••• I say that the terrorists 
cons ti tu te a far greater danger to 
authorities and the police ••• without 
shall fail to rid ourselves of this 
cooperate are helping the terrorists. 
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us than they do to the 
cooperating with them we 
i.'6~1 and a 11 who ·do not 
Believing in Britain's post-war promises and believing that IZL and LHI 
terrorism jeopardized Bri tish's goodwill towards Zionism, Ben Gurion 
ordered the mobilization of the Hagana's anti-dissident squad, in an 
operation known as the "Season," a hunting season on the dissidents. 
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The Hagana waged a one-sided civil war on the IZL and the LHI. In 
mid-November, the Season opened on the LHI with the Hagana kidnapping a 
LHI member and seizing the LHI archives in Haifa. Yellin-Mor threatened 
Golomb with re ta lia ti on against the Jewish Agency and the Hagana 
command. But LHI was already weakened by arrests, small, poorly armed, 
and isolated. Still, the LHI was a tightly knit group with few informers 
and dangerous because the LHI carried personal weapons at all times. 
Dayan negotiated with LHI's Joseph Liebstein and the LHI agreed to 
interrupt their activities to avoid an encounter with the Hagana. The 
LHI member was released. Golomb made false, or halfhearted, overtures 
for a merger of LHI in to the Hagana, promising increased activism 
against the British; but he had already achieved his prime objective, 
the elimination of the LHI from the Season. The LHI ha 1 ted their 
operations for six months and the Hagana halted their attacks on LHI. 
By mid-December, the Hagana turned their full attention toward the IZL. 
Tactically, Golomb had eliminated the possibility of uniting LHI and IZL 
against the Hagana. The Jewish Agency viewed LHI as merely a "classic 
terrorist group," while the IZL represented the greatest challenge to 
the political hegemony of Ben Gurion and the Jewish Agency. 
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The Hagana's operation possessed two specific goals: close down 
the dissidents' source of funds in the Yishuv and detain the dissident 
commanders. The Hagana successfully cut off IZL funding but internment 
of the IZL officers proved difficult. As an underground army, the 
Hagana found it difficult to hold the IZL men for very long in homes or 
apartment buildings. Many were re leased because of the protests of 
local residents. And despite the Hagana' s greater total numbers, the 
IZL did not concern itself with defending settlements as did the Hagana, 
so the Hagana's ability to concentrate troops in one place was not 
vastly superior to the IZL. 
To effectively eliminate the IZL, the Jewish Agency confronted the 
choice between more visible and direct assaults on the IZL, such as 
assassinating or executing the IZL leadership, or cooperation with the 
Mandatory forces to gain imprisonment facilities. Both choices involved 
the grave breeches of ethnic solidarity and the potential political 
risks of infuriating the general Yishuv against the Jewish Agency. Yet 
Ben Gurion and Golomb recognized that any potentially controversial 
actions taken by the Hagana would be supported by the 
political-propaganda backing of the official Yishuv media. They elected 
to cooperate with the British police. 
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By January, the Hagana and the CID coordinated their assault on 
the IZL fighters and its infrastructure. Hagana officers Teddy Kollek 
and Reuven Shiloah acted as liaisons and accompanied British on raids to 
avoid the arrest of Hagana people. IZL members, pro-Jabotinsky 
Revisionists, or sympathizers lost their jobs, were expelled from 
school, and were evicted from their premises. In total, about 250 
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Palmach men under Allon and Avidan carried out tracing, track down, and 
arresting operations. The anti-dissident squads abducted IZL members 
and sympathizers, took them to kibbutzim or caves, and interrogated them 
as to their activities in the organization, their officers' names, and 
any missions they had, or would, carry out. Sometimes the treatment was 
ruthless. In the case of Eli Tavin, the IZL Intelligence Chief seized 
on February 27, 1945, the Hagana held him for over a year, during which 
time they tortured him with ritual executions and brutal tactics. 
At first, the Hagana resolved to hold their own prisoners, but, 
since hiding places were limited, the Hagana began handing their 
prisoners over to the CID. Eventually, the Hagana stopped their 
abductions and just handed information directly over to the CID, who 
carried out the job. The Hagana provided names of wea 1 thy loca 1 
supporters, addresses of printing presses, and bank accounts. Although 
there existed controversy over the qua 1i ty of the names, with some CID 
officials complaining that the Hagana was censoring names to work off 
old political vendettas, the damage to the IZL was heavy. In total, the 
Hagana handed some 700-1000 names of persons and institutions over to 
the CID. Some 300-500 IZL suspects were captured and turned over to the 
police, including Lankin, Merridor, and Landau of the IZL High Command. 
By early March, the Season appeared to be crushing the IZL's 
organizational structure. 
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The Season created a major crisis within the IZL High Command. 
With funds drying up, with weapons caches being confiscated and 
impounded, and with comrades being captured, tortured, imprisoned, or 
deported for detention in East Africa, many IZL commanders naturally 
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called for the most obvious response: full retaliation against the 
Hagana. In the eyes of the IZL, the dominating Left had used the 
machinery of the Yishuv and "joined the Nazi-British in a war against 
us." 
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Begin raged on IZL radio and in the IZL press, likening the 
Hagana' s Season to the murderous fratricide of "Cain" and declaring that 
"we shall repay you Cain." Yet Begin steadfastly refused to initiate an 
all-out civil war. Begin hoped the political tide within the Yishuv 
would shift against the Season policy. He recognized that only the 
British would gain from a battle between the Hagana and the IZL. 
Begin's proposal for restraint, "for no halt in the battle against the 
occupying power and no civil war," ll 3 was reluctantly adopted as IZL 
policy. Begin engineered an IZL policy which placed ultimate 
Nationalist objectives over the immediate survival of the IZL, national 
patriotism over sectarian interests. Civil war was avoided. 
ll4 
In the spring of 1945, Golomb announced that "the Organized Yishuv 
has brought terrorist activity to a standstill." The Season had halted 
IZL extortion, smuggling, and robberies, but the an:es ts gained much 
more publicity. Public opinion within the Yishuv could not tolerate the 
Hagana's "ethnic breach" for long, despite the Jewish Agency's energetic 
propaganda campaign. The biblical injunctions, such as "your destroyers 
shall go forth from you," 
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warning of the dangers of civil war, had 
been ignored. Within the Hagana, there evolved much tension and 
resentment over the Hagana's role in the Season. 
Most of the leadership of the far Left and the Palmach, who had 
refused to sanction or participate in the Season, spoke out bitterly 
against the operation, pressuring Ben Gurion to close the affair. 
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Within the most militant circles of the Hagana, there existed much 
respect and sympathy for the IZL and LHI. Many Hagana officers had 
shared British prison cells in Palestine and in Mauritius with LHI and 
IZL fighters, so, though there remained great po li ti ca 1 differences, 
they fe 1 t a degree of respect and admiration for the dissidents as 
fellow prisoners and as fellow warriors. Many prominant Palmach 
commanders resented their inactivity and murmured against the policy of 
restraint. Some even defected to join the dissident organizations. In 
the struggling Hagana, general morale among the rank-and-file and the 
officers was exceedingly low. The Season evolved into a major public 
relations disaster for the Hagana. ll
6 
In May, 1945, Golomb and Sneh announced the end of the Season 
operation, though Hagana intelligence continued to relay information to 
the British un ti 1 mid-June. On balance, the Season proved a dismal 
failure for the Jewish Agency and the Hagana. From October to May, IZL 
terrorism was quelled and the IZL infrastructure had clearly been 
maimed; but the IZL was not destroyed. Much of the IZL' s higher 
echelons alluded capture, most notably, Begin himself. The Hagana ... s 
quite visible action against fellow Jews corroded the image of the 
"establishment," blemished the Hagana with fratricide, and generated 
sympathy and support for the IZL. The IZL had actually added many new 
recruits during the Season. The persecution of the IZL coupled with 
Begin's policy of res train t adorned the IZL leadership "with a mantle of 
national responsibility." 
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Most significantly to the Jewish Agency, 
the Season produced criticism from the Mandatory administration for its 
limitations and failed to produce any concrete promises or concessions 
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from London. By cooperating with the Mandatory regime and by resorting 
to a demonstration of force, the Jewish Agency had revealed its lack of 
true sovereignty over the Yishuv, underscored Britain's continued 
supremacy, and conceded recognition to the power of the dissident 
organizations. 
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In the war years of 1939-1945, the Yishuv struggled to help defeat 
the Axis powers, to defend the Yishuv, to promote the immigration of 
Jewish refugees to Palestine, and to accommodate an oscillating British 
policy. From this collage emerged distinct underground military bodies 
backed politically by the far Right and by the far Left. The far Left's 
commitment to defending the kibbutzim and the country from the Axis 
threat spawned the development of the Palmach; the Palmach, despite the 
political competition between the far Left bloc and Ben Gurion's 
MAPAiniks, became the loyal, elite corps of the official national 
underground force, the Hagana. From the other side of the political 
spectrum, from the ruins of the Jabotinsky Right, two schisms evolved, 
the LHI and the IZL-- each armed with differing ideology, tactics, and 
purpose, yet both dedicated to ending the British Mandate in defiance of 
the official Yishuv leadership. In 1944, the growing strength and 
impact of the IZL and LHI orchestrated "revolt" conflicted with the 
Anglo-Zionist diplomacy efforts of the official Yishuv, precipitating a 
joint Hagana-Bri tish campaign, the "Season," against the dissident 
groups. In May, 1945, the Season ended in failure with the Hagana badly 
tarnished and with the dissidents intact and still in revolt. As the 
war in Europe drew to a close, the official Yishuv waited to witness 
whether their patient compliance with the British would be rewarded or 
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whether the Hagana might need to find new game to hunt. 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNEASY ALLIANCES: 1945-1948 
In May, 1945, the war in Europe ended and the Yishuv looked 
towards London to see what the future held. The British Labor Party, 
which had voiced its full support of Zionism during the elections, won 
an upset vie tory over Chu re hi 11 and the Conservatives, who had delayed 
deciding on the Palestine issue since the Moyne assassnation. The 
Yishuv rejoiced in the Labor victory which seemingly harkened to the 
speedy establishment of a Jewish state. Yet when the Labor Party 
assumed office in the summer of 1945, under the leadership of Clement 
Attlee, they quickly dispelled the enthusiastic hopes of the Jewish 
people. 
British post-war policy in Palestine, engineered by Foreign 
Minister Ernest Bevin, "became what the Revisionists had always 
contented it was: one based solely on British interests, and 
incompatible with Zionist ambitions." 
1 
No Zionist proposal appeared 
at the post-war Peace Conference and Britain asked an indifferent world 
to absorb Jewish refugees. Britain gave every indication that it had no 
intention of relinquishing Palestine while it paid increasing tribute to 
the value of Anglo-Arab relations. 
The Jewish Agency gradually realized their hopes in the new 
government were misplaced. After the British government formally opposed 
a Jewish Agency message sent in May, requesting permission to transfer 
one million refugees to Palestine, Weizmann's "Anglo-centric" Zionism 
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was devastated. Anglo-Zionist relations became strained to the breaking 
point. By the summer's end, with the assumptions under which the WZO 
and the Jewish Agency had operated during World War II shattered, the 
official Zionist leadership faced a difficult re-evaluation of strategy 
with regard to Anglo-Zionist relations, the urgency of Jewish statehood, 
2 
and the role of the Hagana. 
By the end of the summer of 1945, the whole world knew the extent 
of the catastrophe which had befallen European Jewry. Yet the western 
democracies remained reluctance to absorb the thousands of Jewish 
refugees who had survived. World Jewish leadership felt a desperate 
sense of urgency about saving the remnants of European Jewry. In light 
of the refugee crisis, the WZO and the Jewish Agency possessed three 
priori ties: facilitate the immigration of the refugees to Pales tine; 
alert public opinion, particularly in the United States, to· the Jewish 
plight and need for a state; and mobilize the Yishuv, socially, 
po li ti ca lly, and militarily, 
challenges of nationhood. 
3 
to assume the responsibilities and 
Ironically, the same war which devastated one-third of World Jewry 
enhanced the professionaliza ti on and the quality of the Hagana troops. 
The re turning soldiers from the Yishuv boosted the ranks of the Hagana 
to 25,000-35,000 members. Yet there still existed great deficiencies of 
funds, arms, and manpower. The Hagana HISH uni ts possessed only 700 
trained officers and only 3,000-4,000 full-time, well-trained, troops. 
The Palmach numbered about 2,000, representing the Hagana's only 
professional, mobile force available for combat. With the majority of 
WZO funds directed towards refugee related efforts, little remained for 
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"defense." Despite the Hagana's independent, large-scale fund drives in 
the United States and in Palestine, "defense" was only slowly becoming a 
priority within the Zionist cause by 1945. The weapons situation was 
dismal, with the Hagana-Palmach possessing about 10 ,000 rifles, 600 
machine and sub-machine guns, and 4,000 pistols in questionable 
condition. Moreover, the Hagana continued to suffer from problems with 
recruiting from amongst the war-weary returning soldiers and refugees, 
and from amongst the urban Yishuv. Much of the Yishuv's urban 
middle-class s ti 11 remained apathetic regarding Jewish self-defense. 
The unpopular Season affair and the Hagana's traditional left-wing 
orientation deterred many talented and dedicated urbanites from joining, 
or sent them to the dissident organizations. Throughout 1945-1947, the 
underground Hagana, presumed as the backbone for a future Jewish 
national army, grew in strength, and recovered from the tarnishing 
Season affair, at a dangerously slow pace. 
4 
Meanwhile, the IZL and the LHI militants found the Jewish Agency's 
indecisive discussions "hairsplitting" and their debate "eccentric," 
when force seemed the only way to create a Jewish state. 




devastated by the Season, both LHI and IZL turned to robbery and 
extortion. With the weight of the Holocaust pressing on them and 
seasoned British troops arriving in Palestine, the IZL reverted, 
somewhat, to LHI methods by terrorizing British personnel. In May, the 
IZL displayed posters and pamphlets warning Jews, Arabs, and other 
citizens to avoid government buildings. Soon afterward, the IZL 
initiated a series of mortar bombings on Mandatory buildings and 
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telephone poles. The mortar bombs had a jarring, demoralizing effect on 
British troops and administrative personnel. In July, the IZL ambushed 
a British army truck, killed the driver, and stole large quantities of 
high explosives. In late July, they blew up a railway bridge. With the 
IZL' s revolt coordinated with the LHI and rapidly gathering support in 
the Yishuv during the summer of 1945, Begin paused to see what the 
British response would be. 
6 
The British responded to the threat of a Jewish revolt by turning 
Palestine into an armed camp. During 1946, the Mandatory government 
augmented the heavily armed Pales tine Police Force and established the 
Transjordanian Frontier Force which patrolled the border. In addition, 
the British transferred the ls t Infantry Di vis ion, the 6th Airborne 
Division, the 3rd Infantry division, and air and naval units, from the 
European theater to secure Palestine. This •formidable array of well 
over 80, 000 troops symbo 1 ized that the Mandatory regime in tended to 
remain in Palestine and was prepared to suppress a Jewish uprising. 
7 
With the stubborn maintenance of the White Paper, with the failure 
of British post-war policy to grant concessions to the Zionist cause, 
and with beleaguered Jewish refugees held in de ten ti on camps in Cyprus 
or in Europe, the Jewish Agency faced a choice they had long dismissed--
forcibly resisting the Mandate. The Hagana and Jewish Agency confronted 
three choices for resistance: begin open assaults-terrorism on the 
Mandatory regime; focus on illegal immigration, new settlements, and 
political demonstrations; or adopt a combination of the two choices, a 
synthesis which - could be described as "cons true ti ve warfare." 
8 
Indeed, most Hagana commanders felt a classic guerrilla war to be 
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impossible with the Arabs in the mountains, with a landscape void of 
forests or jungles, with the overwhelming British military occupying 
strategic locations with well-trained, well-outfitted troops, and with 
the British Navy blockading the Mediterranean. 
9 
The issue of open resistance to the Mandate polarized the Jewish 
Agency. Weizmann and the moderate General Zionists, supported by 
HaShomar HaTzair and Mizrachi, objected to an assault on the Mandate. 
Most of the political center, wi_shed to maintain the Yishuv's ties with 
Britain, yet, under the circumstances, they viewed violence as a 
legitimate extension of the Zionist political battle. Golomb defined a 
new role for the Hagana by stating that, "the use of force is required 
for freedom of settlement, immigration, development, and autonomy." lO 
Sneh argued that, "Britain is not an enemy ••• it is a bad partner. We 
shall hit him to make him a good partner, but he is not an enemy." 
11 
During the summer and autumn of 1945, more of the power once possessed 
by Weizmann, and his Anglo-Zionist oriented following, passed to Ben 
Gurion, and his moderate, Yishuv-oriented constituency.· The proposal of 
Ben Gurion and the majority, for a limited resistance against the 
British, was adopted. The new Hagana policy would still focus on 
illegal immigration yet would involve a limited struggle, avoiding 
12 
British and Jewish casualties, for political and ethical reasons. 
As the Jewish Agency became increasingly defiant towards the 
British and moved closer towards open acts of defiance, Sneh and Galili 
suggested that, the dissident organizations might be brought in to the 
moderating influence and control of the Jewish Agency within the context 
of a united resistance. The Season had proved the deficiencies of the 
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Hagana-Pa lmach to act as the Yishuv' s sole underground military 
institution; the Jewish Agency's plan for a "controlled" resistance 
could be spoiled by the independent actions of the LHI and the IZL. 
During September, Gali li and Sneh made contact with IZL and LHI to 
propose a union of the dissident undergrounds with the Hagana. Both the 
IZL and the LHI expressed interest in cooperating in an anti-British 
campaign. 
13 
On September 23, Sneh cabled Ben Gurion in Paris to suggest that, 
if the Hagana perform "one serious incident," 14 British policy might 
be jarred. Golomb and Sneh argued that the recent desertion of 
twenty-five Palmach troops to the dissident organizations symbolized the 
Yishuv's eagerness for a demonstration of Jewish military strength and a 
merger of the Hagana with the IZL and the LHI would certainly increase 
that .strength. With most of the Hagana tied to defending the 
settlements, the addition of the IZL and the LHI would bolster Jewish 
military might in the cities. Furthermore, Sneh believed that a united 
resistance movement composed of the Hagana, LHI, and the IZL, would 
prevent the two dissident groups from engaging in independent, reckless 
terrorism, which would engendered the wrath of British Army and drag the 
Yishuv into a vortex of violence and anarchy. 
15 
In October, Ben Gurion instructed Sneh and Galili to contact the 
High Command of IZL and LHI. Yellin-Mor and the LHI staff quickly 
agreed to cooperate, but refused to merge with the Hagana. And despite 
the still festering wounds caused by the Season, Begin and the IZL also 
agreed to cooperate in an anti-British campaign. But Begin urged the 
Hagana to adopt a more extensive program, for a national "war of 
I 
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liberation." Begin's program called: for the immediate establishment of 
a Jewish provisional government; for the formation of Jewish national 
courts and exchequer to boycott the Mandatory regime; for the 
unif ica ti on of in terna tiona 1 fund drives; and for the creation of a 
united "Liberation Army" under a supreme military command; and for an 
immediate war on the Mandatory power. Begin believed that the Yishuv 
could indeed oust the war-weary British from Palestine. 
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Sneh, Golomb, and the Hagana High Command thought that the Yishuv 
would be crushed in an all-out clash with the British Army. The Hagana 
command wanted to merely stage a recognizable show of force to lever at 
the negotiating table, "as a warning and an indication of much more 
serious incidents that would threaten the safety of all British 
interests in the country, if the government did not grant the Zionist 
requests." 
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Sneh stressed that the attacks must be 
ideologically-politically appropriate, an attack on British institutions 
and not on British personnel. Begin refused to join the Hagana and LHI 
in a complete union, doubting the "staying-power" of the Jewish Agency 
in a war against Britain and the reliability of LHI after the Moyne 
assassination. But Begin pledged full cooperation and skeptically, yet 
enthusiastically, accepted a united Jewish military front. 
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In spite of some objections from the left-wing representatives in 
the Jewish Agency about cooperating with the militant Right, on November 
1, the IZL, the LHI, and the Hagana reached an agreement, forming the 
"Tenuat Hameri HaEvri," the "Jewish Resistance Movement," or JRM. The 
JRM would be a Jewish underground "guided by a single authority which 
would control a single fight." 
19 
The IZL and the LHI would be 
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permitted to act independently in matters of fund raising and arms 
procurement, particularly vital to IZL, which as a result of the Season, 
faced a drastic shortage of arms and funds. But most importantly, any 
military operations would proceed only after the approval of a joint 
committee, called "Committee X," headed by Sadeh of the Palmach, Amihai 
Paglin of the IZL, and Yackov Banai of LHI. The JRM agreement required 
rep re sen ta ti ves of the three mi 1i tary bodies to meet every two weeks to 
determine policy and to select targets. Ultimately, the Hagana set the 
tone for the JRM committee. The attacks would not be against 
individuals and due warning would be given in sabotage operations to 
prevent loss of human lives. In the autumn of 1945, the three 
underground organizations, which for years had been separated by 
tactics, politics, and ideology, remained distinct, yet had agreed to 
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act in concert. 
Even before the final ratification of the JRM agreement, the JRM 
slowly initiated its anti-British campaign. In October, Hagana radio, 
"Kol Yisrael" (Voice of Israel), renewed its illegal broadcasts, 
condemning the Mandatory regime. On October 11, the IZL raided a 
British Military camp in Rehovot. In late October, British clashed with 
Hagana troops at the northern settlement of Kfar Giladi and the Palmach 
attacked Athlit Transit Camp, freeing 208 immigrants. On October 31, 
the Hagana and Palmach blew-up over 200 railways with some 500 
explosions, suspending all rail traffic in the country, and sunk three 
British patrol ships. That same night, the LHI attacked the oil 
refiners in Haifa and the IZL attacked Lydda railway station. 
The JRM was not without some internal discord. The IZL's Rehovot 
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raid was bigger than agreed upon. Hagana radio condemned it and even 
LHI complained that its staff had not been informed. Begin apologized, 
blaming two overzealous junior officers, and the incident created no 
further difficulties. The IZL complained that the Hagana had not fully 
informed them regarding the Hagana attack on October 31st at the Lydda 
junction, accounting for several IZL casualties. And many in the Jewish 
Agency feared an all-out British reprisal after the deployment of the 
Sixth Airborne Division in Palestine in September. But the morale of 
the Hagana, IZL, and LHI was high, inspired to fight for Yishuv and 
brothers in Europe and confident after the impressive October 31st 
raid. In spite of internal tensions, the JRM remained intact. 
For the next eight months, the three undergrounds concentrated on 
attacking major British installations and on illegal immigration 
efforts, while the Jewish Agency accompanied the rebellion with 
publicity campaigns in London and Washington. Although the existence of 
the JRM would be kept secret, the Jewish Agency wanted the attacks to 
symbolize that British military might could not pre·vent independent 
J . h ·1· i 
21 
ew1s m1 itary act on. 
The undergrounds and the Yishuv citizenry became more and more 
defiant of the British authorities. In November, the Vaad Leumi 
declared a "General Strike," precipitating a burst of Jewish-British 
violence which claimed six Jewish lives and injured sixty others, mostly 
teenagers and children. A Hagana at tack on the Sidna Ali coastguard 
station, part of the lookout system for illegal immigrant ships, ended 
in a shootout at the Jewish settlements of Hogla and Givat Halm which 
claimed six Jewish lives. In late November, the Hagana seized a large 
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British weapons cache. In December, the IZL attacked British police and 
adminis tra ti on buildings. In January, news of the massacre of Jewish 
detainees in Eritrea spread anti-British sentiment and stirred 
violence. In late January, the Hagana hijacked a British train and 
stole the company payroll. In February, 1946, the Palmach blew-up a 
radar station near Haifa and attacked four police stations. In late 
February, the Hagana unsuccessfully attempted to seize complete control 
over Tel Aviv, to keep the British forces out, to facilitate the landing 
of illegal immigrants. An IZL attack on three British airfields 
extensively damaged or destroyed twenty-two British aircraft. In March, 
the IZL destroyed seven RAF Spitfires and stole weapons from the RAF 
barracks and Sarafand Army Camp. In April, the IZL blew-up five bridges 
and raided the Ashdod railway station. In May, the LHI attacked railway 
workshops and installations near Haifa. As anti-British sentiment 
fermented within the Yishuv, the Jewish Resistance Movement accelerated 
. h' h 22 into. ig gear. 
Although the JRM continued to combat the British, there existed 
many underlying tensions, generated by political and tactical 
differences, be tween the underground organizations. Though the Jewish 
Agency and the Hagana had set the terms of the JRM's November, 1945, 
agreement, the IZL and the LHI spearheaded the majority of the 
resistance operations, while the Pa lmach-Hagana conduc tad most of the 
post-World War II efforts of illegal immigration. In addition, the 
infrequent Hagana-Pa lmach an ti-British operations were aimed at 
inflicting material damage, and they went to extraordinary lengths to 
avoid British casualties. But the LHI operations continued to be aimed 
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at British personnel and to try to assassinate British high officials. 
In February, 1946, LHI raided a British bank and killed two Jews. 
In April, the LHI led an attack on the barracks of the Sixth Airborne 
Division, stealing weapons, but resulting in the death of seven British 
soldiers. In May, LHI shot seven policemen in Tel Aviv. Likewise, IZL's 
daring missions also had led to many British casualties. In January, 
IZL's raids on police stations killed ten policemen and wounded eleven. 
The fundamental difference lay in the fact that the Hagana, under 
the direction of Jewish Agency, remained concerned with the diplomatic 
arena and viewed the Britain as bad partner; Hagana operations were more 
carefully executed, limited in scope, and politically timed. Yet the 
LHI and IZL made the strategic assumption that the Yishuv should make 
war on the Mandatory regime and that "the great events would thus take 
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care of themselves." The IZL and the LHI felt .engaged in a war of 
national liberation against the English enemy and that British 
casualties were expected, unavoidable, and justifiable. The JRM 
remained intact, yet shakey, under the weight of these fundamental 
differences. 
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The raising tide of in terna tiona l recognition for the plight of 
Jewish refugees also threatened to tear apart the fragile JRM. In 
spring of 1946, the American proposal for allowing the immediate en try 
of 100,000 refugees into Palestine was greeted with approval by most 
quarters of the Yishuv, but not by LHI. LHI feared the proposal would 
extinguish the revolt by placating the population. A major immigration 
deal might have placed the JRM on precarious ground. As Yellin-Mor 
explained, if Britain allowed a substantial influx of Jewish refugees in 
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the spring of 1946, then the underground "would have been forced to stop 
all operations for as long as immigration continued. The view of the 
masses of the Yishuv would have been, 'let's absorb 100,000 immigrants 
and then we shall see'." 
25 
An appealing immigration offer, 
temporarily restoring the Jewish Agency's confidence in British 
government, might have "driven a wedge" in the JRM, isolated LHI and 
IZL, and convinced the Jewish Agency to renew another Season campaign in 
the hope of winning further concessions from London. 
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Yet the British remained too concerned with Anglo-Arab relations 
and underestimated strength of the Jewish undergrounds. The American 
proposal evaporated and the British did not allow a massive immigration, 
which might have soothed Anglo-Jewish relations and indirectly broken 
the unity of the JRM. Instead, the British responded to Jewish 
underground violence with demonstrations of force. The British police 
and soldiers performed sweeping cordon, search, patrol, and detaining 
operations. These British security efforts uncovered a few secret arms 
caches and lead to the arrest of a handful of the underground fighters; 
yet.the more general result was the harassment of Yishuv citizenry, 
which only stirred and intensified anti-British sentiment and support 
for the militant undergrounds. The Mandatory regime's forceful response 
to Jewish terrorism played into the hands of the undergrounds. 
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From November, 1945, to July, 1946, Jewish Agency-British 
relations remained extremely tense. The Jewish Agency continued to 
stress illegal immigration, quietly tolerate terrorism, and publicly 
denounce the British policies. The Mandatory regime continued to press 
the Jewish Agency to stop terrorism; yet, while Jewish Agency publicly 
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condeumed terror, the Yishuv's official leadership acted increasingly 
more defiant of British policy. In January, 1946, Ben Gurion summed up 
the feelings and policy of the Jewish Agency 
Without in the least condoning the acts committed, the Executive 
considers the policy at present pursued by the Mandatory 
government, which is based on the violation of fundamental 
provisions of the Mandate, to be primarily responsible for the 
tragic situation which has developed in Palestine. The 
Exe cu ti ve cannot agree that it can in fairness be called upon to 
appear in the i~~idious position, assisting the enforcement of 
that po Ucy ••• " 
In late February, 50,000 people, including Jewish Agency leaders, 
attended the funeral for the four Palmach men killed in a raid, 
demonstrating their defiance of British policy. Hagana radio voiced an 
impassioned epitaph that, "not one drop of their sacred and innocent 
blood flowed in vain. It would not drop on the soil unless it had soaked 
through the walls of slavery and corroded the chains which for 
generations have fettered salvation and light." 
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In early June, 
Hagana intelligence discovered a British "Hit-List" for members of the 
Hagana-Palmach which further infuriated the Jewish Agency; Hagana radio 
publicly denounced the British by declaring, "let the Yishuv, the 
diaspora, and the whole world know that we shall fight." Anglo-Jewish 
Agency tensions cemented the Hagana's commitment to the JRM. 
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The Hagana, the IZL, and the LHI submerged their differences and 
continued to unite in their assault on the Mandatory regime. On June 
10, the IZL stopped three trains, ordered the passengers to disembark, 
and destroyed the trains. On June 17, 1946, the JRM orchestrated their 
most extensive attack on the Mandatory regime in a operation known as, 
"the Night of the Bridges." Ten of all eleven road and rail bridges in 
Palestine were knocked out. The British were shocked and impressed. 31 
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Meanwhile, the secrecy of JRM added to the tensions be tween the 
Hagana, the IZL, and the LHI. With most of the Yishuv unaware of the 
JRM's existence, the Jewish Agency sponsored press continued to denounce 
the IZL and LHI for their acts of terror. IZL contended that the Hagana 
Command was excluding them from arms acquisition raids. The LHI blamed 
the Hagana command for poor coordination on June 17 attack which caused 
several LHI deaths. On June 18, the IZL abducted two British officers 
from the Tel Aviv Officers' Club. They used the Britons to ransom for 
the lives of two IZL members, Yosef Shimshon and Michael Ashbel, 
captured and sentenced to death by a British court. While Jewish Agency 
condemned the death sentence, Ben Gurion disapproved of kidnappings and 
publicly denounced the IZL. The kidnappings were also condemned by 
Hagana radio and in officia 1 Yishuv press. Despite these tensions, the 
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JRM was not yet unravelling. 
By late June, 1946, the Mandatory government lost patience with 
Jewish violence and with the Jewish Agency. By mid-1945, the CID had 
broken the Hagana code and intercepted communiques between Sneh, Galili, 
and Ben Gurion, regarding the JRM and the Jewish Agency's role in 
organizing it. On June 29, the British police launched operation 
11Aga tha, 11 also known as "Black Shabba th. 11 Thousands of British troops 
and police, backed by armor and air uni ts, scoured the en tire Yishuv. 
Because the CID lacked enough information on the dissident groups to 
effectively strike at them and because of British perturbation with the 
Jewish Agency, Agatha was directed more at Yishuv establishment than at 
IZL or LHI. 
Agatha became a nationwide search-and-arrest operation designed to 
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break the Hagana and the Palmach, and to "reorganize" the Jewish Agency. 
British police arrested leading Yishuv officials, such as Gruenbaum and 
Bernard Joseph of the General Zionists, Rabbi Fishman of Mizrachi, 
Wolfgang Von Weisal of the Revisionist Party, Yitshak Ben Aharon of 
Achdut HaAvoda, and Sharett of MAPAI. In total, the British forces took 
over 2,200 persons into custody, searched 27 settlements, and captured 
fifteen major Hagana arms caches. Yet Agatha failed to des troy the 
Hagana because many of its higher echelons, including Galili, Sneh and 
Sadeh, alluded capture. "In order to break the Hagana," Galili 
reflected, "they would have had to use drastic violence, something that 
they were unable to do because of the nature of the British democracy." JJ 
With the exception of a large arms cache seized at Meskek Yagur, 
the Hagana ... s infrastructure was not impaired, though Agatha did force 
the Hagana further underground. And with Ben Gurion in Europe, the 
British failed to radica 11y change the Jewish Agency ... s leadership. Yet 
the British gained much incriminating evidence regarding the Jewish 
Agency ... s role in underground terrorism. Most significantly, Agatha 
achieved partial success by intimidating the Jewish Agency into avoiding 
further direct encounters with the British forces. 
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In early July; the JRM ... s Committee X felt that something must be 
done to the British to make amends for Agatha. The IZL had eyed an 
attack on the British Sec re taria t Headquarters in the King David Hotel 
for over a year. Together, Sadeh and Paglin worked out the details on 
the King David Hotel opera ti on, called opera ti on "Tsedek," (meaning 
"Justice"). The JRM committee hoped that an assault on the King David 
Hotel would serve as a symbol that British force alone could not rule 
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Palestine and possibly destroy the incriminating documents seized during 
Agatha. Ben Gurion gave his approval from Europe via Sneh and the 
operation received final approval by the JRM Committee. The IZL attack 
on the King David Hotel would be coordinated with parallel assaults by 
LHI on the nearby David Brother's Building and by the Hagana on the 
Bat-Galim arms depot. Galili and Sneh made it clear to Paglin that the 
explosion must come outside of business hours and, after much debate, 
the committee decided on thirty minutes warning time to avoid 
casua 1 ties. The JRM believed that this daring attack would receive 
in t~rna tiona 1 acclaim and might jar the intransigent British 
35 
government. 
At the same time, the Jewish Agency, shocked by Agatha, began to 
reconsider the wisdom of the JRM. Few leaders of the WZO and of the 
Yishuv were even aware of the JRM' s existence, including Weizmann. In 
early July, the British published information implicating the Jewish 
Agency and the Hagana in the JRM. Weizmann, believing the British 
government was moving steadily towards a partition plan, felt surprised, 
indignant, and outraged that the Hagana had engaged in acts with the 
dissidents which could undo his diploma tic work. Weizmann feared that 
"terrorism would get out of control and create an ideology of violence 
which would destroy the liberal and humane element in Zionism, thus 
leading to a chauvinistic lack of realism." 
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Weizmann threatened to 
resign as President of the WZO unless the Hagana halted all its direct 
anti-British missions. 
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Reluctantly,· Sneh and the Hagana command bowed to Weizmann's 
ultimatum and conveyed to JRM Committee an order to postpone all 
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anti-British missions. With the JRM's continued existence in jeopardy, 
Sneh informed the IZL and the LHI of the postponement of the King David 
Hotel operation and the Hagana cancelled its parallel scheme at 
Ba t-Galim arms depot. Though Sneh's messages to Begin later became a 
matter of dispute, there were clearly a series of postponements, 
specifically on July 19 and 21. With the order to halt all operations, 
the JRM's future remained in doubt. 
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Yet IZL decided to proceed with the King David Hotel operation. 
On July 22, the IZL successfully bombed one of the nerve centers of the 
British civil and military administration in Palestine. The IZL 
explosives leveled one wing of the hotel, killing 91 and wounding 45 
persons. The King David Hotel explosion reverberated in newspaper 
headlines throughout the world, in the British government, and in the 
Yishuv. 
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The explosion of the King David Hotel caused an eruption of 
controversy within the Yishuv which would never cease. The Jewish 
Agency loudly condemned the IZL and Ben Gurion decried the IZL as "the 
enemy of the Jewish people." 
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The Hagana command, particularly 
Galili, stated that Begin acted for independent political reasons and 
without regard for human life, claiming the IZL gave insufficient 
warning time. 
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But the IZL asserted that three separate warning 
telephone calls were given and received. Begin insisted that IZL "did 
not want to hurt one living sole. The ethics of the IZL demanded every 
possible precaution to prevent civilian casualties." 
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IZL blamed the 
loss of life on "the British tyrants who played with human life," 
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on the negligence of British General Sir John Shaw. The IZL considered 
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the King David Hotel a "human tragedy;' but pointed out the positive 
effects of gaining international press for Palestine issue, particularly 
in British press. 
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IZL members and supporters claimed Begin had no arterial political 
aims in carrying out the King David Hotel operation, that Begin felt 
that "there was time enough for ideological power struggles after the 
state was declared," 
45 
and that "Begin had no interest in rushing 
into acts which might give Ben Gurion the excuse to unleash the Palmach 
and MAPAI for a civil war." The IZL and the LHI had gained 
re spec tabi li ty in JRM by participating with the "official" Yishuv 
underground, the Hagana-Pa lmach. More importantly, the JRM had given 
the LHI and the IZL the freedom to concentrate their resources on waging 
larger assaults on the Mandatory regime without having to face the 
Hagana as an additional foe. With the JRM arrangement under intense 
criticism following the King David affair, the Hagana command asked the 
... IZL to claim full responsibility for the explosion. In the interest of 
preserving the JRM, Begin agreed to accept full public responsibility. 
Begin and the IZL did not want the JRM to collapse. 
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But the JRM was now doomed. On July 30, the British responded to 
the King David disaster with an operation called "Shark." Operation 
Shark was a punitive measure carried out by 16 infantry battalions, 3 
armored regiments, and 2 artillery regiments, and supplemented by 
thousands of police. The British forces cordoned off Tel Aviv for four 
days, imposed a curfew, and searched for IZL, LHI, and Palmach-Hagana 
commanders. The Bri.tish forces confiscated a few Hagana arms caches and 
arrested almost 800 people. But, with the exception of LHI's Shamir, 
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all of the undergrounds' higher echelons, particularly Begin, the prime 
target of the operation, alluded capture. Like opera ti on Agatha, 
opera ti on Shark failed to accomplish its tac ti ca 1 goals and further 
harassed the Yishuv populous, but intimidated the Jewish Agency. 47 
After operation Agatha, the King David affair, and operation 
Shark, Ben Gurion, who had been wary of cooperating with the dissidents 
from the JRM's inception, wanted the Hagana withdrawn from the 
underground union. Like most leftist politicians, Galili, a constant 
advocate against terror- tac tics, also vehemently opposed the continued 
cooperation and tacit recognition given to the "dissidents" by the 
existence of the JRM. The far Left even pressed for a renewed war on 
the IZL and LHI. And Weizmann, utterly appalled by the summer's events, 
demanded the immediate disbandment of the JRM. Only Sneh pressed for a 
continuation of JRM, but he was in the minority. In protest, Sneh 
resigned from his position as Chief of the Hagana's National Command, to 
be eventually replaced by Galili. The repercussions of the King David 
Hotel-Shark episode brought other more left-wing commanders into the 
High Command of Hagana. Without Sneh, known for his sympathies for the 
Right, the link which had held JRM together vanished. By late August, 
the Hagana had formally withdrawn from the JRM. The JRM union, which, 





underground movements together, 
By the end of the sununer of 1946, Jewish Agency propaganda machine 
began condemning Jewish terrorism more loudly and earnestly. The Jewish 
Agency decided to again emphasize diploma tic pressure, public 
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demonstrations, and media campaigns to alter British policy and world 
opinion. And the Hagana Command was ins true ted to concentrate 
completely on illegal immigration and engage in no more direct 
Hagana-Bri tish clashes. The Hagana Command decided to restrict armed 
operations of Hagana-Palmach to sabotaging coastal installations and 
vigorously resist deportations of ships ladened with refugees, the 
majority of whom the British sent to Cyprus. 
Although the vast majority of ships failed to evade British naval 
and coastal patrols, from May 1945 to May 1948, the Hagana brought in 
30,000-40,000 illegal immigrants into Palestine. As the British 
intensified the blockade, Hagana demolition teams sabotaged British 
ships and Hagana land units organized interception plans, creating ruses 
to decoy the British while immigrants landed. The Hagana _even ordered 
passengers to physically resist deportation efforts to further tax the 
British forces. Moreover, the bursting detention camps in Cyprus 
overtaxed the war-weary British Navy, Army, and Airforce, and generated 
intense international political pressure, placed upon London to resolve 
the plight of Jewish refugees. 
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The IZL also continued their efforts to bring in immigrants, 
accounting for the arrival of 8,000-15,000 immigrants in the post war 
years with only a handful of ships at their disposal; but their efforts 
were constantly undermined by WZO interference with IZL fund raising in 
the United States. And, though they acknowledged that "finally the 
Hagana was doing the job" SO with regard to illegal immigration, the 
IZL and the LHI scorned the Hagana's new tactics of ordering immigrants 
to resist arrest, which resulted in Jewish civilian casualties, as 
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"resistance by proxy." 
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The IZL and the LHI felt the essential war 
was the fight against the Mandatory regime, not at sea, but on the soil 
of Pales tine. 
Undeterred by the British police efforts, the LHI and IZL 
continued to attack transports, military camps, installations, and 
British personnel. By the end of 1946, IZL membership had grown to 
2500-3000, of which some 800-1000 were full-time effectives. LHI 
membership reached 800-1000, of which 150-200 were full-time 
effectives. In addition, the IZL infrastructure continued to grow. 
IZL's Eli Tavin organized an IZL recruitment program among the Jewish 
detainees in Europe, while Eliezer Ben Eliezer rejuvenated the IZL' s 
fund raising efforts in the United States despite the constant 
interference of the Zionist "Establishment." The LHI and the IZL had 
developed and sharpened their skills' for waging larger assaults during 
the JRM period. During autumn of 1946 to autumn of 1947, the IZL and 
LHI revolt accelerated into full-swing. 
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Freed from the moderating influences of the JRM, · the IZL and LHI 
returned to an all-out war on the Mandatory regime. In September, LHI 
killed the highly effective Sergeant T.G. Martin, who had been in charge 
of operation Shark, and began laying hundreds of deadly booby-trapped 
mines. The IZL initiated a series of bombings on British embassies in 
Europe by gutting the British embassy in Rome in October. In late 
October, the IZL blew up a series of road and rail networks, and a 
police vehicle. In November, the IZL blew up the Mandatory Tax Office 
in Jeru·sa lem. From October to December, Jewish terrorism killed over 
100 British troops. In December, IZL abducted four officers and flogged 
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them in retaliatio'n for the flogging of IZL men by British authorities. 
In January, the IZL began abducting hostages to lever against captured 
IZL fighters. In a joint mission on March 4, Arce prison was 
attacked,leaving eight IZL and LHI men killed, five arrested andthree 
sentenced to death. In March, the IZL bombed the British Officers' Club 
in Jerusalem, killing twenty British officers. In mid-March, the LHI 
destroyed two oil transport trains and, after the British imposed 
martia 1 law, mined the urban roadways. In late March, LHI attempted 
bombings in Eng land and attacked oil refineries in Haifa, while it 
launched campaigns of personal terror in Haifa, Jerusalem, and Rehovot. 
In April, the LHI destroyed the Headquarters of the British mobile force 
near Tel Aviv. In May, the LHI and the IZL made a massive assault on 
the Acre prison, led by Dov Shimshon, and, among the 131 Arabs and 120 
Jews who escaped, 29 IZL and LHI men were freed at the cost of nine 
killed and five arrested. 
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For all these spectacular events, the IZL and the LHI orchestrated 
hundreds of smaller incidents of arson, robbery, sniping, and bombings. 
The revolt made a powerful impact on the morale and fortitude of the 
British forces in Pales tine. Though the LHI and the IZL undergrounds 
also suffered casualties, they were far fewer than the British 
casualties. The IZL and LHI were winning this war of attrition. 
The LHI and the IZL turned Palestine into a battleground. By 
winter of 1946, the British evacuated all non-essential civilians and 
the remainder moved in to fortified compounds known as "Bevingrads." In 
response to Jewish terror, British turned to more savage reprisals, 
curfews, searches, and arrest operations. In mid-March, the British 
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designed operation "Elephant," to give the Jewish community "a taste of 
the consequences of their continued passive attitude towards terrorism." 
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Although operation Elephant arrested 24 known IZL or LHI members, 
it also closed down businesses, harassed innocent citizens, and fostered 
greater sympathy for the IZL and the LHI within the Yishuv. The 
Mandatory courts sentenced captured underground fighters to death in 
more than 20 cases; however, the IZL often countered British justice by 
kidnapping British officers to ransom them for the lives of the their 
comrades. The British forces failed to maintain law and order, while 
the international press coverage transmitted the incidents of 
British-Jewish violence at a time when sympathy was growing for the 
plight of Jewish refugees. By the early spring of 1947, the British 
authority in Pales tine was collapsing and Bevin announced that the 
British government had decided to hand the Palestine problem over to the 
United Nations. 
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During the 1946-1947 winter, following the collapse of the JRM, 
while the IZL and the LHI combated the British forces, the Jewish Agency 
debated protractively and indecisively whether the British could be 
moved towards a partition of Palestine and establish a Jewish state, or 
whether the Hagana-Palmach should renew a campaign of anti-British 
resistance. Then the British handed the problem over to the United 
Nations, changing the context of the discussion. 
While the UNSCOP committee began preparing its report in the 
spring and summer of 1947, the Jewish Agency steered a twin policy of 
trying to gain international sympathy for a Jewish state and, at the 
same time, restore their relations with the British government. Despite 
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the objections of many re pre sen ta tives in the Jewish Agency to 
partition, Abba Hillel Silver in particular, the UNSCOP seemed to be 
heading in that direction, so Ben Gurion and Moshe Share tt hoped that 
Britain could be persuaded to help implement a viable partition plan. 
To this end, Ben Gurion, Sharett, and Golda Meir negotiated with Bevin 
in London. In order for Britain to consider the Zionist position, Bevin 
stressed that Jewish terrorism must be quelled and pressed the Jewish 
Agency for a renewal of another "Season" on Jewish dissidents. For 
their part, the Jewish Agency officials stressed that without British 
concessions on immigration, the Yishuv would not cooperate with British 
authorities. Al though no definitive understanding was reached, Ben 
Gurion, looking for improved Anglo-Zionist relations and worried over 
the growing support for the dissident organizations and program, 
promised the British to renew an anti-dissident campaign. 
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Ben Gurion engineered a "small Season," designed to contain the 
dissidents and win British approval. In June, the Jewish Agency 
sponsored a massive anti-dissident propaganda campaign. Share tt asked 
foreign correspondents, "not to reprint the activities of the 
underground organizations so much in terms of glorification which 
encourage the terrorists and undermines the efforts of the responsible 
Jewish institutions to isolate them and to deny them the sympathy of the 
public." 
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The Jewish Agency press blamed the IZL and the LHI for 
acts of sabotage and the murder of British and Jewish policeman. On June 
12, the British reciprocated by releasing all Hagana and Palmach men in 
British prisons in Palestine. 
Ben Gurion also instructed the Hagana to foil dissident terrorism. 
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On June 12, the Hagana blew up an IZL arms dump. On June 17, the Hagana 
prevented a IZL raid on a British camp near Rehovot. On June 19, the 
Hagana foiled a daring IZL plan to tunnel under the Citrus House 
officer's club in Tel Aviv and blow it up. Begin and the IZL command 
had hoped the Citrus House operation would impress UN committee that 
"Jewish determination to bring British rule to an end," and "believed 
that this operation might well prove the decisive blow of the revolt." 58 
The Hagana saved the British officers, though Hagana commander Zeev 
Werba accidentally blew himself up trying to defuse the explosives. 
Most of the ranking British officials attended Werba's funeral and the 
Jewish Agency-Hagana 's anti-dissident campaign achieved an extremely 
positive image in British press. Anglo-Zionist relations seemed to be 
mending at the expense of the dissident undergrounds. 
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In early July, Ben Gurion, pleased with the apparent improvement 
in Anglo-Zionist relations, remained concerned that Jewish terror might 
upset the UNSCOP's move towards partition. He ordered 200 Palmach 
troops assembled to launch an anti-dissident operation in the pattern of 
the "Season." The Hagana threatened, beat-up, and arranged the exile of 
several IZL members. But the Yishuv was quickly outraged by these 
actions. Influential Yishuv leaders, specifically Rokach and Silver, 
found out about Ben Gurion's scheme, interceded on behalf of the 
dissident organizations, and protested that a renewal of the Season 
which might plunge the Yishuv in to civil war. In addition, within the 
ranks of the Palmach-Hagana, there existed little enthusiasm to renew an 
anti-dissident struggle. Allon and the Palmach eventually refused to 
participate. Many restless officers were openly sympathetic to the 
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IZL. The Yishuv's general mood, in spite of the Jewish Agency's attempt 
to heal Anglo-Zionist relations, remained decidedly anti-British. 
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While the Jewish Agency unsuccessfully attempted to bridge 
British-Zionist tensions, the Hagana-Palmach continued to engage in 
illegal arms acquisition and illegal immigration. During the summer of 
1947, the saga of the ship "Exodus" and her 4, 500 refugees, many 
hand-picked Hagana men and women under the ins true tions of Pa lmach 
commander Ike Aranne, unfolded. Resisting deportation to Cyprus or 
transhipment to France, the British eventually forced the former 
Holocaust survivors aboard the Exodus to return to Germany. The Exodus 
episode gained international attention for Jewish plight, raised 
anti-British sentiment around the world, and solidified the Jewish 
community's anger towards the British. In late July 1947, Hagana 
launched two attacks on British radar stations near Haifa and damaged a 
transhipment vesse 1; Hagana-Pa lmach commanders ordered their uni ts to 
sink British ships if they attempted to interfere with immigration 
efforts. 
Britain. 
After the Exodus, 
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the Jewish people lost all faith in 
Meanwhile, the IZL criticized the Hagana for using Exodus 
immigrants, instructing them not to unload in France, as political pawns 
in a struggle against the British. And the IZL was outraged that no 
minority proposal for Jewish state consisting of all of Palestine had 
been submitted to the UNSCOP by the Jewish Agency. In July, ignoring 
the protests of Ben Gurion and Sharett, and the threats of the Hagana, 
Begin met with UN committee representatives to expiain the IZL platform, 
as inherited from Jabotinsky. Yet the IZL remained chiefly concerned 
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with continuing combating the British, particularly in the presence of 
the UNSCOP. 6 2 
During Exodus episode, the IZL concentrated in saving their 
cap tu red men from death sentences. IZL considered that the British had 
been duly warned to observe "prisoner-of-war conventions" with regard to 
captured "Freedom Fighters." On July 30, the British hung three IZL men, 
captured in the Acre prison raid. In response, the IZL in turn hung two 
British officers, Sergeants Marvin Paice and Clifford Martin, kidnapped 
as ransom since June. In bitter re ta lia ti on, the British ins ti tu ted 
opera ti on "Tiger," in August, involving some 5,000 troops and 
in te rroga ting almost 1500 people. The British even arrested many 
prominent Jews suspected of IZL sympathies, such as the mayors of 
Netanya, Tel Aviv, and Ramat Gan. And some British troops, in anger and 
frustration, broke into undisciplined rampages of rioting, beating, and 
harassment throughout the Yishuv. 
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During the late summer of 1947, the IZL-LHI forces and the British 
forces engaged in a blood-bath. In August, the LHI attacked trains near 
Haifa and Hederah. In September, LHI killed a British policeman in a 
raid on a Barclays' Bank in Haifa and the IZL blew-up the British police 
Headquarters in Haifa. !Q:'om AUgust l~.5 to September "1)47, Bri ta;in suffered 
over 200 killed by Jewish terror in Pales tine, compared with under 50 
killed on the side of Jewish undergrounds. The summer violence, the 
Exodus affair, the hanging of the two British officers, and the angry 
British responses, left the UNSCOP with the impression that the 
Mandatory regime could not maintain control over Palestine. As the 
situation between Arabs and Jews also became more tense, UNSCOPieS left 
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with the impression that the Mandatory regime could not maintain control 
over Palestine. After-observing the events in ?alestine during the summer 
of 1947, the UNSCOP committee decided on a majority proposal for a 
partition of Palestine. 
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In early autumn, the Jewish Agency and the dissident organizations 
remained in tensely at odds. The Jewish Agency had condemned the IZL' s 
execution of the two officer's as "a bloodthirsty deed contrary to all 
human standards." 
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In September, Jewish Agency pamphlets warned the 
Yishuv that the dissident organizations "gain their livelihood by 
gangsterism, smuggling, large-sea le drug traffic, armed robbery, 
organizing the black market, and thefts." 
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The Hagana announced that 
all possible measures would be used to root out terrorism, while the IZL 
countered with threats of assassinating Jewish Agency officials. The 
Hagana continued to shadow IZL men, and both the Hagana and the IZL 
engaged in mutual kidnappings and beatings. In October, the Hagana shot 
two IZL men in Rishon Le-Zion. The IZL responded with a sea thing 
wallposter campaign against Ben Gurion and the Jewish.Agency. At the 
same time, the WZO and the Jewish Agency geared up for a massive 
international publicity campaign in support of partition, while Begin 
and the IZL propaganda refutiated the very notion of partition. Began 
renounced the UN proposa 1 as i l lega 1 and not binding on the Jewish 
people, for "Jerusalem will always be our capital. •• the Land of Israel 
will return to the People of Israel, the whole of it, and forever." 67 
Though both undergrounds threatened civil war, with the talk of 
partition, the inter-Yishuv conflicts became overshadowed by increasing 
talk in both the Arab community and the Jewish Yishuv of war. 68 The 
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Arabs had watched the Jewish underground organizations attack the 
British from the sidelines for years, and had learned from the tac tics 
of Jewish terrorism. With the talk of partition, the Palestinian Arabs 
lost patience with the role of spectators. 
community violence escalated. 
Incidents of Arab-Jewish 
Despite rising Arab-Jewish tensions, the LHI continued to assault 
British personne 1, believing that the British announcement to evacuate 
was a bluff to lower the Jewish defenses. With Shamir imprisoned in 
Eritrea, Yellin-Mor had piloted the LHI political towards the extreme 
Left, so that LHI believed British imperialism was responsible for 
raising Arab-Jewish tensions, and that an Arab-Jewish war could still be 
avoided. Yet with the approaching thunder of a possible Arab-Jewish 
civil war in Palestine, the attentions of the Hagana-Palmach and the 
IZL, turned away from the British and from each other, and focused on 
preparing for a struggle with the Arabs·. 
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By the mid-1947, the Hagana stood unprepared to defend the Yishuv 
in a major Arab-Jewish civil war or a larger war involving Palestine's 
Arab neighbors. In essence, the Hagana remained structured along lines 
of 1936-39 riots, emphasizing localized, static defenses. There existed 
no system of national mobilization. On paper, the Hagana-Palmach could 
claim 45, 000 registered men and women, yet the majority of these were 
HIM (reserve) forces, inadequately trained and armed. The only mobile 
force, the 3,000 Palmach troops, possessed only 400 professional staff, 
Despite efforts to evade the British blockade and to secretly import 
weapons, a dangerous deficiency existed. The Hagana possessed only 
17,600 rifles, 900 machine guns, and 800 mortars, and no anti-tank or 
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anti-aircraft weapons. And the fledgling air force, established in early 
November, had merely eleven planes. The Hagana-Palmach was unprepared 
to wage lengthy guerrilla war, and certainly not a full-scale war. 
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With the Hagana under these conditions, Ben Gurion, named Director 
of the Jewish Agency's Security Affairs in late 1946, foresaw a major 
war, not a guerrilla campaign, and advocated general mobilization and 
the establishment of a conventional, unified army. Yet not all of the 
Jewish Agency representatives shared Ben Gurion's outlook. Some 
believed that Arab-Jewish tensions could be resolved through 
negotiation, and that Jewish mobilization might escalate a wider 
conflict. In September, Galili, Head of the Hagana National Command, 
argued in the National Council of the Histadrut that, whether there 
would be a civil war with Palestinian Arabs or an invasion of regional 
Arab armies, the Histadrut must authorize the Hagana command to 
"conscript any member for guard, command, and training duties." 
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Simultaneously, Galili and the far Left urged restraint with the Arabs 
and action against Jewish extremis ts. When speaking ·of mo bi liza tion, 
Galili envisioned worker's militas in the fashion of the Palmach, but 
Ben Gurion pressed for non-voluntary, universal conscription. In 
October, Ben Gurion ordered Hagana to produce a general enlistment 
plan. In mid-November, 1947, the Vaad Leumi finally consented to 
mobilize six HISH brigades. But still mobilization proved difficult in 
a war-weary Yishuv, fragmented by an array of social and political 
differences. In late November, Ben Gurion sent emissaries to purchase 
weapons in America and Europe. But the British occupation continued to 
hamper Hagana efforts to draft and train troops, and to import and 
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retain arms and ammunition. The Hagana's preparations for war proceeded 
. d ha d. d . . 72 ami st c os, ispute, an opposition. 
On November 29, the UN vote for a partition of Palestine triggered 
an explosion of Arab-Jewish clashes. Politically divided over 
enlistment and the character of the army, confused over the strategic 
assessments, and restricted by the British occupation, the Yishuv faced 
the difficulties of an Arab-Jewish civil war in Palestine from December 
1947 to May 1948. 
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As Palestine's Jewish-Arab civil war intensified, the Hagana 
slowly evolved into the framework for a regular army. By December, 
1947, the Hagana finally had a substantial budget and the National 
Command evolved into a general headquarters or GHQ with four fully 
operational regional commands. Yet the Palmach and HISH brigades 
mobilized slowly. In December, the Hagana-Pa lmach together possessed 
only 4,000-5,000 "effectives," mobilized troops, ready for action. The 
Jewish Agency was not yet an official government to enforce 
conscription, so the initial calls for all citizens 17-25 to enlist went 
unheeded. With the difficulties mobilizing the Yishuv population, not 
all Hagana members had been called up by as late as February and 
non-members as late as March. Most of the Hagana members remained tied 
to defending the settlements. 
Almost all Jewish troops were poorly equipped. All the 
Hagana-Palmach units faced drastic shortages of uniforms, blankets, 
boots, canteens, and, of course, weapons. In late December, the Hagana 
still had no heavy weapons, only 700 light machine guns, 200 medium 
machine guns, 700 mortars, and only enough ammunition for three days of 
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fighting. Arms and ammunitions trickled in from France and Italy, and 
Zionist agents had, by early 1948' secured the subs tan tia 1 
Czechoslovakian arms deal; but the problem to transport the weapons 
through the British blockade had still not been overcome. 
The Jewish Agency realized that the British would not maintain law 
and order. And the British persisted to impede Hagana 's development by 
barring the importation of arms, by preventing the influx of fresh 
troops, and by confiscating Jewish arms on the pre text of maintaining 
order in a land rife with war. Facing the twin problems of British 
opposition and the Hagana' s lumbering development, the Hagana and the 
Jewish Agency, tried to avoid a massive crack-down by the British forces 
until they withdrew in May and an escalation of Arab violence involving 
the neighboring Arab armies. Ben Gurion and the Hagana High Command 
adopted a. "Havlaga" strategy in the first months of the war. 
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With the Yishuv's military situation critical, interest in 
political-military unity grew. Beginning in mid-December, Begin, 
Landau, and Katz met with delegations from the Jewish Agency, though not 
with Ben Gurion, who refused to negotiate with the dissidents. These 
talk.!:lwere strained, protracted, and difficult. Although the Arab-Jewish 
civil war brought the interests of the IZL and the Hagana-Palmach into 
greater alignment, the animosities, mistrust, and different 
political-military assumptions persisted. 
The IZL opposed the Jewish Agency's emphasis on "punitive 
operations" and "moderation and non-provocation" towards the Arab 
attacks. Instead, the IZL launched a major counterterror campaign and 
mounted offensive attacks on the Arab community, bombing Arab markets 
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and making hit-and-run attacks on Arab businesses and cafes. Similarly, 
the IZL resisted British arms confiscations and decried the Hagana for 
permitting disarmament of its troop at such a critical time. IZL was 
furious over the Zionist establishment's interference in the fierce 
competition for funds in the United States. The IZL chastised the 
Jewish Agency for not doing enough, sooner, to mobilize and arm the 
Yishuv. Begin scolded the Jewish Agency's hopes for an interna tiona 1 
Peace Keeping Force as "wishful thinking." In addition, they feared that 
Weizmann faction might delay statehood. The IZL agreed to accept 
authority of a new Provisional government if established before May 15; 
if not, Begin threatened to establish independently, or in concert with 
others. 
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Most importantly, the IZL opposed par ti ti on, particularly the 
relinquishment of Jerusalem. Some in IZL felt Begin should declare 
Provisional government, especially Hillel Kook and Eri Jabotinsky, to 
prevent partition. According to Begin, his greatest worry in the early 
months of 1948 "was that the Arabs might accept the United Nation's 
plan. Then we would have had the ultimate tragedy, a Jewish state so 
small that it could not absorb all the Jews of the world." 
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Begin 
rejected the UN Partition boundaries and called for the immediate 
formation of a united Jewish Army to conquer all of Palestine. The IZL 
fe 1 t the Jewish Agency-Hagana ... s policies endangered the Yishuv and the 
future of a Jewish nation; while Ben Gurion and his followers believed 
the same of the IZL. 
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In early 1948, as Arab-Jewish violence escalated, Hagana-IZL 
relations became more and more tense. As the Hagana gradually 
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militarized, the IZL lost support in Palestine and abroad, and the IZL 
became threatened with severe arms and funds shortages. The Jewish 
Agency constantly appealed to the Yishuv not to support IZL and LHI. In 
addition, there were outright incidents of beatings, interrogations, and 
kidnappings between the IZL and the Hagana. 
In January, the rival undergrounds arranged a prisoner exchange. 
The Hagana men were released and returned, but the Hagana claimed that 
IZL's Yedidia Segal escaped from their custody before being released. 
·sega 1 never appeared and was found dead three days later in the Arab 
village of Tireh. IZL broke negotiations with Jewish Agency until, at 
IZL' s insistence, a public inquiry committee investigated the incident. 
In February, Hagana men threw hand-grenades into a crowd attending a IZL 
rally and fund raiser at Mograbi Square in Tel Aviv. Many in the crowd 
were wounded. Some IZL commanders urged Begin to retaliate. Io spite 
of the larger Arab-Jewish struggle, the Hagana and the IZL broke off 
negotiations as the possibility of Jewish civil war still loomed. 
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Then in late February and March, as Arabs and British troops both 
became more hostile towards the Yishuv, the Jewish Agency-Hagana war 
policy shifted. In late February, British police in Jerusalem disarmed 
four Hagana men and abandoned them to an angry Arab mob, who mu ti lated 
the Jews. By March, the exhausted British restated their intention to 
evacuate Palestine in May and increasingly handed strategic positions 
over to Arab soldiers. And IZL and Hagana Intelligence reports 
circulated of British complicity in Arab terrorist attacks, such as the 
bombing of the Palestine Post Building and of Ben Yahuda Street. Though 
Ben Gurion ruled to· avoid committing large forces before the Mandate 
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expired, wishing to avoid offering the Mandatory forces a pre text to 
wage a full-sea le attack on the Yishuv, he took the calculated risk of 
ordering Hagana-Palmach troops to· resist arms confiscations. 
Within the Yishuv and Hagana command, criticism also grew of Ben 
Gurion's strategy of not surrendering one kibbutz, avoiding anti-British 
clashes, and hoping that the defensive, static posture of Hagana-Palmach 
troops would preserve some Jewish territorial continuity. Some 
condemned this tactic as an antiquated extension of Havlaga. In spite 
of the difficulties of procuring weapons and recruiting troops, by early 
March, 1948, there existed six HISH brigades and three Palmach brigades 
and the Hagana-Palma.ch could claim some 21,000 effectives. By late 
March, the Hagana Command, Commander Yigael Yadin in particular, 
insisted to Ben Gurion that restraint was obsolete. Ben Gurion ordered 
a limited offensive thrust, an "active defensive," in the north and 
central regions, and set plans for major offensives when the British 
evacuated. Havlaga ended forever as the Hagana-Palmach prepared for an 
ff 
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o ensi ve strategy. 
As the IZL saw the transformation of the war and of Jewish Agency 
tac tics, "Ben Gurion and his Hagana Commanders finally awakened to the 
grim reality, to the fact that the infant nation was naked and alone in 
a hos tile world." 
80 During the winter of 1947-1948 the LHI 
continued to launch independent, and deadly, attacks on British troops 
in Jerusalem and Rehovot, resulting in almost 100 British casualties; 
but under the shadow of an invasion of Arab armies when the British 
departed, the Hagana's and the IZL's interests converged. In early March 
negotiations were resumed. IZL's Kook and Lankin met with Sneh to 
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hammer out problems with fund raising and differences over their 
attitudes towards the British. The Hagana and IZL undergrounds finally 
groped for reconciliation. 
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On March 8, the Hagana-IZL discussions evolved into a working 
agreement. Begin restated that after independence he would dissolve the 
IZL into a national army. The IZL command agreed that, in situations of 
static defense, IZL troops would follow the orders of Hagana 
commanders. All IZL operations would require Hagana approval in 
advance. In turn, IZL could resist arms confiscations irrespective of 
Hagana policy and the Hagana accepted the principle of IZL reprisals or 
arms raids against the British if executed after joint approval. 
Moreover, the Jewish Agency and the Zionist establishment promised not 
to interfere with IZL immigration efforts, fund raising, and independent 
weapons procurement, but the IZL had to refrain from robbery or 
extortion. The IZL would not receive any official Yishuv funds and 
would retain an entirely separate command. 
IZL opposed suggestions of immediate unification fearing the 
Jewish Agency might still postpone the declaration of independence; if 
statehood was declared IZL would accept a provisional government's 
authority everywhere except in Jerusalem, which was outside the Jewish 
portion of partition. By mid-March time, IZL came above ground and 
decided to concentrate its military muscle on Jaffa, Ramele-Lydda, the 
Haifa area, and Jerusalem. Although Ben Gurion and followers postponed 
ratification of the IZL-Hagana agreement in the Zionist Council for 
seven weeks, the two largest, rival Jewish undergrounds reached an 
understanding not unlike the defunct JRM-- the Hagana and the IZL 
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remained distinct, yet they agreed to fight in concert. 
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As the IZL and the Hagana sought reconciliation, the Arab-Jewish 
war intensified and the situation in isolated Jerusalem became 
critical. The convoy system, which supplied Jerusalem with all her 
vital military supplies and food, collapsed. In late March, Ben Gurion 
and the Hagana command authorized the implementation of operation 
"Nachshon, 11 designed to break the blockade of Jerusalem by securing the 
heights above the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. The Nachshon offensive 
received a boost from the first shipment of Czech arms of 4500 rifles 
and 200 machine guns arriving on the IZL""s ship "Nora." 
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In early 




But in Jerusalem itself, the Hagana si tua ti on 
David Shaltiel, Hagana commander of the Jerusalem sector, a French 
Foreign Legion veteran, and an advocate of orthodox military procedures, 
was forced to rely on the re la ti vely strong LHI and IZL uni ts around 
Jerusalem. Yet Sha 1tie1 had played a large role in the "Season," as the 
Hagana Intelligence Chief, and he and the "dissident organizations" felt 
strong mutual distrust. Sha 1tie1 argued repeatedly with LHI and IZL 
commanders in Jerusalem, Yehoshua Zettler and Mordechai Raanan, over 
tac tics and weapons distribution. Since January, the lack of 
coordination between David Shaltiel and IZL-LHI troops contributed to 
Jerusalem's situation weak, particularly in the besieged Jewish quarter 
of the Old City. On April 7, Shaltiel learned of IZL-LHI plans to 
attack the Jerusalem suburb of Deir Yassin. 
attack on Deir Yassin, specifying: 
Sha 1 tie l approved the 
I have no objection to your carrying out the operation provided 
you are able to hold the village ••• I warn you against blowing 
up the village, which would lead to the flight of inhabitants 
and the ogs-upation of the destroyed and empty houses by foreign 
forces. . 
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On April 9, the LHI-IZL unit, under Ranaan's command, approached 
the village of Deir Yassin with about 100 troops. According to the 
LHI-IZL troops, they used a loudspeaker to warn civilians to leave. 
Some villagers fled but many stayed. The LHI-IZL troops attested that 
the Arabs opened fire and heavy fighting ensued. When Arab prisoners 
suddenly began shooting, the LHI-IZL men recalled, the fighting became 
even more bloody, evolving into a hand-to-hand, house-to-house 
struggle. The LHI-IZL units suffered over 40 casualties. After a full 
day of battle, the village was "subdued." 220 Arabs, many women and 
children, had been killed. 
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Shaltiel arrived the evening after the battle and ·refused to 
accept responsibil.i ty for the attack's outcome. Hagana troops openly 
criticized LHI-IZL troops when a Hagana unit, under Yeshurvin Schiff, 
replaced Ranaan and IZL-LHI unit. Shaltiel ordered Schiff to disarm the 
dissident troops, but Schiff protested that the Hagana troops would 
refuse to insight a civil war. To the press, Shaltiel claimed that the 
Hagana entered to clean up shameful scene. He denied that Deir Yassin 
was a "military operation" and claimed "the IZL and LHI soldiers stood 
and slaughtered men, women, and children ••• not in the course of the 
opera ti on, but in a premeditated act which had as its intention 
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slaughter and murder only." 
In the following days, the British and Red Cross logged Deir 
Yassin as an atrocity. The Jewish Agency suspected that Ranaan and the 
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dissidents were trying to break Ben Gurion's delicate negotiations on an 
accord with Abdullah, which gave TransJordan the "Triangle" (the West 
BanK) and East Jerusalem in exchange for peace. The Jewish Agency press 
bitterly condemned the LHI-IZL as "fascists" and "murderers," and the 
attack as a blemish upon the honor of the Jewish people. 
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Some LHI members, such as Yellin-Mor, decried the Arab-Jewish 
conflict and rebuked the assault on Deir Yassin; but according to the 
IZL, and the LHI in Jerusalem, Deir Yassin represented a glorious 
military victory. Begin insisted that at Deir Yassin, "none of our men 
carried out a massacre. It was very tragic but there was no massacre." 
Ranaan and Zetler disclaimed any atrocities and Begin the con tended 
that, "civilians who disregarded our warnings suffered inevitable 
casua 1 ties." 89 Moreover, the IZL felt appalled by Ben Gurion' s 
apologetic letter to "the enemy" Abduilah. 
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They claimed that the 
Jewish Agency used Deir Yassin to discredit their organization. The 
controversy never subsided, remaining shrouded in conf lie ting 
explanations, versions, and excuses. The Deir Yassin incident 
contributed to the panic and flight of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, 
became the battle-cry in future Jewish-Arab bloodshed, and 
infected the deep wounds separating the Yishuv's military bodies. 
further 
91 
Despite Deir Yassin, the Yishuv's different military 
organizations, pressed together by a common enemy in a war of community 
survival, submerged their differences and focused on the Arabs. In 
mid-April, the secret agreement between Hagana and IZL outlined on March 
8th was .officially ratified, despite the opposition of Ben Gurion and 
many leftist representatives in Zionist executive. In late April and 
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early May, as the Hagana-Palmach forces conquered Haifa, Tiberias, Safed 
and much of the lower Galilee, the IZL command drew up plans to attack 
Jaffa. Jaffa represented the IZL's biggest military mission. Begin 
hoped to alleviate the threat that Jaffa posed to the neighboring Jewish 
city of Tel Aviv, sabotage what they believed would be a final plot by 
British forces to secure a bridgehead in Palestine, and to press Jewish 
military forces beyond the UN Partition boundaries which he repudiated. 
Rebounding from a stinging defeat at the village of Manshiya, the 
IZL attacked Jaffa on April 25 under Paglin's command. After two days 
of fierce combat, the 500-600 IZL troops became bogged down. Al though 
the Jewish Agency and the Hagana Command had originally condemned the 
attack, on April 27, Galili and Yadin approved the continuation of the 
attack under the terms of the March 8th agreement. 
Begin gave his commander, Paglin, 24 hours to reach the sea, and, 
thereby, split the town in half. Paglin and the IZL succeeded. On April 
28, the Hagana joined in the attack, in conjunction with their operation 
"Chametz," which involved encircling the ·town. The IZL provided cover 
fire for Hagana troops. April 30, the British moved in tanks and 
counterattacked. The IZL stopped the tanks at great cost and the battle 
evolved in to a stand-off. In the Jaffa operation, the IZL suffered 42 
killed, and 400 wounded. As IZL and Hagana soldiers held the battle 
lines together, Hagana commanders were ins true ted to a void clashes with 
IZL personnel. And IZL commanders were informed that: 
For the time being this is to inform you that wherever there 
are IZL positions, they will from now on come through the 
command of the Hagana area commanders, through IZL position 
commanders. The.IZL will not undertake any action unless agreed 
upon beforehand with the Hagana. This includes acquisition of 
arms from the British Army. The IZL will be prepared to 
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undertake operations on request of the Hagana High Command. 
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On May 11, the British withdrew, and the Hagana and IZL troops marched 
in jointly, to fully secure the almost abandoned city by May 13. 
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The conquest of Jaffa represented perhaps the IZL's finest hour, 
and certainly the finest hour of Hagana and IZL cooperation. Yet 
underlining the joint military vie tory were the per sis tent differences 
of political outlook. Many Jewish Agency representatives and the 
official Yishuv newspapers criticized the IZL"" s unilateral actions in 
Jaffa, claiming that the assault only provided material for Arab 
propagandists and that Jaffa could have been taken without a fight. Yet 
the IZL described Jaffa as the IZL's "greatest operation, which changed 
the face of the struggle in Palestine, this time with a conscious 
purpose, breaking across the frontiers of partition." 
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Nevertheless, despite different political aims and IZL 
apprehensions that the Jewish Agency would stall on declaring statehood, 
in early May, Begin continued to reassert that he had placed the IZL 
under the Hagana's operative orders, would disband after the declaration 
of statehood, and would support the state. In mid-May, the newly 
established "National Administration" (formed from the Jewish Agency in 
late April in anticipation of statehood), began working out a formal, 
and seemingly final, agreement with Begin and the IZL. The Hagana and 
the IZL appeared to be functioning together, to be fighting the same 
battle. 
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During the post-war period of May, 1945, until July, 1946, 
Britain's apparent anti-Zionist policy drove all the Yishuv's 
underground military bodies-- Hagana, Palmach, LHI, and IZL-- together 
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in a "Jewish Resistance Movement." Despite significant internal tensions 
regarding both political vision and military tactics, the JRM endured 
for over nine months. But the dramatic events of the summer of 1946--
such as operation Agatha, the King David Hotel affair, and operation 
Shark-- precipitated the demise of the JRM. From autuum of 1946 until 
autuum of 1947, the Hagana-Palmach and the IZL-LHI forces waged 
independent and conflicting campaigns. The Jewish Agency tried to steer 
a complex course of trying to attract international support for a Jewish 
state and restore relations with the British, while instructing the 
Hagana to continue facilitating il lega 1 immigration. The LHI and IZL 
chose the straightforward course of waging a revolt-in-arms against the 
Mandatory regime. In the autumn, as a partition of Pales tine and a 
Jewish-Arab war drew nearer, the relations between the Yishuv's 
undergrounds remained bitter and tense. The Hagana-Palmach forces 
slowly mobilized while adopting a military policy of restraint. As the 
LHI continued to assault the evacuating British, the IZL launched 
attacks on the Arab community and chastised the Jewish Agency's more 
restrained political-military strategy. But the escalating Arab-Jewish 
violence drove the IZL towards the Hagana-Palmach, which gradually was 
emerging as the skeleton of the future na tiona 1 army. In the early 
spring of 1948, the IZL and the Hagana commands groped for 
reconciliation, in spite of intense political-military differences on 
the battlefield-- such as at Deir Yassin and at Jaffa. By May, 1948, 
the Hagana-Palmach and the IZL seemed united in an uneasy alliance for 
the sake of "national" survival. 
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UNIFICATION OF THE ISRAELI ARMY: 1948-1950 
In the spring of 1948, as the Yishuv prepared for statehood and a 
war of national survival, Ben Gurion assumed the official role as both 
political and military leader of the inchoate Jewish nation. During 
Apri 1, the Jewish Agency formed the "Na tiona 1 Administration" with its 
executive "Council of Thirteen," chaired by Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion 
assumed power as chief civilian executive and representative, and as 
chairman of the "Committee for Security," as the prospective Defense 
Minister for the future Jewish state. Despite in terna tiona 1, 
particularly American, and some WZO pressure. to postpone, Ben Gurion and 
his followers felt determined to declare a Jewish state. Likewise, 
despite the existence of disparate, rival political-military bodies and 
traditions within the Yishuv, Ben Gurion stubbornly envisioned sculpting 
a professional, unified, apolitical army. 
Ben Gurion faced the challenges, not only of leading a new nation 
through a war of national survival, but the internal political challenge 
of forming a unified, professiona 1-s ty le, apoli ti cal army. Ben Gurion 
recognized that the formation of such an army required the realization 
of several fundamental goals: nationalize, formalize, and depoliticize 
the army; establish the supremacy of civilian government in determining 
matters of war and peace; make the Defense Minister the final arbitrator 
in civil-military conflicts; allow the Defense Ministry to prescribe the 
the character and professional standards of the officer corps; 




The two great challengers· to Ben Gurion's goals were the IZL and 
the Pa lmach. The IZL and, to a lesser extent, the LHI represented 
military-political threats outside the influence of Ben Gurion and the 
political center. The Palmach and the far Left, since they participated 
in the official Yishuv government, threatened the center more internally 
as a rival to the political aspirations of Ben Gurion and MAPAI. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Palmach represented the heir to a 
radically different military style-- the Pioneer-Soldier tradition--
from the Professional tradition which Ben Gurion hoped to institute. 
2 
Within the official military forces, the Hagana and the Palmach, 
there existed grave conflicts of authority, stemming in part from their 
underground institutional roots. The Vaad Leumi, in the process of 
becoming the "National Assembly," remained responsible for choosing the 
Hagana High Command. The National Administration was charged with 
appointing the Hagana's National Command, while .they had also 
established Ben Gurion at the helm of the Committee for Security. And 
the Palmach possessed its own supreme command. Authority remained 
decentralized and the chain of command confused-- a situation 
incompatible with a truly unified "national" army. 
On another level, all the undergrounds had basically fought with 
limited weapons and limited training, were restricted to mostly land 
forces, lacked discipline, and were geared for mostly defensive 
maneuvers-- a situation incompatible with a nation facing the probable 
onslaught of several Arab armies, needing to mobilize the entire Yishuv 
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and a mixed multitude of new immigrants. Ladened with the vestiges of 
their long underground period, the transformation of the Yishuv's highly 
publicized, voluntary undergrounds into a compulsory, professional army 
evolved into a major political battle in the midst of the 1948-1949 War. 
3 
In late April, 1948, during a period of relative calm-- following 
the Jewish vie tories over the Palestinian irregulars and before the 
coming of the Arab invasion precipitated by the exit of the British and 
the declaration of statehood proposed for May 15th-- Ben Gurion launched 
his campaign to remold the Jewish community's military structure and 
character. With the LHI stunned into inaction by the departure of the 
British and the developing Arab-Jewish war, and with the IZL moving 
closer towards a full alliance with the Hagana, Ben Gurion focused on 
solidifying his hold over the Hagana-Palmach command and abolishing 
the political, underground ch~racter of the Hagana-Palmach. 
Ben Gurion's central problem was the Palmach. Though representing 
the crack-force and the majority the trained officers of the Hagana, the 
Palma ch was linked to the newly formed MAPAM Party, created by a merger 
of HaShomar HaTzair and Achdut HaAvoda (Kibbutz HaMeuchad). 
The approach of national independence brought the various factions 
of the far Left together under the MAPAM banner. Under the leadership 
of Tabenkin and Yi tshak Ben Aharon, MAP AM re presented a far Left, 
pro-Soviet stance. MAPAM favored a negotiated binational state as the 
solution to the Arab-Jewish conflict and, in theory, advocated Havlaga 
related tac tics. MA PAM fe 1 t Ben Gurion and MAP AI had betrayed the 
- Socialist-Zionist tradition and international Socialism, and wanted to 
mold the society of the coming Jewish nation in the Kibbutz-Palmach 
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mold. 
Yet Ben Gurion and MAPAI wanted to steer the future Jewish state 
on a neutral course, yet leaning towards West. Ben Gurion appreciated 
Soviet support for a Jewish state in the UN vote and the Czech arms deal 
as a product of Soviet interests in ousting Britain from the Middle 
East. Ben Gurion rejected Communism and the idea of a binational state, 
and believed a major battle with the Arabs was rapidly approaching. As 
an extension of earlier confrontations between Ben Gurion and the far 
Left, the Pa lmach"" s marriage to the MAP AM party placed it at poli tica 1 
4 
odds with Ben Gurion. 
Beyond the Palmach""s political character, its military character 
also placed it at odds with Ben Gurion""s aspirations. The Palmach 
possessed an independent command and Palmach commanders exhibited a 
tendency to disregard the Hagana""s central command decisions when they 
conflicted with their own ideas. In late March, the Palmach had even 
demanded that the Negev front be placed exclusively under their command, 
to which Ben Gurion had refused. Ben Gurion saw . the Palmach as 
dangerous "power hungry renegades from the egalitarian Left." 5 And he 
regarded the Palmach""s kibbutz-like structure as appropriate for 
fighting a guerrilla or underground war, but ill-suited for conventional 
war fa re. Ben Gurion wanted to mold Israel's army into the British 
model, instilling distinction of rank, military etiquette, and 
discipline. Ben Gurion rejected the Palmach""s partisan, underground 
tradition and egalitarian, voluntaristic military style as the basis for 
6 
a na tiona 1 army. 
By May, 1948, general mobilization boosted the Hagana""s numbers to 
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approximately 32,000 effectives, compared to the Palmach's 3000-3500 
troops. Yet the Palmach played a disproportionately large role in the 
official Yishuv forces, accounting for most of the field commanders and 
eight of twelve senior commanders. Unlike the IZL or the LHI, the 
Palmach's recognized loyalty and legitimacy with regard to the official 
Yishuv government earned it the admiration of the majority of the 
Yishuv. In addition, the Palmach's success on battlefield, and its 
voluntaristic and egalitarian mystic contributed to its popularity. The 
Palmach's popularity, coupled with the Palmach's larger representation 
in army than in the electorate, made it a difficult institution to 
uproot. Because of its political roots, its military style, and 
popular, influential position in the Palmach-Hagana command structure, 
Ben Gurion viewed the Pa lmach as a poli tica 1-mili tary cliche' which 
would undermine the forthcoming army's posture as the instrument of the 
civilian government. 
7 
The greatest obs true tion be tween the authority of· Ben Gurion as 
Defense Minister and the Pa lmach command was the Na tiona 1 Command, 
another vestige of the underground days. The Head of the Na tiona 1 
Command, the post of "RAMA," headed by Galili, acted as intermediary 
between the Chiefs of Staff (or "Ramatkal"), the Hagana Command, the 
Palmach Command, and the Council of Thirteen. Galili, a MAPAM 
re pre sen ta ti ve popular with the genera ls and with the cabinet, 
championed the Pa lmach' s internal autonomy. In the spring of 1948, the 
grave military situation added to the difficulties involved in modifying 
or changing the Pa lmach, so Ben Gurion began his strategy to unify the 
army, to gain legal and ab solute control over the army command, to 
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eliminate any other authority between the General Staff and himself, and 
to start whittling down the Palmach, by abolishing the National Command 
and ousting Galili. 
8 
On April 21, despite opposition from almost every party, Ben 
Gurion announced the National Command would be dissolved. The 
announcement had no rea 1 effect and the Na tiona 1 Command remained 
intact. On April 26, Ben Gurion summoned Ga lili and intimated his 
dissatisfaction with the state of the Hagana-Palmach command structure 
and with the evolution of the Palmach into private army cadre dominated 
by a single party. Ben Gurion stressed that there existed no clear 
chain of command, no clearly defined process of appointments, and not 
enough discipline in the troops. Ben Gurion proclaimed that the 
underground days were over and informed Galili that the National Command 
was thereafter abolished. 
Galili returned that evening to suggest changes in the Palmach""s 
structure in response to Ben Gurion""s criticisms. Galili suggested that 
the Palmach did not need an independent command, the Palmach could be 
divided into a number of different districts, and there could be a 
general tightening of discipline. But Galili was vehemently opposed to 
the loss of his own position. According to Gali li, there must be an 
intermediary be tween Prime Minister and genera 1 staff of army, to 
safeguard against totalitarianism, and he represented the most suitable 
person. The contest between Ben Gurion and Galili over the fate of the 
National Command remained unresolved. 
9 
On April 27, MAPAM and MAPAI representatives met separately and 
together, while Ben Gurion and Galili restated their positions. Ben 
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Gurion asserted that "the Defense portfolio is the most important one in 
the Executive" lO and should not be the property of a minority party. 
Tabenkin and Ben Aharon of MAPAM refuted Ben Gurion's plans for a 
professional Army along British lines by asserting that the Hagana had a 
clear "working-class character" and the "pioneering elements" were the 
Hagana's essence. Ben Gurion insisted that he absolutely rejected the 
"doctrine of a political or workers' army." 
11 
On Apri 1 30, when the Na tiona 1 Adminis tra ti on and Counci 1 of 
Thirteen formally assumed its official interim position as the Yishuv's 
government, Ben Gurion reasserted that he would accept the role as Prime 
Minister and Defense Minister in the Provisional Government only if he 
was given complete control over the command and the character of army. 
On May 2, Ben Gurion offered Galili a position as deputy Defense 
Minister in a new organization for the command. He then informed the 
Chiefs of Staff and the National Command of the National Command's 
abolition, stating that "in the future, the Chiefs of Staff will receive 
their orders directly and solely from the head of the Security Forces or 
h • d 1 II 12 is e egate ••• 
On May 3, the Chiefs of Staff-- Eliyahu Ben Hur, Zvi Ayalon, Moshe 
Zadok, and Yadin-- met with Ben Gurion to discuss the issue of Galili 
and the Na tiona 1 Command. With the illness of Chief of Sta ff Dori 
complicating the matter, the generals argued with Ben Gurion not to 
dismiss Galili and disrupt the tradi tiona 1 Hagana-Palmach 
chain-of-command. That same day, Galili sent note to Ben Gurion stating 
that, "I've thought over your proposals again. I cannot and do not wish 
to act and participate in the kind of setup you propose." 
13 
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On May 4, the Council of Thirteen gathered for a stormy meeting. 
Most ministers objected to altering the command system, especially with 
a major war looming on the horizon. Ben Gurion was isolated. Many 
ministers complained furiously that Ben Gurion had not consulted the 
counci 1 before taking action. MAPAM re pre sen ta ti ves violently opposed 
abolition of the National Command and the ouster of their political 
comrade Galili, demanding that the order be repealed immediately. Most 
of the representatives agreed, even the MAPAI ministers, with the 
exception of Share tt. Ben Gurion repeated that he would accept the 
Prime Ministry and Defense Ministry only if his plans for a unified 
command were accepted. He emphasized that: 
The Army and all its components must be subject to the 
authority of the people, which at this point means the authority 
of the National Administration. All activities of the Hagana, 
or of an Army, must be in accordance with the decisions of the 
elected authorities. This is true in regard to the activities 
of a p la to on commander, a brigade commander, and the Chief of 
Staff. The organiza tiona 1 s true tu re that has existed un ti 1 now 
cons ti tu tes a a grave threat to our existence. Anarchy and a 
state are two contradictory conceptions, especialt4 in a time of 
war, even more so when it is a war of survival. 
Furthermore, Ben Gurion specified that the Defense Minister must act as 
"Head of War" and the General Staff as an "Instrument of War" in order 
for the civilian government to maintain ultimate hegemony over the 
15 
army. 
On May 5, the Chiefs of Staff again requested that Ben Gurion 
retreat from his attempt to abolish the National Command. But Ben 
Gurion refused "to be a partner to any arrangement under which 
soldiers--members of the Hagana, of the Palmach, or what ever the name--
are not subject to a .single authority." Galili sent a note to Ben Gurion 
restating that he would resume his functions "on the condition that I am 
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given a grade be tween you and the Chiefs of Staff~" 16 Ben Gurion 
refused to budge. 
On May 6, the Chiefs of Staff sent a threatening note to Ben 
Gurion: 
The situation at the front just now calls for a commanding 
authority at the head of the Hagana. The abolition of the post 
of Chief of the National Command and the illness of the head of 
the Chiefs of Staff have left the Hagana without a leader having 
authority to command the brigades and direct the Chiefs of 
staff. This state of affairs has already proved disastrous for 
the conduct of the war during the past three days. The Chiefs 
of Staff ••• consider that the days to come will be decisive for 
the conduct of the war and the preparations for May 15. They 
cannot continue to assume their heavy responsibilities while 
this matter remains unsettled. They demand the reinstatement of 
Israel Galili until definite arrangements are made. If the 
matter it. not settled within twelve hours from now, the Chiefs 
of Staff will no lon&ff consider themselves responsible for the 
conduct of the war. 
The letter was signed by Yadin, Zvi Ayalon, Israel Ben Hur, Moshe Zadok, 
and Yosef Avidar. The ultimatum represented a outright revolt against 
the authority of Ben Gurion. With the military situation critical and 
with the United States and the WZO pressing for a postponement on 
statehood, the generals' threat carried added clout. Ben Gurion's 
position as leader of the Yishuv was at stake. 
On May 6, Ben Gurion confronted the five signatories of the 
ultimatum and categorically refused to comply. As a small concession, 
he suggested that Galili could continue as his deputy. Confronted by 
Ben Gurion's unshakable stance, and with the proposed time until 
statehood dissolving, the Chiefs of Staff agreed to continue with their 
du ties. This surrender by the Chiefs of Staff re presented the turning 
point. On May 9, Galili took up his duties as a deputy. Though his 
position remained vague, he eventually took charge of mobilization, 
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manpower, and military specialists. Ben Gurion was winning in the 
struggle for political authority over the army. 
18 
Though Ben Gurion had apparently won, the controversy continued in 
the government and in the press. Without the mediating influence of the 
Na tiona 1 Command, MAP AM leaders appreciated that Ben Gurion' s 
political-military plans directly threatened the Palmach. A Mapam 
journalist wrote: 
.•• any attempt to adapt the Hagana to the apparatus of an 
accepted regular army by disbanding the Palmach, eliminating the 
experienced and loyal commanders of the Hagana would have one 
result:impairing the fighting capacity and pioneering strength 
of all the Hagana brigades and paving the way for military 
careerism... disbanding 
1
191e Pa lmach would mean breaking the 
backbone of the Hagana. 
MAPAM representatives continued to attack Ben Gurion in cabinet 
meetings, accusing him of "totalitarian intentions , " 
20 and of 
endangering the safety of the settlements by dismantling the tradi tiona 1 
Hagana-Palmach framework. 
According to Ben Gurion, "in accepting the Ministry of Defense, I 
had but one aim-- to ensure our country's security. As head of the 
armed forces, I acknowledge no po li ti ca 1 party." 
21 
On May 12, Ben 
Gurion again informed the National Adminis tra ti on that he refused to 
accept the post as Defense Minister unless the coming Provisional 
Government possessed direct control over a unified military command. As 
Ben Gurion recalled: 
I made it clear to the Provisional Government, when it 
delegated the defense portfolio to me ••• that I would accept the 
ministry only under the following conditions: 1) The Army that 
would be formed and all its branches be subordinated to the 
government of the people and only that government. 2) All 
persons acting on behalf of the Army or the Hagana will act only 
according to a clearly defined function, established by the 
government of the people. The procedure which prevailed in the 
' 
Hagana could not and ~~uld not prevail when the army of Israel 
will be established. 
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Furthermore, Ben Gurion insisted that "multiplicity of authorities is 
very dangerous." The army must be "subject to the role of the people," 
he said, and "all who act ••• in the army, must act only in those areas 
f " l d 11 23 o authori.ty de egate them by the elected government. 
With the approaching thunder of an Arab invasion on May 15th and 
the related crisis over the statehood issue, MAPAI ministers and 
re pre sen ta tives rallied around their leader. Though Ben Gurion 
continued to the fight hesitations of his colleagues, disapproval from 
military leaders, and outcries from the far Left, Ben Gurion 
successfully gained the twin post of Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister. By mid-May, he had eliminated the National Command before the 
statehood would have given it 'de facto' legal status, and placed 
himself in the best position to unify the Yishuv's military bodies under 
the banner of the civilian government. 
24 
While seizing the reins of the embryotic army, Ben Gurion began to 
steer a new course for the Hagana-Palmach command. In an effort to 
remove the inefficiency and confusion in Hagana-Palmach's chain of 
command, the undefined procedure of appointments and promotions, and the 
general lack of discipline and training, Ben Gurion had attempted to 
find a foreign senior commander willing to assume overall command. He 
sought someone experienced in conventional warfare and in di rec ting a 
large-scale force who could act as a political neutral to facilitate 
unification of the Yishuv' s disparate poli tica 1-mili tary bodies. Ben 
Gurion recruited Ame.rican Colonel David Marcus and Canadian Major Ben 
Dunkelman, but no senior commanders could be seduced from abroad. 
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This failure forced Ben Gurion to rely on local military talent 
and upon himself to develop and unify the emerging Jewish army. With 
Chief of Sta ff Dori i 11, normally Sadeh would take over opera tiona 1 
command. Yet Ben Gurion, wary of Sadeh's association with the Palmach 
and unconventional warfare, ordered him to take over command of newly 
mobile Eighth Brigade, easing him out of the High Command. Ben Gurion 
appointed the relatively apolitical Yigael Yadin, to assume the position 
of 'de facto' Chief of Staff, though he retained his title as Head of 
Operations branch at GHQ. Together, Ben Gurion and Yadin would shape 
25 the future Israeli Army. 
By May 14, when Ben Gurion declared the independence of the State 
of Israel, he had achieved the central position to sculpt a 
professional, unified, political Army. The dismissal of Galili and the 
abolition of National Command represented a critical first step. Yet 
both the Palmach and the IZL still claimed special status with regard to 
the central command. 
After the Declaration of Statehood came the invasion of the 
combined Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Transjordan. 
With all available units engaged and with the survival of the new State 
of Israel in doubt, Ben Gurion was forced to wait to disband the 
Palmach. With their fighting capabilities needed and with their 
prestige still too high, Ben Gurion backed off from his plans to 
dissolve the Palmach and concentrated on national survival. 
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Though overshadowed by the imperative of defeating the invading 
Arab armies, Ben Gurion maintained his "domes tic" 
organizational-political goals; solidifying his dominance in the new 
181 
"Provisional Government" and consolidating Israel's inherited 
military bodies. With the Palmach, aside from the dimension of its 
leftist political connections, there was the issue of military style--
the Palmach's scorn for formal military etiquette and ritual, and its 
bonds to egalitarian-voluntaristic ideals, and informal, collectivist 
values. With the IZL, it was not so much an issue of style, for the 
middle-class IZL were believers in formal protocol and a unified, 
centralized authority-- yet their authority was Begin and the IZL High 
Command, and not Ben Gurion and the Provisional Government. In the 
midst of the invasion, Ben Gurion kept a watchful eye on the still 
independent actions of the dissidents, the LHI and, particularly, the 
IZL. 
27 
Yet, in mid-May, it appeared that Israel's Declaration of 
Independence, the ensuing Arab invasion, and the departure of the 
British forces, would dispel Ben Gurion's apprehensions about the 
dissident organizations. 
On May 15, the British-- who suffered from 338 subjects killed in 
Palestine in three years of post war involvement, from general and 
economic war-weariness, from a shift in international opinion which 
deplored British policy in Pales tine and sympathized with the Jewish 
refugees, and from a failure of British policy to appease both the Arabs 
and the Jews while fulfilling her own interests-- departed from 
Palestine. The British Mandate of almost two decades ended, and with it 
seemingly ended a primary factor which had galvanized the dissident 
organizations together and placed them in opposition with the official 
Zionist leadership. Though the IZL and LHI played a larger direct 
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military role in ousting the British, the burgeoning Hagana -- after 
years of careful preparations, training, recruitment, arms procurement, 
and official status-- clearly assumed the role as the nucleus of an 
emerging national army in the face of the Arab invasion on all fronts. 
Begin and the IZL emerged above-ground and broke their anonymity. 
In a time of national peril, they appeared to keep their earlier pledge 
of supporting the Provisional Government after the Declaration of 
Independence. On May 15, Begin proclaimed on IZL radio: 
The Irgun Zvai Leumi is leaving the underground inside the 
boundaries of the Hebrew independent state ••• now ••• there is no 
need for a Hebrew underground. In the State of Israel we shall 
be soldiers and builders. Anzl9 we shall respect its government, 
for it is our government ••• 
The Hebrew revolt of these last four years has been blessed 
with success ••• the State of Israel has arisen ••• the words of 
your Irgun fighters were not vain words: it is He~0ew arms which 
will decide the boundaries of the Hebrew State. 
Begin's announcement carried a dual message, promising to support the 
government and alluding to joining a forthcoming national army within 
Israel's official UN boundaries; yet the IZL would maintain its 
integrity and purpose as an underground political-military body outside 
those borders. Begin reserved the right to fight against the UN 
Partition boundaries which, he believed, had never been scared and would 
eventually be crossed. 31 
On May 16, Levi Eshkol, Galili, and David Cohen of the Provisional 
government met with Begin, Landau, Merridor and Katz to discuss 
shortages of funds for some withstanding arms purchases of the IZL. 
According to IZL sources, the IZL offered the Hagana the joint use of 
the newly purchased LST ship, the "Altalena," (Jabotinsky's pen name) to 
transport badly needed men and weapons to Israel. IZL asked the Hagana 
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to buy the craft for 150,000-250,000 dollars in exchange for 
transporting 1000 Hagana men from Europe to Israel, thereby repaying the 
IZL's debt. 
On May 17, Eshkol and Galili contested that the Altalena's cover 
had been blow, that the vessel was known by agents throughout the 
Mediterranean. The Hagana turned down the IZL's offer for collaboration 
on the Al ta lena venture. Nevertheless, the two sides apparently put 
aside a generation of suspicion and reasserted the March 8th and Apri 1 
26th agreements. IZL again promised cooperation with, and subordination 
to, the Hagana command until the official establishment of the new 
Israeli Army and the dissolution of the IZL. 
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On May 26, the "Tzava Hagana LeYisrael," the "Israeli Defense 
Force," or IDF formally came into existence as Israel's first national 
ins ti tu ti on. The Provisional Government's "Order 1t4," specified that 
the IDF would be structured under unity of command, universal 
conscription, requiring soldiers to take an oath to the State, and 
prohibiting "the establishment or maintenance of any other armed force 
outside of the IDF ••• " Ben Gurion saw the leg is la tion as a triumphant 
symbol that "the Hagana shed its character as an underground 
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organization and has become a regular army." The legal precedent 
was established for a unified Israeli Army. 
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Meanwhile, after statehood was declared and the British had 
finally departed, the LHI had been in a quandary. Their whole ideology 
had been entwined in the war against imperialistic Britain. Throughout 
early 1948, the LHI command had continually doubted that the British 
would really leave and they were shocked and dismayed by the evolution 
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of Arab-Jewish conflict. During May, the splintering LHI command 
debated whether to remain a secret organization or to disband entirely. 
A smaller Jerusalem faction of about 100-150, under Zettler and Shieb, 
remained intact to continue fighting for a unified Jewish Jerusalem. In 
Tel Aviv, the largest faction decided to join the IDF en bloc, while 
Yellin-Mor focused on creating his newly inaugurated "Fighters' Party," 
which had assumed a Communist orientation. On the afternoon of May 
28th, some 700-850 LHI fighters marched together into an IDF recruiting 
camp near Tel Aviv and joined the nation army. Except in Jerusalem, the 
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LHI ceased to exist. 
Meanwhile, the IDF's negotiations with the IZL proceeded gradually 
and smoothly. On May 28, Merridor, the IZL' s chief liaison with the 
IDF, announced that the IZL was ready to merge totally with the IDF. On 
June 1, Begin ordered his IZL men to begin to join the arm;w ani again 
declared over the IZL radio that, "in that part of the country which 
Hebrew law reigns, there is no need for a Hebrew underground. In the 
State of Israel we sha 11 be builders and soldiers." 36 On June 2, the 
IDF and the IZL signed a tr~a ty for a merger. At the signing, Begin 
remarked, "In exultation and joy I sign the agreement to form a unified 
Hebrew Army; we had dreamed about this throughout all our years in the 
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underground." 
The treaty specified that the IZL would be drafted in to separate 
battalions, that IZL facilities, arms, supplies, equipment must be given 
over to IDF, and that IZL Headquarters could be used for one month to 
facilitate the merger, then it must be dissolved. The IZL could conduct 
no further IZL fund raising, arms importation, or weapons purchases. 
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The agreement was binding everywhere in Israel except in Jerusalem, 
which was still an "international city" and where the Hagana, LHI, and 
IZL remained separate military bodies. By June 3, the IZL's integration 
into the new Israeli Army began. On June 4, IDF radio announced that 
the IZL was acting in full cooperation with the IDF. 
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Yet by mid-June, the IZL' s integration in to the IDF preceded 
haltingly, and the June 2nd agreement was only partially fulfilled. 
There were shinning examples, like the newly mobilized Eighth Armored 
Brigade formed, under Sadeh's command, by a composite of Palmach, 
Hagana, and IZL troops. But, though the IZL Headquarters did supervise 
enlistment, only about 1000 IZL members had enlisted in IDF battalions. 
IZL fund raising outside Israel continued, which the IZL justified as 
legitimate for its forces opera ting in Jerusalem and claimed that some 
of the funds were directed toward their legitimate political movement, 
the newly formed "Heru t" ( Freedom) party. With the arms shortage 
critical, the IZL handed over arms in small quantities to the IDF and 
allocated most of its stockpiles to its troops in Jerusalem. The IZL's 
arms acquisition continued and its contacts were not handed over to 
Hagana Intelligence. And the IZL experienced difficulty integrating 
into a "National Army" which was at heart the Hagana, the same Hagana of 
the Season affair. They showed a reluctance to dissolve after years of 
struggle and comradery. The IZL was clearly not disbanding in the haste 
exhibited by LHI. 
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Meanwhile, lingering political differences and the progress of the 
war irritated IDF-IZL relations. From May 14 to June ll, the new State 
of Israel withstood the onslaught of the combined Arab armies. The IDF 
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repulsed the Lebanese and Syrian armies to hold onto the Galilee and 
stopped the Egyptian advance in the south. The Arabs lost their 
offensive momentum and the war evolved in to a stalemate. Yet 
Transjordan' s Arab Legion repulsed the IDF at Ramla, Lydda, Jenin, and 
Latrun. And the Egyptians and the Arab Legion were pressing in on Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem. 
In Jerusalem, the situation was grim. On May 19-22, poor 
communications be tween IZL' s Ranaan, LHI' s Zettler, Pa lmach commanders 
Uzi Narciss and Rabin, and IDF regional Commander Shaltiel contributed 
to the failure of an attack on the Zion Gate, designed to lift the siege 
of the isolated Jewish Quarter in the Old City. Within the Jewish 
Quarter, a Palmach unit under Mordechi Gazit, a Hagana unit under Moshe 
Russnak, and an IZL unit under Isser Nathanson refused to cooperate 
fully, contributing to the loss of the Jewish Quarter on May 23. In the 
end, the groups were united only in blood and defeat. 
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In the hope of reinstituting a peaceful partition, the UN and the 
United States mediated a truce beg:inrrlng on June ll. Ben Gurion, Ya din, 
and the IDF High Command welcomed the chance to regroup, and absorb arms 
and new immigrants into the struggling Israeli forces. Yet Begin and 
his colleagues in the Herut party, voiced vehement opposition to the 
original UN partition boundaries and viewed the truce as virtual 
surrender. Against a background of the tensions over the IZL's merger 
into the IDF, the emotional loss of the Jewish Quarter in Old Jerusalem, 
and Herut-IZL's outrage over the partition issue and the implications of 
the ceasefire, the Altalena incident unfolded. 
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In May, the IZL had secured a massive arms deal with the French, 
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approximately five million dollars worth, through the offices of French 
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, in exchange for IZL guarantees of 
protection for the French Catholic institutions in Palestine. Prolonged 
talks with the French and troubles purchasing the arms caused a serious 
delay in loading the shipment aboard the Altalena. In addition, the IZL 
claimed, Hagana Intelligence Chief Chaim Ben Menachem, tried to prevent 
the Altalena from leaving the French port by preventing the grant of an 
entry permit into Palestine. Not until June 11th did the Altalena sail 
from Port de Bouc. The ship was heavily laden with 5000 rifles, 270 
machine guns, three million bullets, anti-tank weapons, and over 900 IZL 
men. Enough weapons for six battalions-- a treasure for a arms-thirsty 
nation in a desperate war, or a chance to boost the IZL' s independent 
strength and program substantially. 
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The IZL did believe that "with adequate equipment, the IZL could, 
in those weeks, have broken the back of the Arab forces on the central 
front and the combined Jewish forces could have pressed on to the 
Jordan." 43 IZL's Ben Ami attested that "if the weapons promised for 
the Altalena had reached Israel as late as May 15, the IZL would have 
44 pushed for safer borders." Yet the creation of the State of Israel 
and of the IDF, the IZL' s June 2nd agreement to merge with the IDF and 
disband everywhere except in Jerusalem, and the political disputes over 
the Partition boundaries and the truce, obscured the role of the 
Altalena and its valuable cargo. 
On June 11, a BBC newscast reported that the Altalena had departed 
from France with an undisclosed cargo. Begin and the IZL command 
claimed they did not know if the BBC report was accurate. Begin and his 
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assistants tried to warn the Altalena crew to delay arrival until the 
landing arrangements with regard to the truce and the IDF had been 
sorted out. But there were difficulties with the radio aboard the 
Al ta lena and the IZL command in Israel could not reach the vessal as it 
steamed towards the shores of Israel awaiting instructions. 
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On June 15, Begin, Ben Eliezer, Merridor, Landau, and Paglin 
contacted Eshkol, Cohen and Gali li, informing them of the ship's 
departure from France and revealing its contents. The IZL leaders later 
claimed that the IDF representatives already knew about the Altalena's 
contents from French agents. Yet the IDF representatives voiced only 
surprise and consternation over the IZL mission. Eshkol criticized the 
secrecy in the mission. Galili and Eshkol demanded a message sent to 
ship to delay arrival. IZL radios continued to try to make contact, but 
they were unsuccessful. 
On June 16, after supposedly reporting to Ben Gurion, Gali li 
reversed himself and asked Begin to land the ship as quickly as 
possible. They discussed the financial aspects of the. arms, but Begin 
agreed that the arms belonged to the nation. Both parties agreed that 
the details of the landing, unloading, and distribution of the 
Altalena's arms would be worked out in the coming days. 
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During June 17-19, Begin and the IZL staff met with IDF 
representatives, Gali li, Cohen, and Pinchas Vaz eh, to discuss the 
problems of landing and unloading the vessel, and of storing and 
allocating the weapons and ammunition. Begin finally agreed to Kfar 
Vitkin as the landing site, an old, loyal Labor settlement north of Tel 
Aviv. Yet the IZL remained confused over whether the IDF would indeed 
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help unload the cargo. Gali li had refused at first; yet, after 
consulting with Yadin, Cohen conveyed a message that the IDF would 
help. Cohen specified that the cargo would be stored in government 
warehouses with IZL and IDF men jointly on guard. 
Begin would not agreed to the government warehouses, and suggested 
joint IDF- IZL guards at IZL store houses. Later, Ga lili met with Begin 
to pass what was supposedly a note from Ben Gurion reading, " you will 
have to accept our full demands or you will bear full responsibility for 
the consequences and the responsibility will be very heavy indeed. 
Unless you change your mind, we will wash our hands of unloading the 
arms." 47 Eventually, Begin accepted Galili's terms of the unloading 
and storage, interpreting that Ben Gurion would thereby tolerate the 
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entire operation. 
The issue of the Altale~a's weapons distribution ignited a heated 
debate in IZL command. Paglio cried that the IZL troops serving in the 
Army deserved the weapons and demanded that entire shipment be unloaded 
by IZL men. Most of the IZL staff opposed handing the entire cargo over 
to the IDF, though Hillel Kook disagreed. When Begin and Galili debated 
the issue of weapons distribution, he told Galili that his commanders 
protested handing the Altalena's cargo directly over to the IDF. Begin 
claimed he wanted his IZL "boys" well armed when they enlisted in the 
IDF and wanted to augment IZL troops in Jerusalem. Begin wanted 20% to 
go to IZL troops in Jerusalem and 80% for IZL men in IDF. Begin argued 
that the IZL had searched for, purchased, and transported the armaments, 
·so "it is only natural that we should equip our own men first." 49 
Eventually Galili agreed to 20% for IZL Jerusalem troops but refused to 
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offer any special consideration for former IZL troops in the IDF. 
Ultimately, Begin retained his demand for 20% of the weapons for IZL 
troops in Jerusalem and the remainder could be distributed according to 
the IDF General Staff. Galili did not voice any further objection. 
Begin then demanded that former IZL men in the IDF should get first 
priority on weapons. But Galili refused. 
By June 19, the ship arrived off shore. Begin's staff urged him 
not to compromise, suspicious of the Left and Ben Gurion. But Begin 
comp lied with Gali li .... s terms. Begin clearly wanted to overcome the 
IZL-IDF's difficulties in negotiation and for the Altalena's unloading 
to proceed unhindered. The June 17-19 conferences remained 
controversial with regard to their contents and what information Ben 
Gurion received, but the IZL command had clearly been given the green 
light for the Altalena landing. On June 19, Begin ordered the Altalena 
to harbor at Kfar Vitkin. SO 
On June 20, Altalena dropped anchor 40 yards from Kfar Vitkin's 
jetty. To a void being de tee ted, the IZL decided to postpone the 
unloading until nightfall. David Cohen restated to Begin his promised 
that the IZL could expect IDF assistance with the unloading. Palmach 
men were sent to inspect the shipment and Yadin himself came to observe 
and to assess the situation. Yadin reported IZL roadblocks, manned by 
IZL troops in IDF uniforms. When Galili sent his liaison officer to 
arrange a conference with Begin at a nearby IDF camp was told by Paglin 
that, if Galili wanted to meet with Begin, Galili should come to Begin 
on the beach. The officer reported Paglin's comment and that the IZL 
men looked very tense. Ben Gurion received these reports. 51 
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According to Ben Gurion, he did not learn of the Altalena mission 
until June 20th. Whatever the truth regarding when he first heard of 
the vessel, by June 20, Ben Gurion had learned of the IZL mobilization 
around Kfar Vi tkin and he clearly in tended to take action to eliminate 
the IZL. 
He called for an emergency meeting of the cabinet and, supported 
by Share tt, made a case against the IZL. Sharett stressed the IZL 
action could cause a fateful breach in the ceasefire and demanded that 
at least 500 IDF troops should be sent to secure the beach at Kfar 
Vitkin. Ben Gurion made a grave and passionate appeal to the cabinet: 
This affair is of the highest importance. There are not going 
to be two states, and there are not going to be two armies. 
Begin will not be allowed to do what he likes. I don't even 
want to discuss, just now, the political and international 
implications of this breaking of the truce; politics don't 
interest me in time of war ••• but we have to decide whether we 
are going to offer power to Begin or order him to cease his 
i~depend~2t activities. If he does not submit, we will fire on 
him ••• 
Some ministers tried to suggest solutions other than forceful 
action against the IZL. Some wanted to temporize and some talked of 
arresting Begin alone. The cabinet sent for Galili and Yadin. They 
reported that two battalions would be needed to put down the IZL. 
Backed by the military staff, Ben Gurion pressed for forceful action. 
He warned the cabinet that, "if the IZL operation succeeds, we will be 
faced with a much greater clashes later. By acting tonight we will 
prevent blackmail tomorrow ••• the IZL must be disarmed at all cost." 
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Eventually, the cabinet ministers approved use of IDF force if the IZL 
leaders refused to cooperate. Only Gruenbaum opposed. Ben Gurion 
ordered Yadin to prepare for action at Kfar Vitkin. 54 
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On the morning of June 21, a mu 1 ti tude of IZL men had gathered on 
the beach at Kfar Vitkin and began unloading weapons and ammunition from 
the Altalena. Host of the IZL men on the beach were not yet assigned to 
the army, but some had deserted their IDF uni ts to participate. Some 
even took IDF vehicles. At the same time, Major General Sadeh relayed 
Yadin's order to Lieutenant Colonel Dayan and his Alexandroni brigade to 
proceed to Kfar Vi tkin, surround the beach, foil the IZL unloading 
operation, arrest the IZL troops, and tranfer the weapons and ammunition 
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to IDF stores. 
During the afternoon, Dayan broke IZL roadblocks surrounding Kfar 
Vitkin, arresting and disarming IZL men. Meanwhile, the Alexandroni 
brigade's deputy commander, Dan Evan, surrounded the beach. Evan issued 
a directive to the Altalena's Captain Dan Fein, demanding that the IZL 
surrender and hand over all weapons. And Galili sent Natanya Mayor Oved 
Ben Ami, a IZL sympathizer, to persuade Begin not to risk a 
confrontation. By all accounts, Begin did not take ultimatum seriously 
and ignored it. By misreading the ultimatum and the· situation, Begin 
cut himself off from potential channels of communication. The refusal 
to acknowledge the ultimatum furthered the suspicion and tension on the 
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beach. 
Assessing the situation differently, Paglin, the IZL operational 
commander on the beach, and Begin argued, first by radio, then on the 
shore, whether to proceed. Paglin wanted to reload the ship and sail to 
friendlier shores, or head back out to sea until the cease-fire ended. 
Begin did not believe the IDF would fire on fellow Jews. He asserted 
that the IZL had "nothing to fear" from the IDF. Paglin requested to be 
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relieved and Begin reluctantly complied. Merridor took over operational 
command but quickly reached Paglin' s assessment. Katz wanted to sail 
the vessel to Yugoslavia, while Kook wanted to return to France. Begin 
insisted that, "Jews don't shoot at Jews." 
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But finally, the IZL 
commanders convinced Begin to sail to Tel Aviv, where the presence of 
IZL members and middle-class sympathizers would help with the unloading 
58 
and deter IDF interference. 
By that evening, the IDF had established roadblocks around Kfar 
Vitkin and IDF troops had formed on hillside overlooking the IZL's 
pontoon bridge. By then, Ben Gurion had ordered Galili and Yadin not to 
negotiate-- either the IZL would obey the orders of the Provisional 
Government or the IDF would open fire. At Sadeh Dor, a small airfield 
outside Tel Aviv, Boris Senior, a former IZL member, and pilot in 
fledgling Israeli Airforce was told to ready his plane to bomb the 
Altalena; shocked by the order, he eventually only ran a reconnaissance 
flight. In addition, two Navy corvettes, the "Wedgewood" and the 
"Ela th," appeared out at sea to provide artillery support. The IZL was 
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surrounded by the IDF. 
At about 7:00 p.m., Begin started to address his men on the beach 
about going to Tel Aviv, just as the IDF opened fire. IDF machine gun 
fire and mortars hammered the IZL men on the beach. IZL commanders 
managed to shove a reluctant Begin into a launch, which safely reached 
the Altalena. Soon Begin and the Altalena sped south to Tel Aviv, 
alluding the IDF corvettes. On the Kfar Vi tkin beach, the IZL fought 
the IDF for several hours, trying to break the semi-circle around them. 
Eventually, the pinned-down IZL commander surrendered. All IZL arms 
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were handed over to the IDF, and the crates on the beach were 
confiscated. The IDF arrested these IZL men and medically treated their 
wounded. The IDF-IZL battle at Kfar Vitkin was over. 
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During the night, Paglin and handful of IZL troops tried to take 
over the city government in Tel Aviv's suburb of Ramat Gan, but IDF 
troops apprehended them en route. Meanwhile, Begin and the crew abroad 
the Altalena cruised passed Tel Aviv harbor. At about 2:00 a.m., June 
22, the Altalena ran aground on the beach, 200 yards from shore, 
opposite the luxury hotels which housed, among others, UN officials and 
foreign journalists. Begin felt the proximity to the hotels and the 
numbers of IZL sympathizers in the Tel Aviv region offered enough 
protection to carry out the unloading operation. Soon after daylight, 
large crowds gathered near the beach, including more IZL men who had 
deserted their posts in the IDF. Eventually, as many as two battalions
of enlisted IZL men deserted. Under the direction of Begin and Fein, 
small boats began shuttling loads from the Altalena to the shore. 
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After receiving reports of the battle at Kfar Vitkin and Begin's 
escape towards Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion conferred with the IDF Naval 
Operations Officer and discussed various opinions, yet none seemed 
"iunnedia te" enough. Ben Gurion feared that delay might mean an 
escalated civil war. He ordered Ya din to bring enough troops to Tel 
Aviv to force the IZL's unconditional surrender. 
Soon afterward, at an emergency cabinet meeting, in the interest 
of avoiding more bloodshed and avert a civil war, some ministers wanted 
to negotiate a compromise solution with tfie IZL. Ben Gurion addressed 
the cabinet, describing the Altalena's significance: 
What happened endangers our war effort and ••• it endangers the 
state. For the state cannot exist as long as it has no army and 
no control over the army. This is an attempt to des troy the 
army and ••• to murder the state ••• fight we must. The moment the 
army and the state give in tg
2
another armed force, there will be 
nothing left for us to do. 
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Ben Gurion added that if the IZL did have "5000 rifles and 250 guns, 
then what they are doing now is nothing compared to what they will do 
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shortly ••• then we shall have two states and two armies." Ben Gurion 
refused to negotiate with the IZL. Ministers Fishman, Gruenbaum, and 
Shapiro, opposed the immediate initiation of a fratricidal clash, 
arguing for negotiations with Begin. Yet during the meeting, news 
arrived of the IZL unloading the Altalena in Tel Aviv. With the sole 
exception of Fishman, the cabinet swiftly approved action against the 
IZL. 
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Yet in Tel Aviv, the IDF forces were initially unprepared to stop 
the IZL. Under command of Allon and Rabin, the government forces had 
only the staff and clerks from the Palmach's nearby headquarters at the 
Ritz Hotel, joined later by a handful of Palmach troops from the 
Yiftach, Negev, and Carmeli brigades. The Palmach troops failed to 
prevent IZL men and supporters from reaching the beach. As street 
clashes and gunfights evolved, the IZL threatened to take over west Tel 
Aviv. Simultaneously, an IZL battalion engaged a IDF battalion at Beit 
Dejen, several miles outside Tel Aviv. In the Ritz Hotel, Allon was cut 
off. He saw a launch heading from the Al ta lena with men and weapons, 
and heavy machine guns mounted on Altalena's deck. Allon asked Yadin for 
artillery support to contain the fighting. Ya din contacted Ben Gurion. 
Ben Gurion approved Yadin's request and he telephoned Allon at the Ritz 
hotel, stating, "we are being faced with open revolt. Not only is Tel 
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Aviv in danger of falling into rebel forces, but the very future of the 
State is at stake." 65 Yadin ordered a field gun brought up. 66 
Aboard the Altalena, when the shooting started, Fein ordered the 
ship's troops to return fire. But Begin countermanded his order. Begin 
tried to radio to Landau on shore to arrange a ceasefire, but without 
success. He tried to direct his men to stop shooting through a 
loudspeaker, but it was blown off. IZL members claimed the IDF ignored 
white flags of surrender, while Palmach commanders attested that several 
summons for surrender were issued to the IZL and ignored. 
At Ben Gurion's residence in Tel Aviv, a contingent led by Mayor 
Rokach tried to convince Ben Gurion to declare a truce and negotiate 
with Begin, to avert civil war. Ben Gurion argued that the government 
faced a serious issue of authority in the country. Ben Gurion refused 
to call off the IDF. During thi,s meeting, word came that the Altalena 
f
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was on ire. 
At about 4:00 p.m., a field cannon fired shells at the ship, 
possibly intended as a warning. But the second s hE! ll plowed in to 
Altalena's deck, exploding ammunition and fuel. Though the ship was 
aflame, Begin ordered the crew not to surrender. But Fein raised white 
flag and ordered the crew to abandon ship. Begin was forced to abandon 
ship and his troops on the beach surrendered, though Begin himself 
managed to allude capture. The IZL had suffered 14 and 69 wounded, and 
the IDF lost 2 men and suffered 6 wounded. The IDF salvaged only 25% of 
the precious arms aboard. The battle for the Altalena was over. 68 
During the night of June 22-23, IDF security forces rounded up IZL 
men in the Tel Aviv area and throughout the country, even raiding the 
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Herut party headquarters in Metsudat Zeev. Hundreds of IZL members were 
arrested, including key figures. That night, Begin delivered an 
emotional broadcast over IZL radio, giving a long account of the 
Altalena affair, underscoring Israel ... s need for weapons, and 
ennumera ting the Provisiona 1 Government ... s broken promises. Yet Begin 
urged his compatriots not to seek retribution and drag the nation into 
civil war. "IZL soldiers," Begin proclaimed, "will not be a party to 
fratricidal warfare." 
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At the end of his broadcast, Begin wept. To 
many of his faithful followers who listened to the broadcast, it sounded 
as if the old resistance leader had finally been broken. But as Begin 
wrote later, "sometimes, as the Altalena taught us, it is essential that 
70 
tears should take the place of blood." 
On June 23, Israel Sheib, of LHI in Jerusalem, contacted Begin in 
Jaffa, urging Begin that the time had come for LHI and IZL to seize 
power in Jerusalem and establish an independent government there. But 
Begin refused. In the explosive atmosphere at a meeting of some 200 
remaining IZL officers, many pressed Begin for retaliation. But he 
resolutely ordered his men not to resist the IDF and urged them to join 
the army, to turn to defend the nation against the Arab threat. He 
pleaded against a "war of brothers." Just as in the Season affair, 
Begin ... s interest in the "national" welfare superseded his partisan 
political interests, quelling the escalation of a possible civil war. 
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In late June, IZL sympathizers waged a propaganda campaign trying 
to explain their position regarding the Al talena incident. IZL argued 
that they had delayed unloading at Kfar Vi tkin to gain the cover of 
night, to protect the mission against UN observers. They felt that 
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previous agreements and negotiations were ignored, that Ben Gurion 
deceived them in the preliminary negotiations in May and early June, 
sending up a "smoke screen" and tricking them in to landing at Kfar 
Vitkin. Or perhaps Galili, entangled in the MAPAM-MAPAI struggle with 
Ben Gurion over the Palmach, had orchestrated a diversion. They cited 
their landing at Kfar Vitkin as evidence that the IZL had no treasonous 
intentions. They believed Ben Gurion and MAPAI, and MAPAM, wanted to 
prevent a successful landing of the Altalena because it would have 
proved a great boon to Herut's election campaign. 72 As IZL's Ben Ami 
reviewed the Al talena Affair, "Ben Gurion had put together his case 
carefully. Nothing would deter him from the course he had embarked upon 
years ago, the liquidation of the opposition he hated and feared most--
Jabotinsky's heritage." 
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In the week following the Altalena's destruction, moderate, 
religious, and right-wing representatives in the Provisional Government 
severely criticized Ben Gurion for his handling of the Altalena affair. 
Many argued that the cabinet did not question the evidence enough and 
condemned the cabinet for not inviting Begin to testify before resorting 
to violence. But Ben Gurion rebutted that if the Altalena had not been 
destroyed, Israel would have been destroyed by private armies. Ben 
Gurion referred to the "Sacred Howitzer" which saved the state. He 
argued that, "there is no country in the world that can allow private 
persons or private organizations to introduce, without its government's 
permission, even the smallest quantities of arms, let alone large 
quantities of rifles, machine guns and ammuntion." 74 And Galili 
offered what became the "official" version of the Altalena Affair by 
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ins is ting that the Government was "surprised in the dead of the night by 
news that the boat was approaching our shores. Our demands that the 
boat be handed over unconditionally to the government and to the army 
were rejected." 75 Though two ministers resigned over the controversy, 
the general public opinion sided with the govemmen t. Because of the 
influence of the official media and the prevailing fear of renewed 
Arab-Israeli violence, the population rallied around their leader, Ben 
Gurion. In late June, the Provisional Assembly gave Ben Gurion a 
massive vote of confidence. 
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Overcoming the great political risks of breaking the truce, 
spurning a disastrous civil war, witnessing a IZL victory in Tel Aviv, 
or fostering a corrosive political scandal, Ben Gurion successfully used 
the showdown over the Altalena to erase the IZL. Regardless of whether 
Begin truly intended to use the Altalena's weapons for a coup de'etat in 
Israel, an offensive in Jerusalem, or to upset the partition boundaries 
elsewhere, Ben Gurion used the Altalena incident to eradicate the IZL as 
a formidable underground political-military institution, as a threat to 
the authority of the Provisional Government and the power of the IDF. 
Regardless of whether Ben Gurion had been ill-informed by Galili, had 
lured the Altalena and the IZL into a deadly trap, or had been startled 
into swift, forceful action on June 20th, Ben Gurion had utilized the 
Altalena incident as a timely and decisive maneuver. 
The Altalena Affair occurred during the first truce in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict-- after Ben Gurion had assumed the twin role of 
Prime Minister and Defense Minister, and after the IDF, possessed with 
the legal status of the "national army," had grown in size and 
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strength. Just as Ben Gurion's traditional enmity and mistrust of the 
IZL undoubtedly influenced his and his followers actions in the Altalena 
incident, Begin and the IZL's traditional repugnance for the Left and 
rejection of the Zionist "establishment" undoubtedly made it difficult 
for them to shake off their underground mentality and loyalties, and 
dissolve swiftly and quietly into the IDF. The Altalena Affair, in one 
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bold stroke, clearly marked the end of the IZL outside Jerusalem. 
After the Altalena's destruction, Begin recognized the legality of 
the Provisional Government, despite his dislike and opposition to the 
policies of the Left. And though his "image as the vie torious 
resistance leader was badly tarnished," 
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Begin concentrated on 
building the Herut party and campaigning for a "greater Israel" which 
included Jerusalem and the Triangle (West Bank). "There was no 
fr~tricidal war in Israel," Begin later wrote, "to destroy the Jewish 
State before it was properly born. In spite of everything--there was no 
civil war." 
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For his part, Ben Gurion turned his attention to 
eradicating the small dissident bands in Jerusalem, ·dismantling the 
Palmach, unifying the nation and the Army, and winning the next phase of 
the "War of Independence." 
During the remainder of the first truce in the war, from late June 
to early July, most of the former IZL troops, except those in Jerusalem, 
joined or rejoined the IDF. On June 27, Ben Gurion and the IDF General 
Staff swore in all the soldiers of the IDF in a ceremony which "served 
to intensify the realization that unifying forces outweighed the 
devisi ve factors." 80 The many disparate e le men ts, accustomed to 
different military experience, tactics, and training, still had to be 
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welded together into a synchronized national army; yet, after June 27th, 
with the exception of the dissidents in Jerusalem, the symbolic pledge 
for unity had been made. 
Aside from the continued shortage of weaponry and the general lack 
of adequate training, the greatest problem of the new Army continued to 
be a lack of unity and discipline. Indeed, the IDF was built on the 
framework of the undergrounds, which had been based on shared ideals and 
common background-- no longer adequate as new immigrants arrived, the 
army grew, and as the borders to be protected became Israel's national 
boundaries. The problem of the IDF's discipline and chain-of-command 
continued to be aggravated by conf lie ts be tween Ben Gurion and the 
General Staff, and by the independence of the Palmach commanders. 
Since Ben Gurion's showdown with Galili over the National Command 
in early May, serious conflicts of authority had occurred. Ben Gurion's 
order on May 24, to disband the Palmach Command, was ignored. In fact, 
the MAPAM reconstructed a new Palmach Command. Ben Gurion discovered 
that his orders transmitted through Ga lili had often been altered and 
his appointments to command were not always carried out. Ben Gurion 
received constant reports of lack of discipline everywhere, including in 
the higher ranks. In early June, Palmach units at Kiryat Anavim near 
Jerusalem had seized arms, vehicles, and rations belonging the "IDF" 
without authorization. Despite orders by Ben Gurion, the supplies and 
equipment were not relinquished. On the Jerusalem front, relations 
between Colonel Marcus and Palmach brigades neared the breaking point 
several times. And Marcus.. acciden ta 1 shoo ting on June 10' further 
raised Ben Gurion's suspicions of Palmach disloyalty. 81 
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Also during the first truce, Ben Gurion set up a highly 
centralized command, determined to personally direct the conduct of 
war. Meanwhile MAPAM continued to pressure Ben Gurion to restore Galili 
and the National Command. In June, Ben Gurion began making promotions 
and postings aimed at installing as many non-political, British-trained 
officers as possible, in the hope of weakening the grip of Palmach and 
MAPAM on the IDF and reshaping a professional, British-styled officer 
corps. Then he appointed British-trained Mordechai Makleff and Shlomo 
Shamir to the High Command to replaced Palmach-MAPAM generals Galili and 
Ayalon. Ben Gurion""s appointments triggered an explosion of 
condemnation both from MAPAM and the General Staff. As Ben Gurion told 
the MAPA! Counci 1 in mid-June, the Palmach represented a continuing 
problem, that "instead of being a pioneering force ••• at the disposa 1 of 
the whole community, an attempt was made, and is still being made, to 
create a sectarian unit under the control of a single party ••• the 
Palmach is now part of the IDF and must share the same status as other 
• " 82 army uni ts • 
Ben Gurion""s assault on ,the Palmach aggravated the already tenuous 
relationship of Ben Gurion and the General Staff. Though Yadin had been 
Ben Gurion""s choice for an interim Chief of Staff in Dori's absence, 
their working relationship was far from harmonious. They had clashed 
over the tactics in the ill-fated Latrun operation of May 23-24, when 
Ben Gurion wanted direct assault while Yadin wanted an indirect attack. 
The Latrun disaster precipitated numerous disputes between Yadin and Ben 
Gurion. Yadin objected to the Prime Minister's interference in 
operational and personnel matters. On June 29, the acting Chiefs of 
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Staff, Yadin, Galili, Yosef Avidar, Moshe Zadok, and Zvi Ayalon accused 
Ben Gurion of heavy-handed, incompetent direction of the war effort. In 
a showdown like the one 
letters of resignation. 
on May 6th, the Chiefs of Sta ff a 11 handed in 
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On June 30, Ben Gurion addressed the Council of Thirteen, 
explaining that the letters of resignations were: 
••• a result of us not having accepted the proposals of three 
people--Galili, Yadin, and Ayalon-- for the reorganization of 
the High Command. I did not approve the plan as it appeared to 
me to be yet another attempt to transform the whole army in to 
the army of a certain party ••• What this business really amounts 
to is an attempt at revolt by the Army. A war is being waged on 
me ••• I demand that a committ~ of three ministers examine the 
matter and draw conclusions. 
As a result of Ben Gurion's request and the Chiefs of Staff's 
resignations, on July 3, five ministers formed a special ministerial 
committee. Headed by Gruenbaum, the Minister of Interior, the committee 
investigated the conduct of the war and the organization of the Army. 
While the MAPAM press assailed Ben Gurion for trying "to starve 
the Palmach into submission," claiming that "he wants a dictatorship 
85 over the army," and that he was "set against MAPAM kibbutzim," the 
testimony of Palmach witnesses before the special committee assailed Ben 
Gurion's military authority and competence. Galili testified, giving a 
dismal portrait of the military situation and emphasizing that the 
removal of National Command caused a complete collapse in the 
chain-of-command. Galili stressed that Ben Gurion's intentions had been 
militarily disastrous, complained of excessive centralization, and 
attacked Ben Gurion's interest in foreign commanders. The Chiefs of 
Staff brought in field commanders as witnesses giving evidence of Ben 
Gurion's military incompetence. Ya din offered more restrained 
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criticism, yet attacked Ben Gurion's attitude, his distrust of the 
General Staff, and his tactics at Latrun and in Jerusalem. Furthermore, 
Yadin lauded the Palmach as bold and disciplined force which played a 
major role in defending the state against the Arab invasion and most 
recently against the IZL. 
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Ben Gurion countered with examples of the Palmach' s 
insubordination. He claimed that Ra bin issued orders, approved by 
Gali li, for Palmach commanders to accept orders emina ting only from 
Palmach Headquarters. He described Uzi Narciss' conflict with Shaltiel, 
the IDF regional commander, over weapons for Jerusalem. Ben Gurion 
explained that eight of thirteen brigade commanders were MAPAM members 
and he spoke against political influence in army. He proclaimed that 
all soldiers and officers in the Army must "enjoy the same conditions 
and operate within the limits set. by the Provisional Government, and 
when there are elected institutions, by those institutions." 
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But the testimony weighed against the Prime Minister. On July 6, 
Gruenbaum's committee told Ben Gurion that the majority favored the 
appointment of two military "directors" to assist Ben Gurion. One would 
act as liaison between Ben Gurion and High Command, or, in essence, a 
reinstatement of the National Command format, with Galili as the likely 
candidate for the intermediary position. The committee's decision 
apparently erased all the achievements of Ben Gurion in early May. 
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A few hours after their verdict, Ben Gurion sent a letter to the 
cabinet: 
I offer my resignation as Prime Minister and as Minister of 
Defense. I am ready to place myse 1f at your disposition, as 
adviser on matters of security, without the right to vote ••• in 
order that the Government's time should not be wasted, I ask you 
to put aside your proposals for reorganizing tg~ Defense 
Ministry, if you wish me to continue at its head ••• 
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His ultimatum triggered a stormy debate in the cabinet. MAPAM ministers 
complained of Ben Gurion's dictatorial methods, excessive concentration 
of power, and incompatibility with other political and military 
leaders. Yet Moshe Sharett and eventually other MAPAI ministers 
supported Ben Gurion. Aware of Ben Gurion's immense popularity and 
influence, and with less than two days before the end of the truce on 
July 8 and the renewal of the war, the cabinet voted to re ta in Ben 
Gurion. Galili retired from his post to spend years in the political 
wilderness. Ben Gurion's position as political-military leader was not 
challenged again for the duration of the war. 90 
Meanwhile, the practical organization of the IDF continued. The 
debate over the High Command ended in a compromise. The Palmach's Moshe 
Carmel obtained northern regional command, Makleff a multi-Brigade 
formation, Sholmo Shamir the eastern front, and the Palmach's Allon the 
critical central front. Yadin remained acting Chief of Staff, while Ben 
Gurion solidified his position as Commander-in-Chief. Ben Gurion 
succeeded in issuing standard uniforms, formal military courtesies, 
badges of rank, and separate officers' mess. Yet many of these new 
"Professional-style" arrangements were boycotted until the end of the 
war, for they threatened the informal, egalitarian style of the Palmach, 
the Pioneer-Soldier tradition. The prevalence of Palmach commanders and 
Palmach units remained the key obstacle to Ben Gurion's plans to unify, 
depoliticize, and professionalize the IDF's policy and character. 91 
The Arab-Israeli fighting resumed from July 9 to July 19. During 
this short period of warfare, the IDF, was strengthened by growing 
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numbers of troops, mostly released refugees from Europe and Cyprus, and 
weaponry, acquired mostly from Czechoslovakia. The IDF amounted to some 
50,000-60,000 troops, distributed in seven regular brigades, one armored 
brigade, and three Palmach brigades. The augmented IDF launched several 
minor offensives. The IDF captured Lod and Ramleh, relieving the 
pressure on Tel Aviv. The IDF captured Nazareth, and held the line in 
the Galilee and in the sou them desert. The IDF checked the Syrians in 
the north, the Iraqis and Transjordans in the east, and the Egyptians in 
the sou th. Yet on the Jerusalem front, where the IDF, the LHI, and the 
IZL forces remained separate, the situation of the Jewish forces 
remained shaky. 
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Though the Jewish forces captured a number of key positions 
surrounding west Jerusalem, there were a number of disastrous attacks, 
which further antagonized the disparate Jewish military groups. While 
IDF and LHI troops won a victory at Ein Karim, the IZL, under Ranaan, 
blamed Shaltiel and the IDF for withdrawing artillery support from IZL 
troops mauled at Malha, outside Jerusalem. Controversy flared over the 
failure of IDF and LHI troops to support an IZL unit of 65 ~en, under 
the command of Yehuda Lapidot, in an ill-fated attack against Egyptians 
at Rama t Rahel. In Jerusalem itself, the relations amongst the 
approximately 600- 700 IDF (Hagana-Pa lmach), the 400-500 IZL, and the 
100-150 LHI troops were extremely tense. 93 
The IZL's and the LHI's old problem of poor communications with 
Shaltiel resurfaced, particularly over the issue of launching, the long 
postponed operation "Kedem," an assault Jerusalem's Old City. Shaltiel, 
concerned with pushing the Egyptians out of the southern Jerusalem 
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region and maintaining the security of the Jewish New City, postponed a 
campaign on the Old City; however, the IZL and the LHI, emotionally 
charged with the prospect of capturing the ancient capital and the 
Temple Mount, pressed Shaltiel throughout mid-July to launch a joint 
attack. Ranaan threatened Shaltiel that the IZL-LHI forces would attack 
the Old City whether alone or in concert with the IDF. 
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On July 17, the combined Jewish forces finally launched operation 
Kedem. But the LHI unit, encountering heavy resistance, failed to 
breech the walls at Jaffa Gate. The IZL forced their way into the Old 
City at the New Gate, but the IDF forces, after their new "Conus" 
explosive device failed to shatter the walls at Zion Gate, were forced 
to retreat. On the evening of July 19, Ben Gurion, over the objections 
of Dori, Allon, Yadin, and much of the General Staff, ordered Shaltiel 
to ceasefire and accept the negotiated truce if the Arabs stopped 
firing. The Arab troops guarding the ancient walls ceased fire. And 
Shaltiel called off operation Kedem. 
Ranaan raged at Shaltiel for his reluctance to disregard the truce 
and push ahead until the West Bank and Jerusalem had been won. Shaltiel 
threatened Ranaan that if the IZL failed to observe his orders to 
retreat, the IDF would cut off vital supplies to the IZL and allow no 
evacuation route for the wounded IZL soldiers trapped in an opening of 
the New Gate, via the IDF positions at the nearby Notre Dame cathedral. 
Bitterly, Ranaan complied. But the IZL and the LHI in Jerusalem 
continued to condemn Shaltiel in the following weeks, blaming him for 
the failure of operation Kedem. And the relationship of IZL's Ranaan 
and LHI's Zettler also deteriorated. The failure of operation Kedem 
caused the LHI in Jerusalem 





zealous few, and 
Throughout July, the Jerusalem issue continued to intensify the 
bad relations between the "dissident" groups and the Israeli Provisional 
Government in Tel Aviv. In early July, Ben Gurion sent Golda Meir, 
Dayan, and other envoys to meet with Abdullah to bargain over prospects 
for a peace agreement. Rumors circulated that the Old City and the 
Triangle would be given to Transjordan in exchange for a peace treaty. 
Simultaneously, Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN special envoy, issued his 
peace plan, calling for the internationalization of Jerusalem and the 
restoration of the 1947 UN Partition Plan boundaries. Bernadotte 
gathered American, British, and in terna tiona 1 support for his 
blueprint. Ben Gurion felt determined to gain Jerusalem without 
alienating international opinion against the young Jewish State. 
Meanwhile, Begin and the Herut party doubted Ben Gurion's resolve to 
seize all of Jerusalem and circulated a petition to include Jerusalem in 
the Jewish State, supported by religious parties and a· wide spectrum of 
other parties. Jerusalem represented an issue which could polarize the 
Provis iona 1 Government. And with their dreams of Jerusalem and a 





greater and greater pressure to enact militant 
In early August, the IZL captured five Britons, believed to be 
spying for the Arabs in Jerusalem. The British government pressed the 
Israeli Provisional Government for their immediate release. Ben Gurion 
sent Bernard Joseph, chairman of the new Jewish Civil Administration in 
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Jerusalem to demanded the release of the five Britons. After protracted 
and embittered negotiations, IZL complied and released their prisoners, 
with the stipulation that they be tried by a Jewish court. The incident 
further convinced Ben Gurion that the time had come to eliminate all 
dissident political-military bodies. 97 The questionable status of 
Jerusalem had given the dissidents "a welcome opportunity to postpone 
the inevitable self liquidation, which in revolutionary politics is a 
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painful process." 
In mid-August, Ben Gurion ordered government representatives to 
negotiate an integration of LHI and IZL in Jerusalem in to the IDF. 
Gruenbaum negotiated with Begin and Katz for dissolution of IZL in 
Jerusalem. Yet the negotiations bogged down under traditional 
hostilities, political differences, and the uncertain status of the 
Provisional Government with regard to Jerusalem. Finally, Ben Gurion 
lost patience and the IDF threatened to liquidate the IZL if it failed 
to come to terms. By mid-September, terms between the IDF and the IZL 
in Jerusalem were negotiated. The IZL uni ts would disband and IDF 
troops would enter into the positions held by the IZL. Yet the IZL 
units would remain intact and would not be sent out of Jerusalem. All 
the terms were predicated upon provisional rule in Jerusalem. Gruenbaum 
could not obtain authorization from Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion would not be 
pressured into declaring a definitive position on Jerusalem. The 
Provisional Government and the dissidents in Jerusalem remained at 
odds. 
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In late summer, Count Bernadotte struggled to implement his peace 
plan and to impede any further Israeli offensive military efforts. He 
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had incurred the hatred of many LHI and IZL in Jerusalem. The 
dissidents feared Bernadotte's diplomacy and had often demonstrated 
publicly against him. On September 17, three men in an unmarked jeep 
assassinated Bernadotte and his assistant, French Colonel Serut, in 
Jerusalem. Though the assassins escaped and were never fully 
identified, it was widely presumed that the "Fatherland Front," actually 
a splinter of the deteriorating LHI, organized Bernadotte' s 
assassination. Most probably, Shieh and Yellin-Mor ordered Zettler to 
direct the murder. The assassination sent waves of shock and bitterness 
throughout the world. Ben Gurion seized upon the reaction to 
Bernadotte's assassination as a pretext for a massive crack-down on the 
LHI and IZL in Jerusalem. 
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On September 19, the Israeli cabinet decided unanimously to 
approve Ben Gurion's proposal to take action against the dissidents. 
The IDF imposed a curfew, arresting hundreds of LHI and IZL fighters, 
financial supporters, and sympathizers, including LHI's Yellin-Mor and 
his lieutenant Mattityahu Shulevitz. The remnants of the LHI were 
shattered forever. On September 20, Yadin issued an ultimatum to the 
IZL in Jerusalem, to disband within 24 hours and to hand in a 11 
weapons. If the dissidents refused, the IDF would take severe action 
against them: 
••• accept in practice as well as in theory the law of the 
state regarding the army, mobilization, and arms, to hand over 
all arms in their possession to the IDF, to disband the specia 1 
uni ts of the IZL, to transfer all those liable for mill tary 
call-up to the IDF, and the status of the IZL is to be like the 
status of every other Jew. If the demands of the government are 
not met, the Army will come, using all means at its disposal. 101 
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With their dreams of a "greater Pales tine" shattered and with the 
prospect of facing the quite formidable IDF, the IZL command in 
Jerusalem decided not to plunge Israel into civil war. At a press 
conference on September 21, Katz, acting as IZL spokesman, declared: 
Rejection of this ultimatum would involve considerable 
bloodshed. The strength of the Irgun Zvai Leumi in Jerusalem is 
sufficient to ensure that any attack would involve the attackers 
in heavy looses. We are not prepared to shed the blood of 
Hagana soldiers whose lives the government is so lightly 
prepared to throw away. We are consequently informing the 
Hagana army this morning of our accep tence of the u 1 ti ma tum af8 
the members of the IZL will be told to join the Hagana Army. 2 
In late September, Israel witnessed the orderly transfer of the 
IZL's men and arms into IDF. Dayan, recently appointed as the central 
regional commander at the behest of Ben Gurion, supervised the orderly 
unification of IDF troops in the Jerusalem region. Despite the vocal 
dissatisfaction of IZL groups in the diaspora, the IZL closed-its Swiss 
bank account. Former IZL fighters submitted to IDF discipline. Most 
focused their political energies on the development of the Herut party, 
"which was to campaign for the restoration of our na tiona 1 
territory ••• on a new plane, in a different climate, against the 
background of an independent sovereign state, with its own life and 
significance." 
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Late September, 1948, brought the final end of IZL 
and LHI. The Jabotinsky-rooted undergrounds were "part of history, the 
terror out of Zion past." 
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By September, the IDF had expanded in to powerfu 1 army exceeding 
80,000 troops, including paratroopers, armored brigades, air force, and 
navy. The long truce, from July-to October, offered opportunity for the 
IDF to more adequately train many new recruits and to absorb an influx 
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of military hardware, principally from the Czech arms deal, which 
included heavy artillery and fighter planes. The lull in the fighting 
also permitted Ben Gurion to attempt to eliminate the last vestige of 
the IDF's underground heritage-- the Palmach. 
By late September, the dissident undergrounds in Jerusalem were 
eliminated, the IDF had imported enough Czech arms that Ben Gurion could 
risk appearing anti-leftist in Soviet-bloc eyes, and the IDF's growth 
had made the Palmach's separate units more expendable. Indeed, many 
Palmach commanders were already dispersed as officers in the regular 
army. The time had arrived to united the entire army along standard 
military lines. Ben Gurion saw no need for an independent Palmach and 
moved to eradicate the Palmach' s separate headquarters. 
105 
The separate Pa lmach command was clearly inefficient from an 
administrative stand point, but the crux of the issue was the future 
political and military character of the army. With Palmach units and 
commanders involved in many of the IDF's spectacular victories, the 
Palmach's prestige and mystique burgeoned. The Palmach's elitist 
posture appeared in recurrent conf lie ts over the the chain-of-command 
between the IDF High Command and the Palmach Command. 
On Sept 7, Dori met with the Palmach' s Allon, Uri Brenner, and 
Eliezer Shoshani to discuss the question of Pa lmach authority. Dori 
raised the issue of the incompatibility of two armies within one 
nation. Palmach commanders made the distinction between "loyal" Palmach 
units and "unreliable" units, and emphasized the indispensability of the 
Pa lmach to the nation. 
arrived at no resolution. 
This conference at a strictly "military level" 
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On September 14, MAPAM delegates met with Ben Gurion to debate the 
positive and negative qualities of the Palrnach, and the over-all state 
of the Army command. Tabenkin stressed that "when an operation had to 
be carried out against the IZL and the LHI, the Palmach was sent." Allon 
argued that the "Palmach is essential for military and political 
reasons ••• a unified Palmach guarantees the character of the army." l07 
Tabenkin and other MAPAM representatives argued that the Palmach 
aided the settlement movement by infusing the collectives with an added 
national purpose. Then the MAPAM representatives reopened the old 
argument, criticizing Ben Gurion"'s military authority and competence. 
Ben Aharon pressed Ben Gurion on resurrecting Galili"'s position and 
claimed discrimination against MAPAM-associated commanders in the 
General Staff. 
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Ben Gurion argued. that Palmach could not have an independent staff 
within a na tiona 1 army. "With the creation of the state," Ben Gurion 
pointed out, "the en ti re army is subordinate only and so le ly to one 
authority, the government of Israel, and its organization has been 
adapted to the war needs of regular armies and not to the tradition of 
the Hagana. " 109 Ben Gurion stressed that the Palmach was an 
"anomaly." The MAPAM delegates remained unconvinced. 
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At the end of September, Ben Gurion ordered Dori to relay an order 
to disband the Palmach Command. On September 29, Dori sent the order to 
Pa lmach General Headquarters, written in very a po loge tic terms. Dori 
tried to soften the blow by explaining that the new command structure 
would be worked out be tween the IDF Genera 1 Sta ff and the Pa lmach High 
Command and that the three Palmach brigades deployed more "efficiently." 
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The Pa lmach appealed to the IDF Genera 1 Sta ff, while MAPAM organized 
angry editorials, protest meetings, petitions. MAPAM made Ben Gurion's 
assault on the Palmach into national scandal. 
lll 
MAPAM represented a small constituency, but the Palmach had won 
great popularity amongst many Israelis outside MAPAM, who defended the 
Pa lmach on the grounds of their courage on the battlefield. MAPAM 
argued that Palmach represented the repository of Zionist pioneering 
spirit. As Allon described the Palmach's role in the IDF: 
The Pa lmach included a 11 the pioneer you th movements, which 
combined their agricul tura 1 training with the'ir military 
training for special battle exploits; at the same time, they did 
not segregate or isolate themselves from _the rest of their 
units, but formed a nucleus for the entire force which included 
masses from rural settlements, the colonies, the cities, and the 
new immigrants ••• anyone familiar with military practice will 
know how to evaluate unit tradition as a heartening factor in 
battle. Most of the IDF's units were lacking in tradition; the 
Palmach had behind ifl2 an organizational, social, and 
professional tradition. 
Ben Gurion denied that the Pa lmach had a monopoly on "pioneering 
status." In a letter to a wounded Palmach soldier in October, he wrote: 
I do not believe that pioneering is the monopoly of the select 
few, a special privilege of a spiritual arist
great believer in the common folk, all Israel and every one in 
Israel, and if the seed of pioneering is sown in all army units, 
we shall be privileged to witness a blessed harvest. There is 
no need or justification for the Setting apart OU 
of certain brigades as pioneering brig\d_rf or to consider all 
other brigades as non-pioneering ones. 
In an effort to remove the issue from Ben Gurion's legal 
authority, MAPAM demanded that the issue be decided by the His tadru t' s 
general council, the supreme ruling body of Labor Zionism. MAPAM was 
better represented in the Histadrut than in the Provisional Government. 
In early October, before the Histadrut's general assembly, Ben Gurion 
insisted that the army's character was a "national" issue, not a "class" 
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issue. The re pre sen ta ti ve na tiona 1 government must command u 1 tima te 
authority over the Army and, therefore, an issue of the Army's structure 
should not be decided within the Labor Movement. And Ben Gurion refused 
to accept "any barrier or organizational distinction between one Jew and 
another ••• in the army." 114 As Ben Gurion wrote privately to a friend, 
"if one party main ta ins a private army, all the parties will organize 
private armies of their own ••• " ll
5 
The battle over the Palmach, in the autumn of 1948, represented a 
contest between the two largest parties in Israel and in the Zionist 
Labor Movement, debating the character of the Army and the State at 
large. In late October, Ben Gurion, MAPAI, and their coalition allies 
were vie torious. 65% of Histadrut's assembly voted against a MAPAM 
resolution to preserve the Palmach Command. The Labor Movement had 
expressed a mandate that the army must be unified, under the ultimate 
command of the representative, national government. 
By late October, action was finally taken to disband the Palmach 
and evacuate Pa lmach Headquarters. On November 7, the Pa lmach Command 
issued its fina 1 order to disband. Except for the Palma ch Welfare 
Office, which aided bereaved families and wounded soldiers, the Palmach 
Headquarters closed forever. Though the MAPAM-MAPAI debates continued, 
structurally, the IDF's command was finally unified. 
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In mid-October, Israel's at ten ti on turned away from the 
MAPAI-MAPAM struggle over the Pa lmach, as the truce collapsed and the 
fighting resumed. The IDF, numbering over 80,000 effectives, launched a 
series of major offensives. In November, the IDF pushed the Syrians out 
of Galilee. In December, Allon, transferred to command the southern 
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front, and his troops drove the Egyptians from the Negev. By end of 
December, Allon broke into the Sinai and captured El Arish, resulting in 
an armistice with Egypt, negotiated in January, 1949, and signed in 
February. In early March, the IDF captured the southwest shores of the 
Dead Sea and secured the eastern Negev. Though s ti 11 poorly equipped, 
the IDF was the strongest army in the region. The dramatic IDF 
victories led to armistices with Lebanon in March, Jordan in April, and 
with Syria in June. The war of 1948-49, the "War of Independence," was 
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over. 
Throughout 1948, "the Israeli Army was made in a.ction." 118 As 
Ben Gurion recalled, "due to the matters of war and the declaration of 
independence, no final decision concerning the organization of the IDF 
took place in the meetings of 119 the Provisiona 1 Government." But 
during 1949-1950, Ben Gurion, backed with a strong, political mandate, 
engineered the basic blueprint for the IDF's democratic civil-military 
posture, based on the model which he had pursued for years. 
In January, 1949, as the IDF's victories brought the War of 
Independence to a close, the State of Israel held its first elections. 
Riding on the crest of his role as traditional leader of the Yishuv, as 
the leader who had unified the disparate Zionist groups, and as the 
victorious Commander-in-Chief of the IDF, Ben Gurion and MAPAI won a 
solid victory at the polls. Out of a vast array of prospective 
political parties, MAPAI captured 46% of the vote. MAPAM placed second, 
capturing 19%, while Begin's Herut mustered 11.3%, and Yellin-Mor's 
Fighters' Party grasped about 1%. Ben Gurion's election triumph 
consolidated his twin position as both civilian and military leader, as 
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Prime Minister and Defense Minister, placing him at the head of the "War 
Cabinet," composed of the Chiefs of Staff and the "Defense and Foreign 
Policy Committee" of the Israeli Knesset (Assembly). 
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With the conclusion of the war, in the spring and summer of 1949, 
began heated debates over the shape of the new Army. The Cabinet and 
the Knesset at large debated new issues, such as the national defense 
budget and the required service of religious persons and women. Yet the 
hottest debate was the continuing Ben Gurion-MAPAM struggle over the 
Army's general character, the final contest over the "Professional" 
verses "Pioneer-Soldier" traditions. 
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Having failed to see the new Israeli society emerge along the 
lines of the leftist kibbutzim and still shocked by the dissolution of 
Palmach, MAPAM reasserted their familiar arguments in a final attempt to 
place the Palmach stamp on the developing structure of the IDF. The 
MAPAM format for the IDF opposed conventional conscription, conventional 
military discipline, and centralized authority. MAPAM advocated a 
"People's Army," along lines of the Republican armi·es of the early 
Spanish Civil War. MAPAM envisioned an elitist corps of politically 
schooled and highly motivated you th in localized, mo bi le uni ts. The 
Palmach's organization and discipline had been associated with group 
consciousness, the individual soldier, and the volunteer spirit. 
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In the new Army, MAPAM acknowledged the need for some degree of formal 
discipline, but insisted that "internal discipline" was equally as 
important. Allon remarked that: 
The education for discipline should be oriented to the 
activation of consciousness ••• the more a fighter will identify 
with the mission of the army as a whole and the task of his unit 
in particular, the stronger and more sincere his discipline will 
be ••• the importance of 
dismissed , bpfJ woe to 
exclusively. 
the formal framework should 




Most importantly, MAPAM advocated that the Army's morale could best be 
maintained by wedding military training with agricu 1 tural schooling, to 
product loca 1 military bodies of Pioneer-Soldiers. In short, MAPAM 
wished to see the IDF organized as had been the already legendary 
Palmach. 
Yet Ben Gurion maintained his determination to establish a 
professional-styled army. Ben Gurion rejected territorial defenses 
based on settlements and local popular militias infused with doctrinare 
Socialist and elitist ideals. Ben Gurion wanted an army infused with a 
strictly na tiona 1, apo li ti ca 1 consciousness. Party politics and 
doctrine had no place in a national army. The security of the state 
should not be restricted to a party elite. Ben Gurion wanted a "nation 
in arms" and not a "class in arms." 
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Security decisions were the 
responsibility of the elected government and the electorate. Ben Gurion 
pointed to the great mission of unification which lay ahead as 
immigrants from Europe, Asia and Africa began arriving. Universal 
conscription offered a powerful tool for national unification. Ben 
Gurion prophesied: 
The primary function of the IDF has been to safeguard the 
State. However, this is not its so le function. The Army must 
serve ••• to educate a pioneering generation, healthy in body and 
spirit, courageous and loyal, which will unite the broken tribes 
and the diasporas, to prepare itf~,5-f to fulfill the historical 
tasks of the State of Israel ••• 
In addition, Ben Gurion insisted that voluntarism was obsolete 
because of Israel's numerical inferiority and the skill requirements of 
modern weaponry. Ben Gurion wanted a regular army, open for all to 
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enlist, with a pay scale, ranks, military police, a small professional 
officers corps, and a large reserve. An army modelled specifically upon 
the British Army, in which many Israelis, including Ben Gurion himself, 
had served. 
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Ben Gurion's program for a Professional Army was 
backed by such military figures as Avigur, Dori, and Ya din. But more 
importantly, after leading the nation through war, dissolving the 
undergrounds, and winning in Israel's first elections, Ben Gurion 
possessed the prestige, popularity, and political clout to mold the 
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Israeli Army in his image. 
The debates culminated in September, 1949, when the Knesset 
enacted the "Defense Service Law," representing the legal blueprint for 
the IDF. The Defense Service Law specified that-- with the notable 
exceptions of non-Jewish citizens, married women and mothers, and 
rabbinical students-- all Israeli men and women, ages 18-29, were 
eligible for conscription. Universal conscription, Ben Gurion told 
Knesset, was designed "to prepare the entire people for defense, to give 
the youth, Israeli born and immigrant, pioneering and military training, 
to maintain a permanently mobilized force adequate to withstand a 
surprise attack and hold out until the reserves were mobilized." A 
soldier's two years (later changed to three) of basic service would be 
followed by a reserve obligation until age 49, a reserve system modelled 
after the Swiss system. The Defense Service Law also specified the 
integration of civilian transportation, hospitals, communications, and 
construction into the military infrastructure, emphasizing the dual 
. . 1 i l" 1 I 1 ld . d d b II • • " 128 civi -m itary ro e. srae wou in ee e a nation in arms. 
As a small concession to MAPAM, dissatisfied with the low military 
2~0 
priority given to settlements, the Defense Service Law's article 'F' 
read, "after completion of basic military training, twelve months of the 
recruit's active tour of duty will be devoted to agricultural 
ins true ti on." 129 l 'F' Artie e was designed to boost "Noar HaLutzi 
LoHemet," (Fighting-Pioneer Youth) or NAHAL battalions, inaugurated by 
Ben Gurion in November 1948 to symbolically replace the Palmach. Yet 
article 'F' was harshly criticized by middle-class and right-wing 
parties, as unnecessary training which would reduce combat readiness and 
professional competence. Never applied in Naval, Air Fore~ and special 
commando units, Provision 'F' quickly became a dead letter. By December 
1949, Ben Gurion obtained power to eliminate it. Though NAHAL remained 
as a service option, as technical requirements in army advanced and army 
grew with Israel's general population explosion, territorial defense 
based on small settlements soon became a "romantic anachronism." 130 
The Defense service law-- followed soon thereafter by Veteran's 
Service Bill and the Military Jurisdiction Bill-- provided Ben Gurion 
and Yadin, who formally replaced Dori as Chief of Staff in November of 
1948, with the legal authority to construct a unified service--
incorporating Naval, AirForce, and ground branches under the same 
General Staff, eliminating any in-service rivalry. Perhaps more 
importantly, Ben Gurion and Yadin legalized their composition of a 
small, unified, professiona 1 Officer Corps, banding poli tica 1 cliches 
and establishing a merit system for determining appointments, 
promotions, and pay. 
Ben Gurion and Yadin struggled in immediate post-war years to 
enforce discipline, against the volunteer spirit and egalitarian 
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individualistic grain of Yishuv, which "usually implied social 
consciousness usually associated with ideological belief and party 
affiliation." 131 Some Israelis equated discipline and hierarchy with 
militarism. As Ben Gurion explained: 
I remember very well the fears expressed by a few members of 
the opposition parties ••• having in mind perhaps the armies of 
the die ta torial regimes in the countries from which they came; 
some Knesset members took exception to the idea of a regular 
army, even as a nucleus of the IDF, fe~3~ng that it would become 
careerist, reactionary, and fascist. 
In the Hagana, there was no military discipline and discipline 
is not acquired on the day a private joins the army. Discipline 
demands tradition, example, law, and order. The members of the 
Hagana were volunteers, serving a few hours a week or a month, 
but it is impossible to have an army without discipline, as it 
is impossible to have a state without a government and laws. 133 
In particular, MAPAM decried the professionaliza tion of IDF officers, 
fearing career cadres would form "barracks elite." Ironically, that was 
just what Ben Gurion feared from the ex-Palmach officers. 
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Ben Gurion feared the Communist influence on officers with MAP AM 
connections and wanted to establish an Officer Corps which projected 
democratic ideals, strictly national loyalty, and formal discipline--
not the collectivist principles, elitism, and partisan loyalties. To 
that end, Ben Gurion and Yadin wage a campaign to retire ex-Palmach, or 
MAPAM associated, officers throughout 1949-1950. 
As the war ended, six of twelve field commanders, two of four 
front commanders, twenty of forty-five colonels, and 40% of all 
lieutenant-colonels and majors were Palmach veterans who held positions 
in the IDF. Yet the Palmach' s three brigades-- Hare li, Yi tfah and 
Hanegar-- were the first to be demobilized and then totally disband. 
Ben Gurion discouraged ex-Pa lmach men from remaining in IDF. Many 
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Palmach veterans-- as well as LHI and IZL veterans-- found the IDF's 
avenues of promotion closed to them. Those MAPAMniks who remained as 
senior officers in the IDF were most often restricted to staff and 
training functions and were rarely given operational commands. 
MAPAMnik officers resigned in frustration or in protest. 
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Throughout 1949-1950, Ben Gurion and Yadin retired most ex-Palmach 
officers and filled the higher echelons with British-trained officers 
like Makleff, or with "politically reliable" MAPAiniks like Assaf 
Simshoni, Moshe Netzer, and Dayan, or with Hagana "old hands" like Chaim 
Laskov. 
The most controversial act of Ben Gurion's "witch-hunt" on Palmach 
veterans occurred in spring of 1949. Ben Gurion claimed Allon, the 
former Palmach supreme commander, had disobeyed his orders by making a 
disputed penetration into the Sinai· desert of Egypt. Allon, supported 
by most of the General Staff, argued that his penetration had been for 
sound, national security reasons. MAPAM protested, but Ben Gurion 
replaced Allon in southern command with Dayan, emerging as one of Ben 
Gurion's proteges'. The southern commanders, the majority being 
MAPAMniks, protested the ouster of their chief, but they cooperated with 
Dayan in the transition, with no acts of dissidence or even of overt 
dissidence towards the government, preventing a potential crisis. 
Some Palmach veterans stayed in the IDF, like Rabin, Chaim Bar 
Lev, David Elazeer, Amos Horev, and Uzi Narciss. Yet Allon's departure 
triggered the exodus of a considerable number of experienced officers 
from the IDF. In 1949, the IDF lost the services of such Palmach 
veterans as Shimon Avidan, Shmuel Cohen, Nahum Golan, Natan Sarig, 
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Yossef Tabenkin, and Sadeh. Ben Gurion made no effort to persuade them 
to stay. 136 
In the itmnediate post-war years, Colonel Makleff, another Ben 
Gurion protege"', noted: 
The bulk of those who resigned were the ones who had political 
aspirations. The lower echelons of the Palmach officers, who 
were able to contribute to forming the young army, for the most 
part remained • Had senior commanders remained in the IDF, we 
would have been compelled to waste another two years in disputes 
over organization. Thus, matters were decided far quicker, a~~7 we didn't have to waste valuable time on sterile discussion. 
The exodus of Palmach officers-- and the exclusion of LHI and IZL 
commanders-- from the IDF Officer Corps created temporary mediocrity, 
yet, in the long term, expedited the process of depoliticalization. The 
IDF lost much valuable military experience, but the censorship of 
Palmach, LHI, and IZL military leadership dampened the internal 
controversy over the organization and the character of the new Army. 
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From May 1948 through 1950, the new State of Israel struggled in a 
war of national survival while Ben Gurion struggled to dissolve the 
underground organizations-- their mentality, structure·s, policies, and 
military traditions. In the spring of 1948, Ben Gurion skillfully 
eliminated the confused chain-of-command in the Hagana-Palmach 
structure, placing himself in the twin role· as both political and 
military leader of Israel. In the early summer, the LHI dissolved and 
the IZL was destroyed, in a showdown with the new "Israeli Defense 
Force," in an incident called the Al ta lena Affair. The LHI and the IZL 
continued to fight on in Jerusalem, inspired by poli ti ca 1 differences 
with the Provisiona 1 Government and the uncertain future of Jerusalem. 
But Ben Gurion used the pressure of the burgeoning IDF to totally 
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disband the dissident organizations in the late summer. After disposing 
of the LHI and the IZL, Ben Gurion mustered the political clout to 
disband the last vestige of the underground days, the Pa lmach. As the 
War of Independence ended in early 1949, Ben Gurion gained the political 
mandate to shape the new Army in his own image. In immediate post-war 
period, Ben Gurion engineered the IDF in to a united and professional 
army, under the ultimate command of the civilian government, which he 
had championed for so long. By 1950, the IDF and Israel had implanted 
the seeds of a "democratic civil-military tradition." 
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Of every tribe, a thousand throughout all the tribes of Israel, 
ye shall send to war. (Numbers 31:5) 
The IDF of 1950 is essentially the IDF of today. Over the last 
thirty-six years, the IDF"'s size, operational structure, arsenal, and 
level of military so phis tica tion has changed. Yet the basic principle 
of a unified, professional, and apolitical army, under the ultimate 
command of the civilian government, has only further entrenched itself 
into Israeli society since the IDF"'s inception. 
The legacy of the competing Zionist undergrounds-- particularly 
some characteristics of the Palmach-- can still be traced to a few 
specific qualities within the IDF: its high proportion of officers to 
rank-and-file; its emphasis on officers leading their men into battle; 
and its encouragement of individual or unit initiative on the 
battlefield. As it was in the Hagana-Palmach, kibbutzniks continue to 
supply the IDF with a disproportionately high number of elite troops. 
Yet the human and political energy of the former political-military 
bodies has been funnelled into Israel's democratic political forum and 
has never interfered with the unity of the IDF, nor the IDF"'s basic 
command structure. After years of political-military factionalism, the 
unification process of 1948-1950 has proved phenomenally successful. 1 
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The descendants of the rival political-military factions of 
pre-state Zionist history have all made gradual moves towards Israel's 
poli tica 1 center. Ben Gurion continued at the helm of the dominant 
MAPAI party until 1963, except for fifteen months between 1953-1955. He 
and his cabinets continued to shape the IDF Officer Corps with 
MAPAiniks-- like Makleff, Laskov, and Dayan, who all served as Chiefs of 
Staff under Ben Gurion. Even after Ben Gurion, MAP AI, or a 
MAPAI-related alignment, continued to win at the polls, dominate the 
Israeli government, and serve as the final arbitrator in military 
matters until 1977. 
The Kibbutz Movement, the far leftist ideology, and the MAPAM 
party suffered a gradual loss of political influence and popularity in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In late 1960s, MAPAM""s moderate factions, Achdut 
HaAvoda and Rafi, split off from the Communists and eventually joined 
MAPAI, forming today's Labor Alignment. This shift towards the 
Left-of-Center corresponded with the return of Palmach veterans-- like 
Galili and Allon-- into the Israeli political spotlight; and the rise of 
Palmach veterans-- like Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, and David Elazer-- to the 
positions of Chief of Staff and Defense Minister. The once bitter 
MAP AM-MAP AI, Ben Gurion-Pa lmach, struggles over 
programs dissolved into reconciliation and unity. 
political and military 
2 
Likewise, the bitter Left-Right, Hagana-IZL, struggles have been 
moderated and institutionalized by Israeli democracy. Yell in-Mor' s 
Fighter's party quickly dissolved. But Begin and the Herut party, with 
their free-enterprise and "Greater Israel" program, spent years in the 
role of opposition in the Knesset. Yet, time and Herut""s merger with 
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various other middle-class parties moderated their program, earned them 
increasing re spec ta bi li ty, and moved them into the political 
Right-of-Center. 
In 1967, Begin's Gahal coalition joined MAPAI in a National Unity 
Government. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the issue of the occupied 
territories taken in the 1967 War, the shock of the 1973 War, and the 
growing political clout of Israel's oriental Jews vaulted Begin's Likud 
coalition on to a power base roughly eq ua 1 to that of Labor, and, 
finally, into the government in 1977. During Likud's rule, non-Laborite 
military leaders-- like Ezier Weizmann, Ariel Sharon, Raphael Eytan, and 
Moshe Ariens -- gained the top military spots in the General Staff and 
in the Defense Ministry. The political descendants of the Jabotinsky 
Right and the Socialist-Zionist Left have have emerged as the two 
largest, most powerful Israeli parties and 
determining the IDF High Command's leadership. 
the most inf luen tia 1 
3 
in 
The IDF High Command's leadership is not divorced from politics 
because it reflects the policies of the legally elected·government. The 
IDF's higher echelons have been shaped in response to the political 
character of Israel's elected government, yet the IDF's higher echelons 
have never influenced the civilian government's character. 
And the IDF' s middle and lower echelons remain s tr ic tly 
professional and apolitical. Promotions and selection for particular 
units are made for reason of merit, and matters of manpower and resource 
distribution are made for reasons of efficiency and national defense. 
The soldiers' training is based on developing competence and na tiona 1 
loyalty. And with most Israeli adults serving in the IDF, no political 
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orientation comes to prevail, no party patronage occurs, even within 
specific Army units. Like Israel's democratic political system, the IDF 
rank-and-file represents the Israeli society at large. The IDF has 
emerged as Ben Gurion prophesied, as the great unifying, nationalizing, 
and democratizing factor in Israeli society. 
4 
After five major wars and countless smaller engagements, the 
relationship of Israel's civilian government and the IDF has not been 
without conflict and controversy: the Lavon Affair in the mid-1950s, 
underscoring the tensions be tween the powers of the Prime Minister and 
the Defense Minister; the conflicts between the General Staff and the 
Air ~e in the 1950s; the IDF's closUreof Bedouin lands in 1972; the 
reports of negligence following the 1973 War; or the 1982 scandal 
involving the massacres of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which pitted 
a judicial committee against the Defense Minister and his Chie~ of 
staff. Time has proved that the IDF is not sacrosanct from public 
scrutiny, nor governmental castigation. 5 
Though military heroes have flooded into the Israeli political 
marketplace, assuming greater public and symbolic roles, Israel 
possesses specific laws forbidding senior officers from holding 
political office and military commands simultaneously. No general has 
ever tried "Bonapartism," to stage a private revolution, to bully the 
civilian government, or perform a coup d'etat. Israel has specific laws 
forbidding paramilitary undergrounds or terrorist groups. The essential 
civilian-Military equilibrium is maintained -- the civilian government 
governs the nation and commands the army, while the Army remains the 
"instrument" of the elected government. The Prime Minister, the Defense 
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Minister, and the cabinet make the ultimate decisions on matters of 
military management, national security, and war. 
Given Israel's tumultuous political and cultural environment, the 
danger of Israel evolving into a "Barracks State," a 
militaristic-authoritarian society exists, but that possibility still 
appears remote. Israel-s democratic civil-military tradition persists, 
ever since the great unification of the IDF in 1948-1950. 
6 
Why did the unification of the IDF succeed? Certainly the 
Yishuv-Israeli society before 1950 represented a highly literate and 
relatively homogeneous one, with common European roots; yet the diverse, 
and usually antagonistic, political differences somewhat negate this 
factor. Certainly the Yishuv was --as Israel continues to be-- united 
under the weight of common enemies: the Nazis, the British, or the Arab 
world. Yet the presence of external enemies did not wholly prevent the 
development of serious internal, political, and -- as in such cases as 
the Season and the Altalena Affair-- military clashes. 
More crucial is the fact that each rival political-military group 
possessed a strong .democratic and nationalist element within their 
ideologies. The WZO-Jewish Agency was clearly democratic in character 
and the Hagana-Palmach ultimately took orders from these official 
political bodies. Jabotinsky's NZO, and even the IZL and the LHI, were 
political organizations first and military bodies second. Their leaders 
--such as Raziel, Stern, Begin, and Yellin-Mor-- gained their positions 
of power through their organizations' elections. Neither could be 
accurately described as Fascist or strictly authoritarian in structure. 
Their essentially democratic backgrounds allowed for a smoother 
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transition into Israeli democracy. 
Likewise, the rival undergrounds all possessed a Jewish 
nationalist dream which superseded their partisan political interests at 
crucial times. The LHI did dissolve in 1948 without resorting to 
fratricidal violence. Begin in particular played a major role in 
preventing civil war-- exemplified both during the Season and the 
Altalena Affair. And the Palmach-MAPAM troops remained loyal to nation 
despite their political struggles with Ben Gurion and the demise of the 
"Pioneer-Soldier" tradition. The nationalist and democratic 
commonalities of the rival groups resulted in a phenomenal absence of 
"major" military clashes. The successful realization of the nationalist 
dream and a democratic Israeli political system galvanized the IDF. The 
different groups did, and still do, serve in the IDF, while their 
leaders shout out their differences in the Knesset instead of 
"shooting-it-out." 
7 
The IDF's unification also succeeded because a strong political 
center did indeed develop. Ben Gurion and MAPA I did represent the 
Yishuv-Israeli majority, which possessed the foresight to constantly 
push for the development of a formidable army, organized with universal 
conscription and along professional lines. In addition, the Yishuv' s 
involvement with the British and in the World Wars provided the basis 
for a "Professional Soldier" tradition. 
Most importantly, the unification of the IDF was a product of Ben 
Gurion's skillful, bold, stubborn, timely, and astute political 
leadership: his patient development of the IDF until it could force the 
disbandment of the LHI and the IZL; or his gradual political assault on 
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the National Command, on the underground traditions, and on the Pa lmach 
and the MAP AM military program. Much of the credit for the successful 
unification of the IDF and the establishment of a democratic 
civilian-military tradition -- and therefore, for the success of the 
Zionist revolution itself-- must go to Ben Gurion. 8 
Until recently, Jewish undergrounds, Jewish "dissidents," appeared 
to be a relic out of Israel's bloody past. Yet in the spring of 1984, 
Israel witnessed the discovery of a most dangerous and disturbing 
development. Israel's internal security force, "Shin Bet," infiltrated 
and uncovered the existence of a new Jewish underground. This 
underground represents a new type in Zionist history-- ultra-orthodox 
zealots associated with the Gush Emunim Movement, which has spearheaded 
the drive for Jewish settlement on the West Bank. Israeli agents 
arrested 27 men on terrorist charges. The list included a rabbi, 
rabbinical students, some reserve paratroopers, and tank commanders. 
IDF military courts began hol_ding military trials for those IDF officers 
who were implicated. This new underground has been 'connected to the 
1980 bomb attacks on Arab mayors, the 1983 assault on Arabs students at 
Hebron Islamic College, the attempt to plant explosives in the Dome of 
the Rock (Al Aqsa) mosque, and the recently foiled plot to blow up Arab 
buses at rush hour. The motto of these new terrorists appears to !:e"an 
eye-for-an-eye," in retaliation for Arab violence against Jews. 9 
Just how extensive this new underground truly is, and what the 
repiercussions of its existence will be, remains to be seen. Yet the 
discovery of the new underground has profoundly disturbed Israeli 
society. Most of the major parties and press have loudly condemned the 
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new terrorists-- for the development of a new paramilitary organization 
pre sen ts a direct challenge to the ultimate sovereignty of the Israeli 
government and the unity of the IDF. The new terrorists strike at the 
heart of Israel's "democratic civil-military tradition," forged in the 
hot fires of Zionist history. 
NOTES VII 
1 Michael Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 
1973)' pp. 13-15. 
2 Rothenberg, p. 75; and Sacher, p. 478; and Duni Zamir, 
"Generals in Politics" Jerusalem Quarterly Vol.20 (1981), pp. 26-34. 
3 Shimshoni, p. 432; and Bell, pp. 348-353; Zamir, pp. 17-20; 
and Haber, p. 255; and Kimche, p. 137. 
4 Zamir, p. 34; and Perlman, p. 150; and Shimshoni, p. 186; and 
Perlmutter, p. 66; and Horowitz and Lissak, p. 191. 
5 Shimshoni, pp. 187, 219. 
6 Shimshoni, pp. 156-161, 177-180, 219; and Avi Hai, p. 124; and 
Perlman, p. 177; and Gonen, p. 59. 
7 Allon, p. 44; and Horowitz and Lissak, pp. 23, 132-171; and 
Shimshoni, pp. 7-8. 
8 Avi Hai, pp. 275-276; and Perlmutter, p. 54; and Handel, p. 
11. 
9 James Kelly, "What Next for Israel?" Time (July 9, 1984). 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allon, Yigael. The Making of Israel's Army. New York: Universe Books, 
1970. 
Avi-Hai, Avraham. Ben Gurion: State Builder. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Books, 1974. 
Bar-Zohar, Michael. Ben Gurion-The Armed Prophet. Englewood Cliffs: 
A:rthur Barker Limited, 196T. 
Bauer, Yehuda. From Diplomacy to Resistance. Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publishing Society, 1970. 
Begin, Menachem. The Revolt. Tel Aviv: Hadar Publishing Company, 1964. 
Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror Out of Zion. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1977. 
Ben-Ami, Yitsaq. Years of Wrath; Days of Glory. New York: Robert 
Speller & Sons, 1982. 
Ben Gurion, David. Israel: A Personal History. New York: Funk & 
Wagnalls, Inc., 1971. 
Bethell, Nicholas. The Palestine Triangle. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 
1979. 
Brenner, Y.S. "The Stern Gang." Middle Eastern Studies, (1965). 
Cohen, Michael J. "The Moyne Assasination." Middle Eastern Studies 
(1979), pp. 358-373. 
Cohen, Michael J. Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-1948. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
244 
Frankel, William. Israel Observed. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1980. 
Gonen, Jay Y. A Psychohistory of Zionism New York: Manson/ Charter, 
1975. 
Haber, Eitan. Menahem Begin. New York: Delacorte Press, 1978. 
Handel, Michael. Israel's Political-Military Doctrine. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1973. 
Horowitz, Dan, and Moshe Lissak. The Origins of the Israeli Polity, 
Israel under the Mandate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978. 
Katz, Samuel. Days of Fire. Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc., 
1968. 
Kelly, James. "What Next for Israel?" Time, (July 9, 1984) pp. 32-33. 
Kimche, Jon. Seven Fallen Pillars. London: Secker and Warburg, 1950. 
Korbonski, Stefan. "The Unknown Chapter in the Life of Menachem Begin." 
East European Quarterly, Vol. 3 (1979), pp. 373-379. 
Kurzman, Dan. Genesis 1948. Cleveland: New American Library Inc., 1970. 
Laqueur, Walter. A History of Zion. New York: Schocken Books, 1976. 
Lorch, Netanel. The Edge of the Sword. New York: Putman & Company, 
1961. 
Luttwark, Edward, and Dan Horowitz. The Israeli Army. London: Cox & 
Wagman Ltd., 1975. 
Mardor, Munya. Haganah. New York: New American Library, 1966. 
Merhav, Peretz. The Israeli Left. London: A.S. Barnes & Company Inc., 
1980. 
Perlman, Moshe. The Army of Israel. New York: Philosophical Library, 
1950. 
245 
Perlman, Moshe. Ben Gurion Looks Back. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1965. 
Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel: Nation Building and 
Expansion, Vol. I. London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1969. 
Perlmutter, Amos. Military and Politics in Israel: 1967-1977, Vol. II. 
London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1978. 
Preuss, Walter. The Labor Movement in Israel. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 
1965. 
Rothenberg, Gunther E. The Anatomy of the Israeli Army. New York: 
Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1979. 
Sacher, Harry. Israel: The Establishment of the State. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1952. 
Sacher, Howard M. A History of Israel. New York: Knopf, Inc., 1979. 
Schechtman, Joseph B. Fighter and Prophet: The Vadimir Jabotinsky Story, 
The Last Years. New York: A.S. Barnes & Company Inc., 1961. 
Schiff, Zeev. History of the Israeli Army. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1974. 
Shimshoni, Daniel. Israeli Democracy. London: Collier MacMillan 
Publishers, 1982. 
Zamir, Duni. "Generals in Politics." Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 20 
(1981), pp. 17-35. 
